•SJ '^ k "^ -2 1^ s 1" •S 1 "< r\ •M >< S ^ l-H e '^ •s > CO ►« W 5^ ^ S, ^ o scs^i^^l^ mtmttuam ^j-XjYr-iM ' '^r^AxZ--^^-^:^ SC4 we difcover the moil obvious and re- markable circumftances of his nature, that he is a compound of body and fpirit. I take this for granted here, becaufe we are only explaining the nature of man. When we come to hi^ fentiments and principles of a£lion, it will be more proper to take notice of the fpirituality and immortality of the foul, and how they.are proved. The body and fpirit have a great reciprocal in- fluence one upon another j the body on the temper and difpoiition of the foul, and the foul on the ftate and habit of the body. The body is properly the miniller of tjie foul, the means of conveying per- ception to it, but nothing without it. It is needlefs to enlarge on the ftruflure of the body ; this is fullicicntly known to all, except we Le£l. 2. MORAL PHILOSOPHr. If defcend to anatomical exadnefs, and then, like all the other parts of nature, it fhews the infinite wif- dom of the Creator. With regard to morals, the influence of the body in a certain view maj be very great in enflaving men to appetite, and yet there does not feem any fuch conneclion with morals as to require a particular defcription. I think there is little reafon to doubt that there are great and eflen- tial diflferences between man and man, as to the fpirit and its proper powers ; but it feems plain^ that fuch are the laws of union between the body and fpirit, that many faculties are weakened, and fome rendered altogether incapable of exercife, merely by an alteration of the ftate of the body. Memory is frequently loft and judgement weakened by old age and difeafe. Sometimes, by a confu- iion of the brain in a fall, the judgement is whol- ly difordered. The inllindtive appetites of hunger and thirft, feem to refide direftly in the body, and the foul to have little more than a paflive percep- tion. Some pallions, particularly fear and rage, feem alfo to have their feat in the body, immediate- ly producing a certain modification of the blood and fpiriis. This indeed is perhaps the cafe in fome degree with all pafTions whenever they are indulged ; they give a modification to the blood and fpirits, which make them eafily rekindled ; but there are none which do fo inilantaneoufly arife from the body, and prevent deliberation, will, and choice, as thefe now named. To coniider the evil paflions to which we are liable, we may fay, thofe that de- pend moll upon the body, are fear, anger, volup- l8 LECTURES ON Led. 2. tuoufnefs ; and thofe that depend leall upon it, arc ambition, envy, covetoufnefs. The faculties of the mind are commonly divided into thefe three kinds, the underftanding, the will, and the affeftions ; though perhaps it is proper to obferve, that thefe are not three qualities wholly diftind, as if they were three different beings, but different ways of exerting the fame fimple prin- ciple. It is the foul or mind that underflands, wills, or is affecled with pieafure and pain. The underftanding feems to have truth for its objeft, the difcovering things as they really are in themfelves, and in their relations one to another. It has been difputed, whether good may be in any decree the objeft of the underftanding. On the one hand, it feems as if truth, and that only, belonged to the un- derftanding; becaufe we can eafily fuppofe perfons of equal intelledtual powers and oppofite moral charac-^ ters. Nay, we can fuppofe malignity joined to a high degree of underftanding, and virtue, or true goodnefs, to a much lower. On the other hand, the choice made by the will feems to have the judgment, or deliberation of the underftanding, as its very foundation. How can this be, it will be faid, if the underftanding has nothing to do with good or evil ? A confiderable oppofttion of fentiments a- mong phiiofophers has arifen from this quefticn. Dr Clark, and fome others, make underftanding or reafon the immedilate principle of virtue. Shaftf- bury, Hutchinfon, and others, make affeftion the principle of it. Perhaps neither the one nor th^ other is wholly right. Probably both are ,41c- celTary. Lect. 2. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I^ The conneclion between truth and goodnefs, be- tween the under (landing and the heart, is a fubjeft of great moment, but alfo of great difficulty. I think we may fay with certainty, that infinite per- fection, intellectual and mortil, are united and infe- parable in the Supreme Being. There is not, how- ever, in inferior natures, an exa£t proportion be- tween the one and the other ; yet I apprehend, that truth naturally and neceffarily promotes goodnefs, and falfehood the contrary ; but as the influence is reciprocal, malignity of difpofition, even with the greatefl natural powers, blinds the underilanding, ^d prevents the perception of truth itfelf. Of the will it is ufual to enumerate four a£ls ; defire, averfion, joy, and forrow. The two lafl, Hutchinfon fays, are fuperfluous, in which he feen^s to be right. All the a£ls of the will may be re- duced to the two great heads of defire and averfion, or, in other words, chufing and refufing. • The afFe(Elions are called alfo palTions, becaufe often excited by external objects. In as far as they differ from a calm deliberate decifion of the judgement, or determination of the will, they may be called flrong propenfities implanted in our na- ture, which of themfelves contribute not a little to bias the judgement, or incline the will. The afiedtions cannot be better underftood than by obferving the difference between a calm, deli- berate, general inclination, whether of the felfifh or benevolent kind, and particular violent inclinations* Every man deliberately wifhes his own happinefs ; but this differs confiderably from a pafTionate at- tachmcr^t to particular gratifications, as a love of 20 LECTURES oil Led. 2. riches, honours, pleafures. A good man will have a deliberate fixed defire of the welfare of mankind ; but this diflfers from the love of children, relations, friends, country. The paflions are viry numerous, and may be greatly diverliiied, becaufe every thing, however modified, that is the objed of defire or averfion, may grow by accident or indulgence, to fuch a fize, as to be called, and defei*ve to be called, a pafiion. Accordingly we exprefs ourfelves thus in the Eng- lifh language : A pafiion for horfes, dogs, play, &c. However, all the pafiions may be ranged under the two great heads of love and hatred. To the firfl belong efieem, admiration, good-will, and every fpecies of approbation, delight, and defire ; to the other, all kinds of averfion, and ways of exprefling it, envy, malice y rage, revenge, to whatever objeds they may be directed. Hope and fear, joy and forrow, though frequent- ly ranked among the pafiions, feem rather to be ftates Or modifications of the mind, attending the exercife of every pafiion, according as its object is probable or improbable, pofle fifed or lofl:. Jealoufy feems to be a pafiiion of a middle nature, which it is not eafy to fay whether it fiiould be ranked under the head of love or hatred. It is often faid of jealoufy between the fexes, that it fprings from love ; yet, it feems plainly impofiible that it can have place without forming an ill opinion of its obje£l, at leafi: in fome degree. The fame thing jnay be faid of jealoufy and fufpicion in frlendfiiip. The paflions may [be ranged in two clafles in a dif- ferent way, viz. as they are felfifli or benevolent, Le£l. 2. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 public or private. There will be great occafion to confider this diftin£l:ion afterwards, in explaining the nature of virtue, and the motives that lead to it. What is obferved now, is only to illuflrate our na- ture as it really is. There is a great and real dif- tinftion between paffions, felfifti and benevolent. The firfl point diredly, and immediately at our own intereft in the gratification; the others point imme- diately at the happinefs of others. Of the firfl kind, is the love of fame, power, property, pleafure. And of the fecond, is family and domeftic aff*e6lion, friendfhip, and patriotifm. It is to no purpofe to fay, thaft ultimately it is to pleafe ourfelves, or be- caufe we feel a fatisfa6lion in feeking the good of others ; for it is certain, that the direft obje6l in view, in many cafes, is to promote the happinefs of others ; and for this many have been willing to fa- crifice every thing, even life itfelf. After this brief furvey of human nature, in one light, or in one point of view, which may be called its capacity, it w^ill be neceffary to return back, and take a furvey of the way in which we become ac- quainted with the objedls about which we are to be converfant, or upon which the above faculties are to be exercifed. On this it is proper to obfer^^e in general, that there are but two ways in which we come to the knowledge of things, viz. ift, Senfation, 2d, Re- ilecbion. The firfl of thefe mufl be divided again into two parts, external and internal. External arifes from the immediate impreflion of obje£ls from without. The external fenfes, in num- VoL. VII. C 12 LECTURES ON" Le£i:. # ber, are five ; feeing, hearing, feeling, tailing, and fmelling. In thefe are obferrable the impreflion itfelf, or the fenfation we feel, and the fuppofition infepa- rable from it, that it is produced by an external ob- jeft. That our fenfes are to be trufled in the in- formation they give us, feems to me a firft principle, becaufe they are the foundation of all our after rea- fonings. The few exceptions of accidental irre- gularity in the fenfes, can found no jufl objedion to this, as there are fo many plain and obvious ways of difcovering and correfting it. The reality of the material fyftem, I think, may be eafily eilabliflied, except upon fuch principles as are fubverlive of all certainty, and lead to univerfal fcepticifm ; and perfons who would maintain fuch principles, do not deferve to be reafoned with, be- caufe they do not pretend to communicate know- ledge, but to take all knowledge from us. The Immaterialifts fay, that we are confcious of nothing but the imprefTion or feeling of our own mind ; but they do not obferve, that the impref- fion itfelf implies and fuppofes fomething external that communicates it, and cannot be feparatcd from that fuppofition. Sometimes fuch rcaf oners tell us, that we cannot Ihew the fubftance feparate from its fcnfible qualities ; no more can any man Ihew me a fenfible quality feparate from a particular fubje£l. If any man will ihew me whitenefs, without fhew- ing me any thing that is white, or roundnefs with- out any thing that is round, I will fhew him the fubftance without either colour or Ihape. I Le6l. 2. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 2^ immateriaiifm takes away the diftinflion between •ri'-h and falfehood. I have an idea of a houfe or a tree in a certain place, and I call this true, that is, 1 am of opinion, there is reallj a houfe or a tree in that place. Again, I fprm an idea of a houfe or a tree, as what may be in that place ; I aik what is the difference, if after all, you tell nie, there is neither tree, houfe, nor place, any where exifting. An advocate for that fyftera fays, that truth coniiils in the livelinefs of the idea, than which nothing can be more manifeflly falfe. 1 can form as diftin£l an idea of any thing that is not, as any thing that is, when it is abfent from my fight. 1 have a much more lively idea of Jupiter and Juno, and many of their a£lions, froqii Homer and Virgil, though I do not believe that any of them ever exifted, than I have of many things that I know happened within thefe fev/ months. The truth is, tho immaterial fyftem is a wild and ridiculous attempt to'cmfettlethe principles of com- mon fenfe by metaphyfical reafoning, which can hardly produce any thing but contempt in the gene- rality of perfons who hear it, and which, I verily believe, never produced conviclion even on the per- fons who pretend to efpoufe it. LECTURE III, INTERNAL fenfation is whatMrPIutchinfon calls the finer powers of perception. It takes its rife firgm the external objects, but, by abilraftion, con- 24 LECTURES OX Le£t. 3. fiders Something farther than merely the fenfible qualities 1. Thus, with refped to many objefts, there is a fenfe of beauty in the appearance, ftrufture, or compofition, which is altogether diftinft from mere colour, fhape, and extenfion. How, then, is this beauty perceived ? It enters by the eye, but it is perceived and relilhed by what may be well enough called an internal fenfe, quality, or capacity ©f the mind. 2. There is a fenfe of pleafure in imitation, whence the arts of painting, fculpture, poetry, are often called the imitative arts. It is eafy to fee, that the imitation itfelf gives the pleafure, for we receive much pleafure from a lively defcription of what would be painful to behold. 3. A fenfe of harmony, 4. A fenfe of order or proportion. Perhaps, after all, the wIioIq of thefe fenfes may be confidered as belonging to one clafs, and to be the particulars which cither fingly, or by the union of feveral of them, or of the whole, produce what is called the pleafures of the imagination. If fo, we may extend thefe fenfes to every thing that en- ters into the principles of beauty and gracefulnefs. Order, proportion, fimplicity, intricacy, uniformity, variety — efpecially as thefe principles have any thing in common that is equally applicable to all the fine arts, painting, ftatuary, architecture, mufic, poetry, oratory. The various theories upon the principles of beau- ty, or what it is that properly conftitutes it, are of much importance on the fubjefl of tafte and cri- Le(^. 5. TJORAL PHILOSOFRrr. ^5 ticifm, but of very little in point of morals. Whe- ther it be a fimple perception that cannot be ana- lyfed, or a Te ne fcai quoi, as the French call it, that cannot be difcovered, it is the' fame thing to our prefent purpofe, iince it cannot be denied, that there is a perception of beauty, and that this is very dif- ferent from the mere colour or dimenfions of the objeft. This beauty extends to the form and ihape of vifible, or to the grace and motion of living ob- jefts ; indeed, to all works of art, and productions of genius. Thefe are called the reflex fenfes fometimcs, and it is of moment to obferve, both that -they really be- long to our nature, and that they are very different from the grolTcr perceptions of external fenfe. It muft alfo be obferved, that feveral diflinguiftied 'svriters have added, as an internal fenfe, that of mo- rality, a fenfe and perception of moral excellence, and our oblicration to conform ourf elves to it in our tondu6l. Though there is no occafion to join Mr Hutch- infon, or any other, in their oppofiiion to fuch as make reafon the principle of virtuous conduft^ yet I think it muft be admitted, that a fenfe of moral good and evil, is as really a principle of our na- lure, as either the grofs external or reflex fenfes, and as truly diilin6l from both, as they are from each other^ This moral fenfe is precifely the fame thing \vixh. what, in fcripture and common language, we call confcience. It is the law which our Maker has written upon our hearts, and both intimates and en- forces duty, previous to all reafoning. The op- C cr 26 LECTURES ON Le£l. 3. pofers of innate ideas, and of the law of nature, are unwilling to admit the reality of a moral fenfe, yet their objeftions are wliolly frivolous. The neceflity of education and information to the produdion and exercife of the reflex fenfes or j^owers of the imagination, is every whit as great , as to the application of the moral fenfe. Tf, thcrefoie, any one ihould fay, as is often done by Mr Locke, If there are any innate principles, what are they ? enumerate them to me ; if they are effential to man, they muft be in every man ; let me take any artlefs clown, and examine him, and fee if he can tell me what they are. I would fay, if the principles of tafte are natural, they muft be univerfal. Let me try the clown, then, and fee Vs'hether he will agree •with us, either in difcovering the beauty of a poem or pi6lure, or being able to aftign the reafons of his approbation. There are two fenfes which are not eafily redu- cible to any of the two kinds of internal fenfes, and yet certainly belong to our nature. They are allied to one another — A fenfe of ridicule, and a fenfe of honour and Ihame. A fenfe of the ridi- culous is fomething peculiar ; for though it be ad- mitted, that every thing that is ridiculous is at the fame time unreafonable and abfurd ; yet it is as cer- tain the terms are not convertible, for any thing that is abfurd is not ridiculous. There are an hun- dred falfehoods in mathematics and other fciences, that do not tempt any body to laugh. Shaftefbury has, through his whole writings, en- deavoured to eftablifli this principle, that ridicule is tlie tell of truth ; but the falfehood of that opinion Lecl. 3. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 27 appears from the above remark, for there is fome- thing really dlllinft from reafoning in ridicule. It feems to be putting imagination in the place of rea- fjn See Brown's Ellays on the Characleriftics. A fenfe of honour and Ihame feems, in a certain view, to fubjeft us to the opinions of others, «s ihej depend upon the fentiments of our fellow- creatures. Yet, perhaps we may confider this fen- timent as intended to be an ailiftant or guard to virtue, by making us apprehend reproach from others for what is in itfelf worthy of blame. This fenfe is very ftrong and powerful in its effects, whe- ther it be guided by true or falfe principles. After this furvey of human nature, let us confider how we derive either the nature or obligation of duty from it. One way is to confider what indications we have from our nature, of the way that leads to the trueft happinefs. This mufl be done by a careful atten- tion to the feveral clalTes of perceptions and affec- tions, to fee which of them are moll excellent, de- lightful, or delirable. They will then foon appear to be of three great clalTes, as mentioned above, eafily diHinguifhable from one another, and gradually riling above one another. 1. The gratification of the external fenfes. This affords fome pleafure. We are led to defirfe whai is pleafing, afnd to avoid what is difgullful to them. 2 . The finer powers of perception give a delight ■which is evidently more excellent, and which we mufl necefTarily pronounce more noble. Poetry, a3 LECTURES ON" LeSi, ^, painting, mufic, &:c. the exertion of genius, and Qxerc^fe of the mental powers in general, give a pleafure, though not fo tumultuous, much more re- fined, and which does not fo foon fatiate. 3. Superior to both thefe, is a fenfe of moral ex- cellence, and a pleafure arifmg from doing what is dictated bj the moral fcnfe. It muft doubtlefs be admitted, that this reprefen- tation is agreeable to truth, and that to thofe who would calmly and fairly weigh the delight of moral a6lions, it muft appear fuperior to any other grati- fication, being moll ?ioble, pure, and durable. There- fore we might conclude, that it is to be preferred before all other fources of pleafure, that they are to give way to it v/hen oppofite, and to be no other- wife embraced than in fubferviency to it. But though we cannot fay there is any thing falfe in this theory, there are certainly very eflen- tial defe£ls. As for example, it wholly confounds, or leaves entirely undillinguilhed, a£ling virtuoufly from feeking happinefs : fo that promoting our own happinefs will in that cafe be the elTence or defini- tion of virtue, and a view to our own intereft will be the fole and complete obligation to virtue. Now there is good ground to believe, not only that reafon teaches us, but that the moral fenfe did:ates to us, fomething more on both heads, viz. that there are difinterefted affeftions that point direftly at the good of others, and that thefe are fo far from meriting to be excluded from the notion of virtue altogether, that they rather feem to claim a preference to the felfilh afFe6lions. I know the friends of the fcheme- of felf-iutcreft have a way of colouring or folving^ 1.C&:, 3. MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 2^ this. Thej fay, men only approve and delight in benevolent aiFeftions, as pleafing and delightful to themfelves. But this is not fatisfjing, for it feems to weaken the force of public affeftion very much, to refer it all to felf-intereft, and when nature feems to -be carrying you out of yourfelf, by ftrong in- flinftive ppopenfities £>r implanted affections, to turn the current and direction of thefe into, the ftream of felf-intereft, in which experience tells us we are mofl apt to run to a vicious excefs. Befides it is affirmed, and I think with good rea- fon, that the moral fenfe carries a good deal more in it than merely an approbation of a certain clafs of actions as beautiful, praife-worthy, or delightful, and therefore finding our interell in them as the moft noble gratification. The moral fenfe implies alfo a fenfe of obligation, thatfuch and fuch things are right, and others wrong ; that we are bound in duty to do the one, and that our conduft is hatefiil, blame able, and deferving of puniihment, if we do the contrary ; and there is alfo in the moral fenfe or confcience, an apprehenfion or belief that reward and punifiiment will follow, according as we fball ad in the one way, or in the other. It is fo far from being true, that there is no more in virtuous aftion than a fuperior degree of beauty, or a more noble pleafure, that indeed the beauty and fweetnefs of virtuous action arifes from this very circumllance — that it is a compliance with duty or fuppofed obligation. Take away this, and the beauty vanillies, as well as the pleafure. Why is it more pleafant to do a jull or charitable ftftion, than to fatisfy my palate with delightful 30 LECTURES ON" Left. 3. meat, or to walk in a beautiful garden, or read aa cxquifite poem ? only becaufe I feel myfelf under an obligation to do it, as a thing ufeful and im- portant in itfelf. It is not duty becaufe pleafing, but pleaiing becaufe duty. The fame thing may be fiiid of beauty and approbation. I do not ap- prove of the conduft of a plain, honeft, induflrious^ pious man, becaufe it is more beautiful than tha. of an idle profligate, but I fay it is more beautiful and amiable, becaufe he keeps v/ithin the bounds of his duty. I fee a higher fpecies of beauty in moral adion : but it arifes from a fenie of obliga- tion. It may be faid, that my intereft and duty are the fame, becaufe they are infeparable, and the one arifes from the other ; but there is a real difr tindlion and priority of order. A thing is not my duty, becaufe it is my intereft, but it is a wife ap- pointment of nature, that I ihall forfeit my intereft, if I negledt my duty. Several other remarks might be made to confirm this. When any perfon has by experience found, that in feeking pleafure he embraces a lefs plealing enjoyment, in place of one more delightful, he may be fenlible of miftake or misfortune, ' but he has nothing at all of the feeling of blame or felf- *;ondemnatlon ; but %vhen he hath done an immoral action, he has an inward remorfe, and ft-els that lie lias broken a law, and that he ought to have don© i>tlierwifip. Left. 4. KORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3I LECTURE IV. THIS , therefore, lays us under the neceffity of fearching a little further for the principle of moral action. In order to do this with the greater accuracy, and give you a view of the chief contro- verfies on this fubjecl, obfer%-e, that there are really three queftions upon it, which mull be inquired into, and diflinguifhed. I am fenlible, they are fo intimately connected, that they are fometimes ne- ceffarilj intermixed ; but at others, not diftinguilh- ing leads into error. The queftions relate to, 1 . The nature of \^ue. 2. The foundation of \4rtue. 3. The obligation of virme. When we inquire into the nature of virtue, we do enough when we point out what it is, or ihew how we may come to the knowledge of every par- ticular duty, and be able to diftinguilh it from the opposite vice. When we fpeak of the foundation of virtue, we aik or anfwer the queftion. Why is it fo ? Why is this courfe of a£tion preferable to the contrary ? What is its excellence ? When we fpeak of the obligation of \-irtue, we aik, By what law we are bound, or from what principles we ought to be obedient to the precepts which it con- tains or prefcribes ? After fpe^iking fomething to each of thefe — to the controverfies that have been raifed upon tliem— . and the propriety or iic*^i:t4^ce of entering far ^- . A^ 3 a LECTURES ON Le(^. 4. into thefe controverlies, or a particular decifion of them, I fhall proceed to a detail of the moral laws, or the feveral branches of dutj, according to the di\nfion firft laid down. I . As to the nature of virtue, or what it is ; or, in Other words, what is the rulo by which I muft try every difputed pra6lice — that I may keep clear of the next queftion, you may obferve, that upon all the fyftems they muft have recourfe to one or more of the following, viz. Confcience, reafon, ex- perience. All who found virtue upon affection, particularly Hutchinfon, Shafteft)ury, and their fol- lowers, make the moral fenfe the rule of duty, and very often attempt to exclude the ufe of reafon on this fubjed. Thefe authors feem alfo to make be- nevolence and public affeclion the ftandard of virtue, in diftin6lion from all private and felfifh pallions. Dr Clark, and moft Englifti writers of the laft age, make reafon the ftandard of virtue, particu- larly as oppofed to inward fentiment or affeftion. They have this to fay particularly in fupport of their opinion, that reafon does in fa£t often controul and alter fentiment ; whereas fentiment cannot alter the clear deciiions of reafon. Suppofe my heart dic- tates to me any thing to be my duty, as, for ex- ample, to have compaffion on a perfon detefted in the commiflion of crimes ; yet if, upon cool re- flection, I perceive that fuftering him to go unpu- niftied will be hurtful to tlie community, I coun- terad the fentiment from the deductions of reafon. Again : Some take in the aid of experience, and chiefly aft upon it. All particularly who are upon the felfifti fcbeme, find it neceflfary to opake expe- Led. 4. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ^^ rience the guide, to {hew them what things are really conducive to happinefs, and what not. We ihall proceed to confider the opinions upon the nature of virtue, the chief of which are as fol- low. 1. Some fay that virtue coiifiils in a£ting agree- ably to the nature and reafon of things ; and that we are to abftrad from all affection, public and private, in determining any quellion upon it. — 2. Some fay that benevolence or public afFeftioa is virtue, and that a regard to the good of the whole is the ftandard of virtue. What is moll remark- able in this fpheme is, that it makes the fenfe of obligation in particular inilances give w^ay to a fup- pofed greater good. — Hutchifiso7i. 3. One author (Wollafton Rel. of Nat. delineated) makes truth the foundation of virtue ; and he re- duces the good or evil of any adion to the tinitli or falfehood of a proportion. This opinion differs not in fubllance, but in words only, from Dr Clark's. 4. Others place virtuo in felf-love, and make a well regulated felf-love the ftandard and foundation of it. This fcheme is befl defended by Dr Camp- bell, of St Andrew's. 5. Some of late have made fympathy the ftand- ard of virtue, particularly Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. He fays we have a certain feeling, by which we fympathife, and, as he calls it, go along with what appears to be right. This is but a new phrafeology for the moral fenfe. Vol. VII. D 34 LECTURES 0?i Lccl. 4. 6. David Hume has a fcheme of morals that is peculiar to himfelf. He makes every thing that is agreccible and useful virtuous, and vice versay by which he entirely annihilates the difference be- tween natural and moral qualities, making health, iirength, cleanlinefs, as really virtues as integrity and truth. 7. We have an opinion publlfhed in this country, that virtue coniifts in the love of being, as fuch. Several of thefe authors do eafily and naturally incorporate piety with their fj-flem, particularly Clark, Hutchinfon, pampbell, and Edwards. And there are feme Vv^ho begin by eflabliihing natural religion, and then found virtue upon piety. This amounts to the fame thing in fubflance ; for reafoners upon the nature of virtue only mean to Ihew what the Author of nature has pointed out as duty. And after natural religion is eilabliflied on general proofs, it will remain to point out what are its laws, which, not taking in revelation, muft bring us back to confider our own nature, and the rational dedu£lion from it. • 2. The opinions on the foundation of virtue may be fummed up in the four following. - I. The will of God. 2. The reafon and na- ture of things. 3. The public intereil. 4. Private intereft. . I. The will of God. By this is not meant what was mentioned above, that the intimations of the di- vine will point out what is our duty ; but that the reafon of the difference between virtue and vice is to be fought ho where elfe than in the good plea- fure of God ; that there is no intrinfic excellence Led. 4. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 in any thing but as he commands or forbids it. They pretend that, if it were otherwife, there would be fomething above the Supreme Being, fomeihing in the nature of tilings that would lay him under the law of neceiSty or fate. But notwiih Handing the difficulty of our forming clear conceptions on this lubjeft, it feems very harOi and unreafonable to fay, that the diilerence between virtue and vice is no other than the divine will. This would be taking away the moral character even of God him- felf. It would not have any meaning, then, to fay he is iniinitely holy and infinitely perfect. But probably thofe who have alTerted this, did not mean any more, than that the divine will is fo perfect and excellent, that all virtue is reduced to conformity to it ; and that v/e ought not to judge of good and evil by any other rule. This is as true as that the di^4ne condud: is the llandard of wifdom. 2. Some found it in the reafon and nature of things. This may be faid to he true, but not fuf- ficiently precife and explicit. Thofe who embrace tin's principle fucceed beft in their reafoning, v.hen endeavouring to ihew that there is an effentiai dif- ference between virtue and vice. But when they attempt to ihew wherein this difference doth or can confift, other than public or private happinefs, they fpeak with very little meaning. 3. Public happinefs. This opinion is, that the foundation of virtue, or that which makes the dif- tinftion between it and vice, is its tendency to prc- rAote the general good ; fo that utility at bonom is the principle of virtue, even with the great patrons of diiinterelled afFeclion. D 2 36 LECTURES ON Lect. 4. 4. Private happinefs. Thofe who choofe to place the foundation of virtue here, would have us to confider no other excellence in it than what imme- diately conduces to our own gratification. Upon thefe opinions I would obferve, that there is fomething true in every one of them, but that they may be easily puflied to an error by excefs. The nature and will of God is fo perfed as to be the true ftandard of all excellence, natural and moral : and if we are fure of what he is or com- mands, it would be prefumption and folly to reafon againft it, or put our views of fitnefs in the room of his pleafure ; but to fay, that God, by his will, might have made the fame temper and conducl virtuous and excellent, which we now call vicious, feems to unhinge all our notions of the fuprem« excellence even of God himfelf. Again, there feems to be in the nature of things an intririic excellence in moral worth, and an in- delible impreffion of it upon the confcience, dif- tin6l from producing or receiving happinefs, and yet we cannot eafily illuftrate its excellence, but by- comparing one kind of happinefs with another. Again, promoting the public or general good feems to be fo nearly conne£led wiih virtue, that we miuft necelTarily fuppofe that univerfal virtue could be of univerfal utility. Yet there are two excefles to which this has fometimes led. One, the fatalifl and necefTitarian fchemes, to which there are fo many objedlions ; and the other, the making the general good the ultimate praftical rule to every particular pcrfon, fo that he may violate par- Left. 4. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 ticular obligations with a view to a more general benefit. Once more, it is certain, that viitue is as really connected with private as with public happinels, and jet to make the intereil of the agent the only- foundation of it, feems to narrow the mind, and to be fo deftruclive to the public and generous affec- tions, as to produce the mofl hurtful effects. If I were to lay down a few propofitions on the foundation of \irtue, as a philofopher, they fhould be the following. 1. From reafon, contemplation, fentiment, and tradition, the being, and infinite perfection and ex- cellence of God, may be deduced ; and therefore what he is, and commands, is virtue and duty. Whatever he has implanted in corrupted nature as a principle, is to be received as his will. Propen- sities refilled and contradid:ed by the inward prin- -cipie of confcience, are to be coniidered as inhe- rent or c outraged vice. 2. True virtue certainly promotes the general good ; and this may be made ufe of as an argu- ment in doubtful cafes, to determine whether a particular principle is right or wrong; but to make the good of the whole our immediate principle of action, is putting ourfelves in God's place, and ac- tually fuperfeding the necefTity and ufe of the par- ticular principle of duty which he hath imprefied upon the confcience. As to the whole, I believe the univerfe is faultlefs and perfed, but I am un- willing to fay it is the best poflible fyllem, becaufc I am not able to imderftand fuch an argument, and becaufe it feems to me abfurd that infinite perfect I>3 38 LECTURES ON" LeSi. 4. tion fliould exhaufl or limit itfelf by a created pro- duclion. 3. There is in the nature of things a difference between virtue and vice ; and however much virtue and happinefs are connected bj the divine law, and in the event of things, we are made fo as to feel towards them, and conceive of them, as dif- tincl. We have the fimple perceptions of duty and intereft. 4. Private and public intereft may be promoted by the fame means, but they are diftinft \aews ; they fliould be made to affift, and not deftroy each other. The refult of the whole is, that we ought to take the rule of duty from confcience, enlightened by reafon, experience, and every way by which we can be fuppofed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in creating us fuch as we are. And we ought to believe, that it is as deeply founded as the nature of God himfelf, being a, tranfcript of his moral excellence, and that it is produdive of the greateft good. LECTURE V. ><. XT remains only that we fpeak of the obligation of virtue, or what is the law that binds us to the perform.ance, and from what motives or prin- ciples we ought to follow its dins in which he may be confi- dered, as laying a foundation for duty. Thefe ilates may be divided into two kinds, i. Natural. 2. Adventitious. The natural ftate may be enumerated thus : i . His ftate with regard to God, or natural relation to him. 2. To his fellow-creatures. 3. Solitude or fociety. 4. Peace or war. Perhaps we may add to thefe, 5. His outward proviiion, plenty or want. Thefe are called natural Ilates, becaufe they are neceffary and univerfal. All men, and at all times, are related to God. They were made by him, and live by his providence. We muft alfo necefiarily know our fellow-creatures, and their ftate, to be iimi- lar to ours in this refpe£l:, and many others. A man muft at all times be independent, or conne£led with fociety- — at peace with others, or at war well — pro- vided, or in want. The other ftates are called adventitious, becaufe they are the efFecl of choice and the fruit of in- duftry, as marriage — family — mafter and fervant — particular voluntary focieties — callings or profef- fions — chara6lers or abilities, natural and acquired — offices in a conftituted fociety— property — and many particular modifications of each of thefe. In profecuting the fubjed further, and giving an analyfis of the moral duties founded upon thefe Lecl. 6. MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 45 ftatcs, I fhall firft take notice of our relation to God, with the proofs of his being and perfecrions, and then confider the moral laws under three heads ; our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to our- felves. I. Our duty to God. To this place I have re- ferved what was to be faid upon the proof of the being of God, the great foundation of all natural religion ; without which the moral lenfe would be weak and infufHcient. The proofs of the being of God are general!}- di\'ided into two kinds, i. A priori, 2. A posteriori* The firft is, properly fpeaking, metaphyncal rea- foning downward from the firil principles of fcience or truth, and inferring by juft confequence the being and perfeftions of God. Clark's Demonftration^ &c. (if there be any thing that ihould be called a prioriy and if this is a conclufive method of rea- foning), is as complete as any thing ever publiibed ; perhaps he has carried the principle as far as it will go. This way of arguing begins by eftablifliing our own exiftence from confcioufnefs. That we are not neceflarily exillent, therefore muft have a caufe ; that fomething muft have exifted from all eternity, or nothing ever could have exifted ; that this Being muft exift by an iatemal neceftlty of nature ; that what exifts neceft'arily muft exift alike every where ; muft be perfect ; aft every where ; be independent, omnipotent, omnifcient, infinitely good, j»ft, true: Becaufe, as all thefe are e\ddently perfeftions or excellencies, that which exifts by a neceftity of na- ture muft be poflefled of every perfedion. And Vol. VII. E 46 LECTURES ON Lecl. 6. the contrary of thefe virtues, implying weaknefs or iiifufficiency, cannot be found in the InjRnite Being. The other medium of proof, commonly called a posteriori, begins with contemplating the univerfe in all its parts ; obferving that it contains many irrefiftible proofs that it could not be eternal, could not be without a caufe ; that this caufe mull be in- telligent; and from the aftonilliing greatnefs, the wonderful adjuflment and complication of things, concludes that we can fet no bounds to the perfec-- tion of the Maker, becaufe we can never exhauft the power, intelligence, and benignity that we fee in his works. In this way of arguing we deduce the moral perfeftions of the Deity from the faint refemblances of them that we fee in ourfelves. As we neceflarily conceive juftice, goodnefs, truth, Sec. to be perfe£lions or excellencies, we are warranted by the plaineit reafon to afcribe them to the Divine Being in an infinite degree. There is, perhaps, at bottom, no difference be- tween thefe ways of reafoning, becaufe they mufl in fome degree reft upon a corhmon principle, viz. That every thing that exifts muft have a caufe. This is equally necelTary to both the chains of rea- foning, arid muft itfelf be taken for an original fentiment of nature, or an impreffion neceflarily made upon us from all that we fee and are con- verfant with. About this and fome other ideas great ftir lias been made by fome infidel writers, particularly David Kume, who feems to have in- duftrioufly endeavoured to Ikake the certaiftty of our belief upon caufe and effedl, upon perfoi>al Left. 6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 47 identity, and the idea of power. It is eafy to raife mctaphjiical fubtleties, and confound the un- dcrilandirig on fuch fubjefts. In oppontion to this, fome late writeisi have advanced, with great appa- rent reafon, that there are certain firil principles, or dictates of common fenfe, which are either limple perceptions, or feen^with intuitive eydence. Thefe are the foundation of all reafoning, and without them, to reaCon is a word without a meaning. Thej can no more be proved than you can prove. an axiom in mathematical fcience. Thefe authors, of Scotland have lately produced and lupported this opinion, to refolve at once all the re5;iements and metaphyfical objections of fome infidel writers. Tliere is a different fort of argument often made ufe of, or brought. in aid of the others, for the be- ing of God, viz. the confent of all nations, and the univerfal prevalence of that belief. I know not whether we mufl fay that this argument reds alfo upon the principle, that nothing can exi6l without a caufe, or upon the plan juil now men- tioned. If it is an univerfal dictate of our nature,, ive mufl take it as true immediately, without fur^ ther examination. An autlior I formerly mentioned has fet this ar- gument in a peculiar light, (Dr \Vilfon of New- caftle). He fajs that we receive all om* know- ledge, as philofophers admit, by fenfation and re- flexion. Now, from all that we fee, and ail the reflection and abftra£tion upon it we are capaple of,, he afnrms it is impofllble we could ever form the idea of a fpii'it or a future ftate. JThey have^ however, been early and univerfal, and therefore. 4^ LECTURES ON Lect. 6. muft have been communicated at firft, and handed down by information and inftru6lion from age to age. So that, unlefs upon the fuppofition of the exiftence of God, and his imparting the knowledge of himfelf to men, it is impolTible that any idea of him could ever have entered into the human mind. There is fomething ingenious, and a good deal of probability, in this way of reafoning. As to the nature- of God, the firft thing to be obferved is, the unity of God. This is fufficiently eftabliflied upon the reafonings both a priori and posteriori. If thefe reafonings are jufl for the be- ing of God, they are flriftly conclulive for the unity of God. There is a necefiity for the exift- ence of one Supreme Being, the fIrft caufe, but no necefiity for mere ; nay, one fupreme indepen- dent Being does not admit any more. And when we view the harmony, order, and unity of deiign, in the created fyftem, we muft be led to the belief of the unity of God. Perhaps it may be thought an objeflion to thi , (efpecially if we lay any ftrefs on the univerfal fentiments of mankind), that all nations have been fo prone to the belief and worfnip of a pliurality of gods. But this argument is rather fpecious than folid ; as, however prone men were to worfhip local inferior deities, they feem to have confidered them only as intermediate divinities and interceflbrs be- tween them and the Supreme God. The perfections of God may be divided into two kinds, Natural and Moral. I. The natural perfeftions of God are fpirituali- ty, immenfity, wifdom, and power. Led. 6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 49 We call thefe natural perfections, becaufe they can be eauij diitiiiguiilied, and in idea at lead le- parated, from goodnefs of dilpoiiiion. It is highly probable, indeed, that fupreme excellence, natural, and moral, muil always reflde in the fame fubjecl, and are truly infeparable : yet we diftinguiih thern^ not only becaufe tlie ideas are diflincl, but becaufe *hey are by no means in proportion to one another in inferior natures. Great powers of mind and perfection of body are often joined to malignity of difpofition. It is not fo, however, in God ; for as; Ills natural perfections are founded on reafcn, fo liis moral excellence is evidently founded in the moral fenfe, or conicience, which he hath implanted in us. Spirituality is what we may call the -jcry nature of God. It mull be admitted that we cannot at )refent form any complete or adequate idea of a rpirit. And iome, as you have heard formerly, ^nlifl that without revelation we could never have acquired the idea of it that we have. Yet there are many who have reafoned in a very ftrong and ieemingly canclufive manner, to ihew that mind or intelligence mull be a fubilance altogether diHincl from matter. That all the known properties of matter are incapable of producing thought, as be- ing wholly of a different kind — that maner as fuch^ and univerfally, is inert and divinble ; thought or intelligence, active and uncompounded. See the bell reafoning on this fubjecl in Baxter's Immate-r liality of the Soul. ImmenHty in the Divine Being is that by whicb Kc is everv vrhere, and equally prefent.. Meta-- 50 LECTURES ON Le^l. 6. phjficians, however, differ greatly upon this fub- jecl. The Cartefians will not admit that place is at all applicable to fpirits. They fay it is an idea wholly arifing from extenfion, which is one of the peculiar and eficntial qualities of matter. The Newtonians, however, who make fo much ufe of the idea of infinite fpace, confider place as eflential to all fubftance, fpirit as well as matter. The dif- ficulties are great on both fides. It is hard to con- ceive of fpirit at all, feparating from it the qualities «f matter ; and after we have attempted to do fo, it feems to be bringing them back to talk of place. And yet it feems not only hard, but impoflible, to conceive of any real being without fuppofing it in fome place, and particularly upon the immenfity of the Deity. It feems to be putting created fpi- rits too much on a level with the infinite Spirit to deny his immenfity. It is, I think, certain, they are either confined to a place, or fo li- mited in their operations, as is no way fo well exprefled as by faying. We are here, and no where elfe. And in this fenfe both parties muft admit the divine immenfity — that his agency is equal, uni- verfal, and irrefiftible. Wifdom is another natural attribute of God, im^ plying infinite knowledge — that all things, in all their relations, all things exifting, and all things polTible, are the objects of the divine knowledge, Wifdom is ufually confidered as refpe<^ing fome end to be attained ; and it implies the clear difco- very of the befl and moR effedlual means of at- taining it. heSi. 6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 5I Power is the being able to do all things, without limit or reftraint. The omnipotence of God is al- ways conlidered as an eflential perfection, and feems to arife immediately from creation and pro- vidence. It is common to fay that God can do all things except fuch as imply a contradiction, fuch as to make a thing to be and not to be at the fame time ; but this is unnecefTary and foolifh in the way of an exception, for fuch things are not the objects of power at all. They are mere abfurdities in our conception, and indeed we may fay, of our own creation. All things are poffible with God, nothing can withlland his power. LECTURE VII. THE moral perfections of God are, holinefs^ juftice, truth, goodnefs, and mercy. Holinefs is fometimes taken in a general and eomprehenlive fenfe, as being the aggregate, im- plying the prefence of all moral excellence ; yet it is fometimes ufed, and that both in the fcrip- ture-revelation and by heathen writers, as a peculiar attribute. In this Mmited fenfe it is extremely dif- ficult to define or explain. Holinefs is that charac- ter of God to which veneration, or the moft pro- found reverence in us, is the correfpondent affec- tion. It is fometimes alfo expreifed by purity ; and when we go to form an idea of it, perhaps we can fcarce fay any thing better, than that it is his being removed at an infinite dillance from the groffelt of material indulgence. 52 LECTURES ON Lecl. 7^ Juftlce is an invariable determination to render to all their due. Juilice feems to be founded on the (Irong and unalterable perception we have of riglit and wrong, good and evil, and particularly that the one deferves reward, and the other pu- nifhment. The internal fandlion, or the exter- nal and providential fanflion of natural laws,, point out the juftice of God. The chief thing that merits attention upon this fubjcd is, the con- troverfj about what is called the vindictive juftice of God : That is to faj, is there in God, or have we a natural fenfe of the propriety of, a difpoiition to in{li£l puniihment, independently of the confe- quences, viz. the reformation of the offender, or the example of others. This loofe moralills often- declaim againft. Yet it feems plain, that the fenfe in our minds of good and ill defert, makes guilt the proper objed of punifhment limply in itfelf. This may have a relation to general order and the good of the whole, which however is out of our reach. Tfie truth of God is one of his perfections, greatly infilled upon in fcripture, and an elTential part of natural religion. It is infeparable from in- finite perfection ; for any departure from truth mull be confidered as arifing from weaknefs or ne- celTity. What end could be fer^^ed to a felf-fuffi- cient and all-fufficient Being by falfehood or de-- ception ? Goodnefs in God is a difpofition to communicate happinefs to others. This is eafily underftood. The creation is a proof of it. Natural and moral. Ledl. 7. MORAL FHrLOSOPHY. 53 evil is no juft objedlion to it, becaufe of the pre- ponderance of happinefs. Mercy, as diftinguifhed from goodnefs or benig- nity, is his being of a placable nature ; ready to forgive the guilty, or to remit defer\^ed punifh- ment. It has been difputed, how far mercy or placability is difcoverable by reafon. It is not mercy or forgivenefs, unlefs it would have been juft -at the fame time to have puniihed. There are but two ways by which men from reafon may in- fer the attribute of mercy to belong to the Deity. I. Becaufe we ourielves are fenlible of this dilpo- fition, and fee in it a peculiar beauty. 2. From the forbearance of Providence, that finners are not immediately overtaken with punifliment, but have fpace given them to repent. Yet as all the con- clulions drawn from thefe principles muft be vague and general, the expectations of the guilty founded upon them muft be very uncertain. We mufl conclude, therefore, that however ftable a founda- tion there is for the other attributes of God in na- ture and reafon, the way in which, and the terms on which, he will fhew mercy, can be learned from revelation only. Having conndered the being and perfections of God, we proceed to our duty to him. This may be conlidercd in two views, as gene- ral and fpecial. j . By the firil I underftand our duty to obey liim, and fubmit to him in all things. This you fee includes every branch of moral duty to our neighbour and ourielves, as well as to God, and fo the particular parts of it will be confidered afterwards. But in this place, coniidering every 54 LECTURES ON Led. 7. good aftion as an a-fl of obedience to God, we will a little attend to the divine foYereigntj, and the foundation of it. In fpeaking of the foundation of virtue, I took in a fenfe of dependance and fubje£lion to God. But as men are not to be deterred from bold in- quiries, a further queflion is raifed by feme. What is properlj the foundation of lihe divine do- minion? I. Some found it dire£lly upon Omni- potence. It is impoffible to reiilt his power. This feems to lay us under a neceffity, rather than to convince us of duty. -We ought, however, to think and fpeak of this fubject with reverence, and cer- tainly Omnipotence feems to oblige us to a£tual, if it Ihould not bring us to willing obedience. It is fomewhat remarkable, that in the book of Job, compofed on purpofe to refolve fome difficulties in providence, where God is brought in as fpeaking himfelf out of the whirlwind, he makes ufe of no other argument than his tremendous majelly and irreliftible powder. Yet to reft the matter wholly upon this, feems much the fame as founding virtue on mere will. Therefore, a. Some found the di- vine dominion on his infinite excellence ; they fay it is the law of reafon that tlie wifefl iliould rule, and therefore that infmite perfection is entitled to univerfal fway. Even this, taken feparate and alone, does not feem wholly to fatisfy the mind. If one perfon is wifer than another, it feems reafon- able that the other Ihould learn of him, and imitate him ; but it fcarcely feems a fufficient reafon that the fu-ft fhould have abfolute authority. But per- haps the weaknefs of the argument, taken in this LeS:. 7. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 55 \4e\v, may arife from the inconiiderable difference bet^veen raan and man, when compared to -the fu- periority of iiniverfal and unchangeable perfection. 3. Some found it upon creation. They faj that God has an abfolute property in all his creatures ; he maj therefore do what he will with his own. This, no doubt, goes a good w^ay, and carries con- fiderable force with it to the mind, the rather that, as vou will afterguards fee, it is fomething fimilar to this in us that lays the foundation of our moft perfefl rights, \az. that the product of our own induftry is properly at our own difpofal. As upon the foundation of virtue I thought it necefiary to unite the principles of dilTerent "'.vriters, fo upon this fubje6l I think that all the three par- ticulars mentioned ought to be admitted, as the grounds of the divine dominion. Omnipotence, infinite excellence, and the original production and continual prefer^'ation of all creatures. 2. Oiu" duty to God may be confidered more fpecially, as it points out the duties we ov/e imme- diately to liimfelf. Thefe may be di^^ded into internal and exter- nal. I. The internal are all included under the three following, love, fear, and tnift. The love of God, which is the firil and great duty both of natural and revealed religion, may be explained in a larger and more popular, or in a more precife and ftricler way. In the firft, love may be refolved into ihc four folloAving afts, (i.) Efteem, (2.) Gratitude, (3.) Benevolence, (4.) Defire. S^ LECTURES ON Led. 7. Thefe four will be found infeparable from true love ; and it is pretty much in the fame order that the a6ts fucceed one another. Love is founded on efteem, on the real or fuppofed good qualities of the objeft. You can no more love that which you defpife, than that which jou hate. Gratitude is alfo infeparable from it, to have a lively fenfe of favours received, and to efteem them for the fake of the perfon from whom they came. Bene- volence, or rejoicing in the happinefs and wiftiing well to the objeft. And, laftly, a defire of a place in his efteem. Whatever we love we defire to poflefs, as far as it is fuited to our faculties. The ftricler and more precife method of confi- dering the love of God, is to divide it into two branches, benevolence, and defire. And indeed our afFeftions to God feem to be capable of the fame divifion as our affeftions to om* fellow-crea- tures, benevolent and felfiQi. I think it unde- niable that there is a difinterefted love of God, which terminates direftly upon himfelf, without any immediate ^aew to our own happinefs, as well as a difcovery of our great intereft in his favour. The fecond great duty to God, is fear ; but here we muft carefully diftinguifti this affeftion from one which bears the name, and is difterent from it, at leaft in a moral view it is altogether oppofite. Dutiful fear is what may be otherwife called vene- ration, and hath for its objeft the infinity of the divine perfe^lion in general, but particularly his majefty and greatnefs. The other is merely a fear of evil or punifliment from him : thefe are called fometimes a filial and fervile fear. The firft in- Led. 7. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 creafes, as men improve in moral excellence, and the other is deftroyed. Perfeft love caileth oiu fear. Perhaps, however oppofite, as thej have the fame name, they may be faid to be the fame na- tural aiFedion, only as it takes place in innocent or holy, and in guilty creatures. The fame majefty of God, which produces veneration in the upright, produces horror and apprehenfion of punifhment in the guilty. The third great duty is tnift. This is a conti- nual dependence on God for every thing we need, together with an approbation of and abfolute re- fignation to his providence. 2. The external duties to God, I fhall briefly pafs oyer, being only, all proper and natural expreflions of the internal fentiments. It may be proper, however, to take notice in ge- neral of the worfhip due to God, that whether we coufider the nature of things, or the univerfal prac- tice of mankind, in all ages, worfhip, and that not only private, but public and fecial worfhip, is a duty of natural religion. Some ^f the enemies of revealed religion, have fpoken with great virulence againfl this, as unrea-< fonable, and even dilhouourable to the Divine Be- ing. The fubftance of what they fay is this, that as it would be no part of the character of an emi- nent and good man, to defire and take pleafure in others praiflng him and recounting his good quali- ties, fo it is abfurd to fuppofe, that the Supreme Being is pleafed with incenfe, facrifices, and praif.s. But it ought to be obfer^red, that he does not require thefe act? and exercifes as any gi-atirication to him- VoL.VII. F 5^ LECTURKS ON Le£l. 7. felf, but ns in themfelves jufl and neceflary, and fiiitcd to the relation wc Hand in to him, and ufeful for forming our temper and univerfal praftice. We ought alfo to remember, that we muft not immedi- ately and without difcrimination, reafon from what would be praife and blame-worthy among men, to what would be juft or unjufl in God, becaufe the circumftances are very different. Befides, though for any man to delire the applaufc of his fellow- creatures, or be plcafed with adulation, would be a mean and contemptible character, becaufe indeed there is fuch unfpeakable imperfeftion in the bell of men ; yet when any duty or fentiment is fully and manifeftly due from man to man, there is no- thing improper or difhonourable in requiring or expedling it. Thus a parent requires refpe£l: and fubmiflion from his chi.Mren, a mafter from his fervants ; and though the injury is merely perfonal, he thinks himfelf entitled to punifh every expreffion of contempt or difregard. Again, every man who has bellowed lignal favours upon another, experts to fee evidence of a grateful and fenfible mind, and feverely condemns every fentiment «r adlion that indicates a contrary difpoiition. On the whole, then, we fee, that if the worlhip of God be what is due from us to him, in confequence of the relation w^e Hand in to him, it is proper and necelTary that he fliould require it. To honour God, is to honour fupreme excellence ; for him not to expeft and demand it, would be to deny himfelf. One other diiEculty I fnall touch upon a little. It refpefts the duty of prayer ; and the obje6lions lie equally againll it on the footing of natural re- Lecl. 7. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ^ 59 ligion and revealed. The objeclions are tv/o* I. Why does God, who perfedlj knows all our v^ants, require and expedl prayer before he will fiipply them ?• To this I would anfwer, that he fupplics great multitudes of our wants without our alldng it ; and as to his requiring the duty of prayer, I fay the fame thing as of worfhip in general ;. it is reafonable and neceffary 10 cxprefs, and to increafe upon our minds, a fcnfe of depend- ence, and thereby lay us under an obligarion of properly improving what we receive. 2. The oiher obligation is with regard to the force or efli- cacy of prayer. Why, it is faid, Ihould we pray, when the whole fyflem of divine providence is fixed and unalterable ? Can we poflibly fuppofe that God will change his purpofes, from a regard to our cries or t€ars ? To this fome anfwer no otherwife than as before, that without having any effect upon the event, it has only an effect upon our minds, in bringing us to a right temper. Dr Leechman of Glafgow, in his difcourfe on prayer, makes no other anfwer to this . difficulty. But I lliink to reft it here, and admit that it has no iij- fiuence in the way of cafualty upon the event, would ift a great meafure break the force and fer- vency of prayer. I would therefore fay further, that prayer has a real efficacy on the event, and juft as much as any other fecond caufc. The ob- jeftion arifes from going beyond our depth, and reafoning from the unchangeable purpofc of God to human anions, which is always unjuft and fal- lacious. However unable we may be to explain it^ notwitliftanding the fixed plan of providence, F z 6o LECTURES ON Le^l. 7. there is a real influence of fecond caufes, both na- tural and moral, and I apprehend the connection between caufe and efFe£t is fimilar in both cafes. If it is fixed from eternity that there fhall be a plentiful crop upon a certain field, I know that nothing whatfoever can prevent it, if otherwife, the efforts of the whole creation cannot produce it ; yet I know as certainly that, hypothetically, if it is not ploughed and fown, there will be no grain upon it, and that if it be properly manured and drefied, it w411 probably be fruitful. Thus, in moral mat- ters, prayer has as real an influence in procuring the bleffing, as ploughing and fowung lias in pro- curing the crop ; and it is as confiftent with the eftablilhed order of nature and the certainty of events in the one cafe, as in the other : for this rea- fon the Stoical fate of old was called the ignava ratio of the Stoics, as they fometimes made ufe of the above fallacious reafoning. LECTURE VIII. WE come now to our duty to mart. This may be reduced to a Ihort fum, by a- fcending to its principle. Love to others, fmcere and a6live, is the fum of our duty. Benevolence, I formerly obferved, ought not to be confidered as the whole of virtue, but it certain- ly the principle and fum of that branch of duty which regards others. We may diftinguifli between, (i.) particular kind Ltd:. 8. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 6l affe£lions, and, (2.) a calm and. deliberate good-will to all. The panic ular kind afTeiiions, as to family, friends, .country, leem to be implanted by nature, to llrengtlien the general principle, for it is only or chiefly by doing good to thofe we are particu- larly related to, that we can promote the general happineis. Particular kind affeclions fliould be retrained and direded by a calm good-will to all. Where- ever our attachments to private perfons prevent a greater good, they become irregular and ex- ec llive. Some tliink that a calm and fettled good-will to others, is an improvement of the particular affec- tions, and ai'ifes from the more narrow to the more exterxiive ; from family, friends, country, to all our fellow-creatures. But it feems more reafon- able to fay, that the geneial afle£lion is a didtatc of our confcience>)of a fuperior kind. If it were only an increafe and extenlion of private afFedion, it would grow more weak, as the diftance from ourfelves increafed, whereas in fud the more en- larged affeclions are intended to be more powerful than the confined. When we are fpeaking of kind aftedlons, it will not be improper 10 obfer^^e that fome unbelievers have obje6bed againfl the gofpel, that it does not recommend private friendiliip and the love of our country. But if fairly conlidered, as the fcriptarc, both by example and precept, recommends all par- ticular a{Fe£lions, fo it is to its honour, that it fets the love of mankind above them every one, and by fo much infilling on the forgivencfs of injuries and ^3 ' 6a LECTURES ON Led:. 8. the love of enemies, it has carried benevolence to the greateft perfcftion. The parable of the Sa- maritan, in anfwer to the quellion. Who is my neighbour ? is one of the greatefl beauties in moral painting any where to be feen. The love of our country, to be fure, is a noble and enlarged afFedion ; and thofe who have facri- ficed private eafe and family-relations to it, have become illuflrious ; yet the lo^-e of mankind is flill greatly fuperior. Sometimes attachment to country appears in a littlenefs of mind, thinking all other nations inferior, and fooliOily believing that knowledge, virtue, and valour are all confined to themfelves. As the Romans long ago made the Piimcajides to mean deceit,, fo there are not want- ing among us thofe who think that all the French are interefted, treacherous, and cowardly. On the great kw of Ibve to others, I fliall only fay further, that it ought to have for its objedl their greateft and beft intereft, and therefore implies wiftiing and doing them good in foul and body. It is neceffary now to defcend to the application of this principle to particular duties, and. to exa- mine what are the rights or claims that one man has upon another.. Rights and obligations are cor- relative terms.. Whatever others have a juft right or title to claim from me,, that is my duty, or what I am obliged to do to them. Right in general may be reduced, as to its fource, to the fupreme law of moral duty ; for whatever men are in duty obliged to do, that they have a claim to, and other men are confidered as under an obligation to permit tliem. Again, r.r LeCt. 8. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 6^ our own happinefs is a lawful objed or end, we are fuppofed to have each a right to profecute this ; but as our profecution may interfere, we limit each others rights, and a man is faid to have a right or power to promote his own happinefs only by thofe means which are not in themfelves criminal or in- jurious to others. Rights may be divided or clafled in feveral diffe- rent ways ; an attention to all of which is of ufe on this fubje6L. Rights may be, (i.) Natural or acquired. Natural rights are fuch as are effential to man, and univerfal ; — ac- quired are thofe that are the fruits of induftry, the effefts of accident or conqueft. A man has a na- tural right to a£l for his own prefervation, and to defend himfelf from injury, but not a natural right to domineer, to riches, (comparatively fpeaking) or to any particular office in a conftituted ftate. (2.) Rights are confidered as perfeft and im- perfeft. Thofe are called perfect rights which can be clearly afcertained in their circumflances, and which we may make ufe of force to obtain when they are denied us. Imperfe£i: rights are fuch as we may demand, and others ought to give us, yet we have no title to compel them. Self- prefervation is a perfect right, but to have a grate- ful return for a favour is not a perfect right. All the duties of juftice are founded on the per- fed rights j thofe of mercy generally on the imper- feft rights. The violation of an imperfe£b right is often as great an a6l of immorality as that of a perfect light. It is often as immoral, or more fo,. to refufe 64 LECTURES ON Left. 8. to fupplj the neccflitous, or to do it too fparmgly,- as to commit a fmall injury againft a man's perfon or fortune. Yet the lall is the breach of a perfeft right, and the other of an imperfect. Human laws reach only, in ordinary cafes, to the perfeft rights. Sometimes imperfe£l rights, by be- ing carried far, become perfect, as humanity and gentlenefs in a parent to a child may be fo grofsly violated as to warrant the interpoHtion of human •authority. ' (3.) Rights are alienable and unalienable. The firfl we may, according to juftice and prudence, furrender or give up by oar own a(El ; the others v/e may not. A man may give away his own goods, lands, money. There are feveral things which he cannot give away, as a right over his own knowledge, thoughts, &:c. Others, which he ought not, as a right to judgp for himfelf in all mat- ters of religion, his right of felf-prefer\^ation, pro- viiion, &c. Some fay that liberty is unalienable, und that thofe who have even given it away m.ay lawfully refume it. The diflinftion between rights as alienable and unalienable is very different from that of natural and acquired. Many of the rights which are ilriftly natural and univerfal, may be alienated in a ftate of fociety for the good of the whole, as well as of private perfons ; as for example, the right of felf-defence ; this is in a great meafure given up in a flate of civil government into the hands of the public, and the right of doing juftice to our- felves or to others in matter of property, is wholly given up. Lecl. 8. MORAL PHILOSOPHT. 6$ (4.) Rights may be confidered as they differ with regard to their obje^l. i. Rights we have over our own perions and aftions. This clafs is called liberty. 2. Rights over things or goods which belong to us. This is called property. 3. Rights over the perfons and adions of other men. This is called authority. 4. Rights in the things which are the property of others, which are of fe- veral forts. When we come to the fecond great diviiion of moral philofophy, politics, the above diftinftions will be more fully explained ; at prefent it is fuf- ficient to point at them in order, to {hew what are the great lines of duty from man to man. Our duty to others, therefore, may be all com- prehended in thefe two particulars, jullice and mercy. Juflice confift» in giving or permitting others to enjoy whatever they have a perfect right to, and making fuch an ufe of our own rights as not to en- croach upon the rights of others. There is one writer, David Hume, who has derided the duty of juftice, refohnng it wholly into power and con- veniency ; and has affirmed that property is com- mon, than which nothing can be more contrary to reafon ; for if there is any thing clear as a dictate of reafon, it is, that there are many rights which men feverally pofTefs, w^hich others ought not to \-iolate. The foundation of property in goods, I wiU afterwards fhew you, is plainly laid in the fo- ciai ft ate. Ar other virtue which this author ridicules is chaftity. This, however, will be found to be iu. 66 LECTURES ON Le(fl. 8. eluded in juftice, and tcrbe found in the fentiments of all nations, and to have the clearell foundation hath in nature and public utility. Mercy is the- other great branch of our duty to man, and is the exercife of the benevolent prin- ciple in general, and of the feveral particular kind aifecbions. Its acts, generally fpeaking, belong to the clafs of imperfect • rights, which are ftrongly binding upon the confcience, and abfolutely nccef- fary to the fubiiftence of human fociety ; yet fuch as cannot be enforced with rigour and precifion by human law^s. Mercy may be generally explained by a readi- nefs to do all the good offices to others that they Hand in need of, and are in our power, unlefs they are oppofed to fome perfect right, or an imperfed^ one of greater moment. LECTURE IX. THE third clafs of moral duties is what con- tains our duty to ourf valves. This branch of duty is as real and as much founded in the moral principle, as any of the for- mer. Confcience as clearly lefliiies the evil of ne- glefting it, and vicious condud in this refped does generally lead us diredly not only to mifery, but to fliame. We may, I think, divide our duties to ourfelves into two heads, which will be both dlilind and Led. 8. MORAL PHiLosoPHT. 6y comprehenfive, i. Self-government. 2. Self-in- tereft. The firil of thefe is to keep our thoughts, de- fires, and affeftions, in due moderation. If it be alked. What is due moderation ? I anfwer, it may be difcovered three ways, (i.) When the indul- gence interferes with our duty to God, (2.) To ourfelves, and, (3.) To our neighbour. When our thoughts or defires are fuch as to be contrary to the love, fear, or truft we owe to God, then they are to be reilrained and brought into fub- jeclion — Thus are generated the virtues of htimi- lity, contcntjnenty patience, and fuch as are allied to them. When our thoughts and inward temper are fuch as to be any way injurious to others, they muft be governed and retrained ; hence arifes the obliga- tion to guard againft all the immoral paffions, which will produce meeknefs and compofure of fpirit. And when we have got but a little experience, we fball fpeedily find that an exceffive indulgence of any paflion, Icve, hatred, anger, fear, difcom- pofes us exceedingly, and is an evil inftead of a blefling. We fhall therefore perceive the neceffi- ty of continence, felf-denial, fortitude, reftraint, and moderation in every thing how good foever. 2. The other general branch of duty to ourfelves may be called felf-intereil. This, taking in natu- ral religion, includes our relation to tlie Divine Being, and attending particularly to that of procTU- ring liis favour. Therefore it is a prime part of our duty to ourfelves, to guard againfl any thing 68 LECTURES ON Lecl. 5. that may be hurtful to our moral characler, or reli- gious hopes. 2. We ought to be acSbive and diligent in acqui- ring every thing neceffary for life and comfort. Moll of our duties to ourfelves, refemble the du- ties of juftice and mercy to others. If there are certain offices due them, and if they have rights and claims in confequence of their flate and rela- tions, the fame is the cafe with ourfelves. We are therefore to take all proper methods to preferve and acquire the goods both of mind and body. To acquire knowledge, to preferve health, reputation, pofTefTions. The whole muft be kept within fome limits ; chiefly we muft guard againft interfering with the rights of others. It will be proper, before concluding this part of the fubje£l, to take notice of the opinions of the ancients, particularly their enumeration of what are called the cardinal virtues. Their cardinal virtues were justice^ temperance^ prudence, -axidfoj'titude. Juftice included the whole of our duty to our neighbour. Humanity or bene- volence, you fee, is kept out of view, though a vir- tue of the firft clafs ; but all its exercifes are with them ranked under the heads of juftice ; tempe- rance was by them considered as much more exten- five than beinf{ moderate in the ufe of meats and drink, to which the Englilh word is chiefly con- fined. The Egkrateia of the Greeks, fignified not only abflinence in meats and drink, but continence or purity, and a moderation of all our dcfires of whatever kind, of fame and riches, as well as plea- Le£l. 9. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 69 fares. Prudence, even in the way they generally explain it, feems fcarcely to be a moral, or fo much as a natural quality. Prudence, they fay, is taking the wifeft courfe to obtain fome good end. The placing this among the cardinal virtues will fliow how matters flood among them. Great parts or talents were in high efteem. They did not very fully diftinguifli between a good man and a great man. Prudence feems rather an embellifliment of an illuftrious charader, than a moral virtue. An- other reafon why prudence feems to have held fuch a place among the ancients was, that their chief foundation for virtue was interell, or what will pro- duce happinefs. The inquiry upon this fubjedl was, what is the summum honum. Now, to this prudence is very neceffary. Agreeably to all this, they commonly called the virtuous man, the wise 7?:an, and he was always an hero. Fortitude is eafily underftood, and may be con- fidered in two lights, as active and pafiive, which gives the two great virtues of patience and va- lour. ■ One of the moil remarkable qualities in morals among the ancients, v;as the debate upon the Sto- ical polition, That pain is no evil, nor pleafure any good. This arifes from comparing external thmgs w^ith the temper of the mind, when it appears without doubt, that the latter is of much more con- fequence to happinefs than the- former. They ufed to reafon thus : Outward polTeflions, "when be- llowed upon a bad man, make him no better, but worfe, and finally more miferable. How, then, cr.n thefe be goods in themfelves, which become good Vol. VII. G 70 LECTURES o>5r Le6l. 9, or evil, according to the ftate of him that ufes them. They were therefore called the things in- different. There was fomething ftrained and ex- travagant in fome of their writings, and perhaps oftentatious, yet a great deal of true and juft rea- foning. The moft beautiful piece of antiquity in the moral way, is the Tablature of Cebes. Let us now recapitulate what we have gone through, and then add fome obfervations, or corrol- laries, on the morality of a£lions. We have conft- dered, 1 . The nature of man. 2. The nature, foundation, and obligation ot virtue. 3. Have given a fort of general analylis of the moral lav/s, as pointing out our duty to God, to our neighbour, and to ourf elves. We miaft now conlider all morality in general as conformity to a law. We have feen above whence ^ this law is coUecled, -and derives its authority. Men may differ, not only as to the foundation, but as to the import or meaning of the law in fome particulars •, but it is always fuppofed that the law exifts. The morality of anions may be confidered in two different lights, but thefe very nearly related to each other, (i.) As they are ranked and difpofed of by the law itfelf ; (2.) In the conformity or op- pofition of the a£lions to the law. Under the firft view, an aftion is either com- manded, forbidden, or permitted. Commanded duties oblige abfolutely, and, as ca- fuifls ufed to fay, semper non vero ad semper; that is to fay, they are obligatory upon all perfons, at the Left. 9. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 71 feaToas that are proper for them, but not upon every perfon at every time ; becaufe then there could be but one moral duty. All men are obliged to worfhip God, but this only at certain times ; other duties have aKo their place and feafon. Prohibitions oblige semtef et ad semper^ all per- fons at ail times. We mufl not lie — this obliges every man at every moment, becaufe no time or circumflances can make it lawful. On permiffion v>'e may obfer\-e feveral things. 1. There is, asfome fay, a two-fold permiiHon, the cne full and abiolute, which not only gives us a right to certain things with impunity, but implies a pofitive approbation of the legiilator, and the other implies only that the aclion is left at large, being neither comrtanded nor forbidden. 2. PermiiTion in natural law^s always implies the approbation of the legiilator ; and whatever is done in confequence of it, is innocently done, for God and conlcience do not permit, or pafs uncondemned, any bad aftions. 3. It is otherwife in human laws ; if they leave any aftion open, it may be done with impunity, and yet by no means with approbation. I may have a right by human laws to fay things in a co- vered and couched manner, v.hich yet may carry in them the highefl degree of malignity. 4. The truth is, v-hen we confider the morality of aclion in a itricl or proper manner, the whole clafs of permitted actions vaniihes. They become by their intention and application either good or bad. G2 7^ LECTURES ON Led:. 9. Confidering a£lions in their conformity to the laws, a diftin£)-ion arifes fimilar to the former, into good or jufl,' bad and indifferent, A good aftion muft be wholly conformable to the law in its fubftance, and in all its circumftances. It is not enough that it be materially good, the time muft be proper, and the intention laudable. A bad a(Sl:ion is that which, either in fubftance or in any circumftance, is contrary to the law. In confequence of this, ftridly and properly fpeaking, all truly good or juft aftions are equally fo, ariling from a perfeft conformity to the la;/, as all ftraight lines are equally ftraight ; but all bad aftions are not equally bad, as lines may be bent in a different degree from the ftraight diredlion. IndiiTerent actions (if there tre any truly fuch) are thofe that are permitted, and neither command- ed nor forbidden by the law j but when we coniider the fpirit and principles of true morality, we ftiall find no actions v/holly indifferent, becaufe we are under an obligation to promote the happinefs of ourfelves and others, to which every aftion may be applied immediately or remotely ; and fubjedion to the divine will may make a part of our defign, in doing or forbearing any thing whatever. In eftimating the morality of aftions, feveral cir- cumftances muft be considered, (i.) The good done. (2.) The principle from which it flows, — felf-intereft of the con traded kind, benevolence, or hope of reward. (3.) The hindrances or oppofi- tion that muft be furmounted, as intereft, inclina- tion, diiTiCulty. An obje£lion feems to arife from this, not ealily folved. If an a£l:on is the more Le£l. 9. MORAL PHILOSOPHT. J§ virtnous, the more oppofition, internal and external^ that is overcome, then the longer a man has had the habit of virtue ; and the more completely it is formed, the lefs merit in his adions. It feems alfo to take away ail moral excellence from the Deity, who cannot be fuppofed to have the leail oppofition to encounter, either from within or without. This objedion cannot be eafily removed, but by faying, that the oppofition is in no other refpeft an evi- dence of the good moral temper, but as it Ihews the ftreno-th of that inclination that overcomes it ; and therefore, when a moral habit is fo ftrong as to overcome and annihilate all oppofition, it is fo much the more excellent. An action c^ood in itfelf, may be made criminal by an evil intention. But no action, in itfelf exil, can be made lawful or laudable by a good intention. A ma:i is obliged to follow the dictates of con- fciencc ; yet a mlftaken confcicnce does not wholly abfolve from guilt, becaufe he ought to have been at more pains to obtain information. An action is not virtuous in proportion to its op- pofite being vicious. It is no high degree of vir- tue to love our offspring, or pro%-ide for a family ;. but to negleft either is exceedingly vjcious. One phenomenon in human nature, nearly con* nected with the moral feelings, has been particu- larly confidered by fome writers, viz. That tiiere is fuch a difpofition in the generality of men to crowd to fee objects of diftrefs, as an extraordinary public execution. What is the defire that prompts to it ? Is xhe fight of mifery a pleafant feeling ? Some G3 74 . LECTURES ojj" Le£l. 9. xefolve it merely into curiofity, which they con- fider as a natural and original impreffion. But there feems to be foracthing in it different . from novelty. Others fay its arifes from benevolence, and is an exercife of compafFior, and that we have a llrong natural impulfe to the affeftion of pity, and really feel a pleafure in indulging it. But though every well-difpofed mind is high- ly fufceptible of pity, at leafl of all the benevo- lence and help that pity fuggeits when the obje^l: prefeiits itfelf, we can fcarcely fay that the feel- ing is pleafant, or that we have a delire after fuch objeds, in order to the gratification. They who re af on on the felfifn fcheme, as ufual, refolve all into private intereil ; they fay we de- light to fee objefts of dillrefs, becaufe it gives us a fecret fatisfa6iion in reflecting upon our own dif- ferent lituation. I believe there is fuch a fatisfac- tion in narrow and contrafted minds ; but to thofe tolerably difpofed it has an oppofite effeft ; it makes them rather confider the calamities which they themfelves are fubje6l to, than thofe from which they are free. Perhaps it would be bed to take more than one principle to account for this elFe£t. Curiofity mufl make a part, and probably humanity and compaf- fion alfo contribute to it. It feems to be thought fome little alleviation to the fufferer's mifery when others pity him. Yet prudent perfons, knowing how unavailing this pity is, often choofe to be ab- fent. Sympathy is a particular a^edion in aid of be- nevolence. Yet, like all other private aff:6t-oiis^ Left. 9. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 75 •vhen it is not moderated, it prevents its own c5e£l. One deeplj affefted with the view of an objecl of diitrefs, is ofien thereby incapacitated to aflift him. Another queftion is fometimes fubjoined to the above, Why men have pleafur* in feeing tragedy, which is a llriking reprefentation of a melancholy cataftrophe ? As far as the fubjed differs from co- medy, it may be accounted for on the fame prin- ciples with the defire to fee objecls of diftrefs. But one powerful principle leads both to ccniedy and tragedy, — a pleafure in the imitative arts ; an exa6t portrait of any cbjecr whatever, gives the hlgheft pleafure, even though the object itfelf were originally terrible or difgulting. We fee plainly, that an indulgence of the plea- fure given by a fine performance, is what crowds the theatre. Unhappily, to give greater pleafure to a corrupt mind, they often invent fuch fcenes, and conduct the matter fo, as to make the ftage the greatell enemy to virtue and good morals. LECTURE X, OF POLITICS. POLITICS contain the principles of focial u- nion, and the rules of duty in a ft ate of fo- ciety. This is but another and more complete \iew of the fame things, drawn out more fully^ 76 LECTURES omr Left. re. and applied to particular cafes. Political law is the authority of any fociety flamped upon moral duty. The fifft thing to be confidered, in order to fee upon what principles fociety is formed, is the ftate immediately previous to the focial ft ate. This is called the ftate of nature. Violent and unnc- ceflary controverfies have been made on thatfubjecl. Some have denied that any fuch thing ever exifted ^ that fince there v^ere men, they have always been in a focial ftate. And to be fure this is fo far tme, that in no example or fa£l could it ever Taft long.. Yet it is impoflible to consider fociety as a volun- tary union of particular perfons, without filppoftng thofe perfons in a ftate fomewhat different before this union took place. There are rights, therefore, belonging to a ftate of nature, different from thofe of a focial ftate. And diftinft focieties, or ftates independent, are at this moment in a ftate of nature, or natural li- berty, with regard to each other. Another famous queftion has been. Is the ftate of nature a ftate of war or peace ? Hobbes, an author of conftderable note, but of very illiberal fentiments in politics, is a ftrenuous advocate for a ftate of nature being a ftate of war. Hutchinfon and Shaftft)ury plead ftrongly, that a ftate of nature is a ftate of fociety. However oppofite and hoftile their opinions feem to be with regard to each other,, it feems no hard matter to reconcile them. That the principles of our nature lead to fociety, that our happinefs and the improvement of our powers are only to be had in fociety, is of the moft un- Left. 10. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. ^7 doubted certainty ; and that in our nature, as it is the work of God, there is a real good-will and benevolence to others ; but, on the other hand, that our nature as it is now, when free and independent, is prone to injury, and confequently to war, is equally manifell ; and that in a ftate of natural li- berty, there is no other way but force, for preferv- ing fecurity and repelling injury. The inconve- niences of the natural llate are very many. One clafs of the above-mentioned writers fay, that nature prompts to fociety ; and the other, that necelliiy and interell obliges to it ; both are equally irue. Suppofing, then, the flate of natural liberty ante- cedent to fociety to be a reality, let us conilder the perfect and imperfedt rights belonging to that ftate, that we may fee more dillindly hov.^, and why they differ in a focial ftate. The perfect rights in a ftate of natural liberty, are, (i.) A right to life. (2.) A right to employ his faculties and induftry for his ov/n ufe. (3.) A right to the things that are common and neceffary, as air, water, earth. (4.) Aright to perfonal liber- ty. (5.) A power over his own life, not to throw it away unnecelTarily, but for a good re af on. (6.) A right of private judgement in matters of opinion. (7 .) A right to aftbciate, if he fo incline, with any per- fon or perfoRS whom he can perfuadc, (not force) ; under this is contained the right to marriage. (8.) A right to charafter, that is to fay, innocence, (not fame). It is eafy to perceive that all thefe rights belong to a ftate of natural libexty, and that it would be unjuft and unequal for any individual to hinder 78 LECTURES OK Le&i. 10. or abridge another in any one of them, without confent, or unlefs it be in juit retaliation for injury- received. The imperfect natural rights are very numerous, but they are nearly the fame in a flate of nature as in a ftate of fociety, as gratitude, compaflion, mu- tual good offices, if they will be no injury to the perfon performing them. Indeed they muft be the fame in a natural and in a focial ftate, becaufe the very definition of an imperfe£l right is fuch as you cannot ufe force to obtain. Now, what you ought not to ufe force to obtain in a ftate of na- tural liberty, human laws in a well conftituted ftate will not give yoti. Society I would define to be an aflbciation or eompaft of any number of perfons, to deliver up or abridge fome part of their natural rights, in or- der to have the ftrength of the united body, to proteft the remaining, and to beftow others. Hobbes, and fome other writers of the former age, treat with great contempt this which is gene- rally called the focial compaft. He infifts that monarchy is the law of nature. Few are of liis fentiments now, at leaft in Britain, yet it is proper to trace them to the foundation. It is to be admitted, that fociety began firft in- fenfibly by families, and almoft necclTarily. Hence parental authority was the firft law, and perhaps it extended for two or three generations in the early -ages. Though the patrons of monarchy ufe this as an argument, it dpes not favour iheir fcheme. This which they call the patriarchal government, tould not extend far ; or fuppofing it could, there Le£t. 10. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 79 would be but one rightful king in all the earth, the lineal defcendcnt of Adam's eldeft fon, not to men- tion that the very order of lucceflion in hereditary- right has never been uniform, and is but of late fettled in the European nations. The truth is, though man, for wife reafons, after- v.'ards to be noticed, continues longer in a family- dependence than other animals, yet in time he becomes sui juris ; and when their numbers are in- creafed, when they either continue together, or re- move and form diftind focieties, it is plain that there muft be fuppofed an exprefled or implied contra£l. Some fay there is no trace or record of any fuch contra£t in the beginning of any fociety. But this is no argument at all ; for things infeparable from, and eflential to any Hate, commonly take place fo infenfibly, that their beginning is not obferved. When perfons believe themfelves, upon the whole, raiher oppreffed than protected in any fociety, they think they are at liberty, either to rebel a- gainft it, or to fly from it ; which plainly implies, that theii* being fubject to it arofe from a tacit confent. Befides, in migrations and planting of colonies, in all ages, we fee evident traces of an original contra£t and confent taken to the principles of union. From this view of fociety as a voluntary com- paft, refults this principle, that men are originally and by nature equal, and confequently free. Liberty either cannot, or ought not to be given 8© LECTURES ON Le<^. I®. Up in the fecial Hate. The end of the union fhould be the protection of liberty, as far as it is a bleff- ing. The definition of liberty in a conftituted go- vernment, will be afterwards explained. Some obferve, that few nations or focieties in the world have had their conflitutions formed on the principles of liberty : perhaps not one twentieth of the ilates that have been ellabliihed lince the be- ginning of the world, have been fettled upon prin- ciples altogether favourable to liberty. This is no juft argument againft natural liberty and the rights of mankind ; for it is certain, that the public good has always been the real aim of the people in ge- neral, in forming and entering into any fociety. It has alfo conflantly been at leaft the profefled aim of legiflators. Therefore the principle feems to have been admitted, only they have failed or been difappointed in practice by miftalie or deceit. Though perhaps not one twentieth part of man- kind have any tolerable Ikill in the fine arts, it does not follow that there are no fuch arts, or that the principles of them are not founded in nature. Reafon teaches natural liberty, and common utility recommends it. Some nations have feen this more clearly than others, or have more hap- pily found the means of eftabliiliing: it. Here, perhaps, we fhould conlider a little the queflion, Whether it is lawful to make men or to keep them flaves, without their confent ? This will fall afterwards to be confidered more fully : in the mean time, obferve, that in every flate there jnufl be fome fuperior ^^and others inferior j and it Ledt. 10. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. St IS hard to fix the degree of fubje^tion that may fall to the lot of particular perfons. Men maj "become flaves, or their perfons and labour be put wholly in the power of others by confent. They may alfo fometimes, in a conftituted flate, be made llaves by force, as a puniihnient for the commiffion of crimes. But it is certainly unlawful to make inroads upon others, unproved, and take away their liberty, by no better right than fuperior power. It has fometimes been doubted, whether it is law- ful to take away the liberty of others for life, even on account of crimes committed. There can be no flrong reafon given againft this, except that which is fuppofed to operate in Great Britain a- gainft making malefactors Haves, that it would be unfavourable to rational liberty to fee any rank of men in chains. But, fetting this afide, it feems plain, that if men may forfeit their lives to fo- ciety, they may alio forfeit their liberty, which is a lefs precious bleifing. It feems alfo more agree- able, both to equity and public utility, to puniih fome fort of crimes with hard labour, than death. Imprifonment for life has been admitted and prac- tifed by all nations. Some have pleaded for ma- king flaves of the barbarous nations, that they are a^ otherwife better, to let out their labour to others for hire. Let us fhortly confider, (i.) How far this fubjec- tion extends. (2.) The duties on each fide. As to the firft, it feems to be only that the matter has a right to the labours and ingenuity of the fer- vant for a limited time, or at mofl for life. He gan have no right either to take away life, or to make it iniupportable by excellive labour. The fervant therefore retains all other natural rights. The pradice of ancient nations, of making their prif oners of war flaves, was altogether imjuft and barbarous ; for though we could fuppofe that thofe who were the caufes of an mijuil war deferred to be made Haves ; yet tliis could not be the cafe of all wha fought on their fide ; befides, the doing fo Vol. VII. I 94 LECTURES ON Jjcdi, II. in one inftance would authorlfe the doing it in any other ; and thofe who fought in defence of his country, when unjuftly invaded, might be taken as well as others. The pra6lice was alfo impolitic, as flaves never are fo good or faithful fervants, as thofe who become fo for a limited time by con- fent. LECTURE XII, OF CIVIL SOCIETY. CIVIL Society is diftinguifhed from domeftic, in the union of a number of families in one ftate, for their mutual benefit. We have before affirmed, that fociety always fuppofes an exprefled or implied contract or agree- ment. Let us now fee what this agreement necef- farily implies. (i.) The confent of every individual to live in, and be a member of that fociety. (2.) A confent to fome particular plan of government. (3.) A mutual agreement between the fubjefts and rulers ; of fubjeftion on the one hand, of proteftion on the other. Thefe are all implied in the union of every fociety, and they complete the whole. Any objeftions that may be raifed againfl this are eafily folved.. Ex. gr. Though every indivi- dual has not given an adual confent, yet his deter- .mination to live with any fociety implies it. Again, if it be aiked, how children come to be members of Lecl. 12. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 95 a focietv ? ii is anfwered, they receive the benefits and partake of the rights of the focietj during the whole time of their education ; and as they conae to the ufe of reafon, they both claim the privilege and acquiefce in the duty of citizens. And if they find any thing infupportable in their condition, they may alter it at their pleafure. Have^ then, all fubjefts a? right, when they fee fit, to remove from the fociety in which they are ? I anfvver, that in all ordinary cafes they ought to have, at leaft in time of peace. Perhaps it may be af- firmed with juftice, that they who have enjoyed the privileges of any fociety in time of peace, if war or danger to the public fiiould arife, they may be hindered from emigrating at that time, and com- pelled to contribute their lliare in what is neceflary TO the common defence. Whatever is the form of government in any fociety, the members may be divided into two claiTes, the ruUrs and the ruled, the magiitrates and fubjects. The rights of rulers may be divided into eflential and accidental : the cilential, fuch as in general mull be veiled in rulers of every fociety ; the accidental, fuch as maybe given to the rulers in fome focieties, but not in others. The eflential rights of rulers, are what require mod to be enumerated ; and thefe again by fome good writers ' are divided into greater and lefTer ef- ientials. Of the firft kind are, (l.) Legiflation. (2.) Taxation for the public expence. (3.) Jurifdiction, or the adminiltration of juftice. (4.) Reprefen- 1 2 Cf6 LECTURES ON Left. 12. tation, or appearing and a£ling in name of the whole, in all tranfaftions, with adjacent indepen- dent flates, chiefly for the purpofes of making wap or peace. The lefs elTential rights of rulers are many, and they are called lefs effential, becaufe they may be more varied than the others ; fuch as, coining of mone}', pofTefling or managing public edifices, con- ferring honours on officers. Sec. The rights of fubjects in a focial flate cannot be enumerated, but they may be all fummed up in protectio?i ; that is to fay, thofe who have furrendered part of their natural rights, expedl the flrength of the public arm to defend and improve what re- mains. It has been often faid, that government is carried on by rewards and punifliments ; but it ought to be obfer^ved, that the only reward that a ftate can be fuppoftd to beflow upon good fubjefts in general, is prote6tion and defence. Some few who have diftinguifhed themfelves in the public fervice, may be diftinguifhed by particular rewards ; but to re- ward the v/hole is impoffible, becaufe the reward mull be levied from thofe very perfons to whom it is to be given. After what has been faid on the foundation of fociety, viz. confent, perhaps it may be neceffary to mention two exceptions. I. It is faid by fome, with apparent reafon, that a tew perfons, if accidentally armed with powder, may conftrain a large ignorant rabble to fubmit to laws which will be for their good. This I would admit in fome cafes, when there is an evident mad- Left. 12. MORAL rHiLosoriiY. 97 nefs and diforder in the multitude, and when there is a moral certainty tliat they will afterwards be pleafed with the violence done them. But in ge- neral it is but a bad maxim, that we may force people for their good. All lovers of power will be difpofed to think, that even a violent ufe of it is for the public good. 2. Though people have a£l:ually confented to iiny form of government, if they have been effen- tially deceived in the nature and operation of the laws, if they are found to be pernicious and de- ilruftive of the ends of the union, they may cer- tainly break up the fociety, recal the obligation, and refettle the whole upon a better footing. Of the different Forms of Government. As foon as men began to confider and compare forms of government, they divided them into three general and limple kinds, (i.) Monarchy, (2.) Ariftocracy, (3.) Democracy. Thefe are called fmiple, becaufe they are clearly difliing-uifliable from each other in their nature and effeds. The ancients generally divided the forms of govern- ment in this manner, becaufe moft of their go- vernments were of one or other of thefe kinds, with, very little mixture. Monarchy is when the fupreme power is veiled in a fmgle perfon. Mr Hutchinfon fays. Monar- chy may be either abfolute or limited ; but this is an inaccuracy, for limited monarchy is one of the mixed kinds of government. But moaarchr may be either temporary or for 13 98 LECTURES ON Le6l. 12. ]if?. The Roman dictators were abfolute for a time, and fo long as they continued, the government was purel monarchical, all other powers being dormant. Monarchy may alfo be either hereditary or elec- tive. Ariftocracy is^ that form of government in which the fiipreme power is lodged with a fmall number of nobles. This is capable of the fame variations as monarchy ; and it may be either tem- porary or perpetual,- hereditary or elective, witli this difference, that a temporary or elective ari- llocracy always puts fome power in the hands of the people. The moil complete arifhocracy is when the ruling party have the power of co-opta- tiori within themfelves, and can fill up as they pleafe the vacancies made by deaths or religna- tion. Democracy is when the fupreme power is left in the multitude. But as in large governments the people in a colle£tive body cannot well meet to- gether, nor could they tranfacl bufinefs with any convenience if they did, they may meet by re- prcfentatives, chofen either by the whole or by par- ticular diftrifts. From thofe fimple forms are generated many complex form.s ; two of them may be compounded together, either in equal or in different proportions, or all thefe may be united, as in the Britilli govern- ment. After pointing out the fimple forms of govern- ment, it will be proper to make fome general ob- fers^ations upon government, and apply them to the Leci. 12. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 99 various forms, to (hew whether any of tliem is pre- ferable to the other, and the advantages and defedls of each in particular. I. There are four things that feem to be requi- fite in- a fyflem of government, and every form is good in proportion as it poffefles or attains them. (1.5 Wifdom to plan proper meafares for the pub- lic good. (2.) Fidelity to have nothing but the public intereft in view. (3.) Secrecy, expedition, and difpatch in carrying meafures into execution. And, (4.) Unity and concord, or that one branch of the government may not impede, or be a hindrance to another. Monarchy has plainly the advantage in unity, fecrecy, and expedition. Many cannot fo eaiily nor fo fpeedily agree upon proper meafures, nor can they expe6l to keep their deligns fecret ; there- fore, fayfome, if a man could be found wife enough, and juft enough for the charge, monarchy would be the bell form of government. Accordingly we find, that in the command of a fliip, fleet, or army, one perfori is commonly intruded with fupreme power ; but this does not apply to Hates, for many reafons. No man can be found who has either ikill fufficient, or, if he had, could give attention to the whole departments of a great empire. Befides, in hereditary monarchies there is no fecurity at all for either wifdom orgoodnefs; and an elective mo- narchy, though it may feem to promife ability^ has been always found in experience worfe than the other, becaufe there is no reafon to expedl that an elected monarch will have the public good at ICO LECTURES ON Le(^. 12. heart ; lie will probably mind only private or fa- mily intereft. Ariftocracy has the advantage of all the others for wisdom in deliberations ; that is to fay, a number of perfons of the firft rank mull be fuppofed by their confultations to be able to difcover the public intereft. But it has very little or no profpe£l of fidelity or union. The moft ambitious projeds, and the moll violent and in\;lacable factions, often prevail in fuch Hates. Democracy has the advantage of both the otliers for fidelity ; the multitude colle<5lively always are true in intention to the intereft of the public, becaufe it is their own. They are the public. But at the fame time, it has very little advantage for wifdom or union, and none at all for fecrecy and expedition. Belides, the multitude are exceeding apt to be de- ceived by demagogues and ambitious perfons. They are very apt to truft a man who ferves them well, with fuch power as that he is able to make them ferve him. If the true notion of liberty is the prevalence of law and order, and thefecurity of individuals, none of the limple forms are favourable to it. Monarchy, every one knows, is but another name Sox tyranriy, w^here the arbitrary will of one capri- cious man difpofes of the lives and properties of all ranks. Ariftocracy always makes vaftals of the inferior ranks, who have r.o hand in governi^ient, and the great commonly rule with greater feverit}^ than ab- folute monarchs. A monarch is at fuch a diftance from moft of his fubjeds, that he does them little Ledl. 12. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. lOI injury ; but the lord of a petty feignory is a rigo- rous tafk-mafter to hfs unhappy dependents. The jealoufy with wliich the members of an ariftocrati- cal ftate defend their own privileges, is no fecurity at all for humanity and eafy treatment to their infe- riors. Example — the Spartans ; their treatment of the Helots — and the barons in all the feudal govern- ments, in their treatment of their vaflals. Pure democracy cannot fubfift long, nor be car- ried far into the departments of ftate — it is very fubjed to caprice and the madnefs of popular rage. They are alfo very apt to chufe a favourite, and veft him with fuch power as overthrows their ow^ii liberty, — examples, Athens and Rome. Hence it appears, that every good form of govern- ment muft be complex, fo that the one principle may check the other. It is of confequence to have as much virtue among the particular members of a community as poffible ; but it is folly to expeA that a ftate ftiould be upheld by integrity in all who have a ftiare in managing it. They muft be fo balanced, that when every one draws to his own intereft or inclination, there may be an over-poife upon the whole. II. The fecond obfer\'ation upon the forms of government is, that where there is a balance of dif- ferent bodies, as in all mixed forms, there muft bo always fome tiexus imperii, fomething to make one of them neceOary to the other. If this is not the cafe, they will not only draw different ways, but will often feparate altogether from each other. In order to produce this nexusy fome of the great eften- lial rights of rulers muft be divided, and diftribut^d lOi LECTURES ON Left. 12. among the different branches of the legiilature Example in the Britiih government — the King has the power of making war and peace, but the Par- liament have the le\^ing and dillribution of money, which is a fufficient reftraint. III. The third obfervation is, that the ruling part of any ftate muft always have confiderable pro- perty, chiefly of lands. The reafon is, property has fuch an invariable influence, that w^hoever poflfeffes property muft have power. Property in a'ftate is alfo fome fecurity for fidelity, becaufe intereft thea is concerned in the public welfare. For this reafon, did men in every ftate live en- tirely by agriculture, an agrarian law would be ne- celTary to liberty, becaufe if a vdk proportion of property came into a few hands, they would foon take all power to themfelves. But trade and com- merce fuperfede the neceflity of this, becaufe the great and fudden fortunes accumulated by trade caufe a rotation of property. IV. In a well-formed flate, the fubjccts fiiould not be too numerous, nor too few. If very nu- merous, the principles of government cannot exert their force over the whole. The Roman empire fell by its own weight. If the fubjefts are toofew^ they are not fufficient to fupprefs internal infurrec- tions, or repel attacks from without. V. It is frequently obferved, that in every go- vernment there is a fupreme irrefiflible power lod- ged fomewhere, in king, fenate, or people. To this power is the final appeal in all quefiions. Be- yond this we cannot go. How far does this autho- rity extend ? We anfwer, As far as authority in * heS:. 12. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I03 fecial ilate can extend, it is not accountable to any other tribunal ; and it is fuppofed in the focial com- pacl, that we have agreed to fubmit to its deciiion. There is, however, an exception, if the fuprenie power, wherever lodged, come to be exercifed in a manifeflly tyrannical manner, the fubjecls may cer- tainly, if in their power, refift and overthrow it. But this is only when it becomes manifeftly more advantageous to unfettle the government altogether, than to fubmit to tyranny. This refiflance to the fupreme power, hov/ever, is fubverting the fociety altogether, and is not to be attempted till the go- vernment is fo corrupt, as that anarchy and the un- certainty of a new fettlement is preferable to the continuance as it is. This doclrine of reiiliance even to the fupreme power is elTentiaily conned:ed with what has been faid on the focial contract, and the confent necef- fary to political union. If it be alked. Who mull judge v/hen the government may be refilled ? I an- fwer, The fubjects in general, every one for himielf- This may feem to be making them both judge and party, but there is no remedy. It would be deny- ing the ^privilege altogether, to make the oppreffivc ruler the judge. It is eafy to fee, that the meaning of this is not, that any little miilake of the rulers of any fociety will juftify refiilance. We mult obey and fubmit to them always, till tlie corruption becomes intole- rable ; for to fay that we might refut legal authori- ty every time we judged it to be wrong, would be inconliilent w^ith a ftate of fociety, and to the very iirft idea of fubie6tion. 104 LECTURES ON Le£l. 12. The once famous controverfy on pafTive obe- dience and non-refiftance, feems now, in our coun- try, to be pretty much over; what the advocates for fubmiffion ufed to fay was, that to teach the lawfulnefs of refifting a government in any inftance, and to make the rebel the judge, is fubverfive of all order, and muft fubjecl a flate to perpetual fedi- tion ; to which I anfwer, To refufe this inherent right in every man, is to eftablifh injuftlce and ty- ranny, and leave every good fubjeception as in itfelf bafe and unworthy, and there- fore a good end cannot juflify it. Beiides> to fup- pofeit were in men's power, on a fufTicient occa- fion, to violate truth, would greatly deltroy its force in general, and its ufe in the focial life. There are two forts of falfehood, which, becaufe no doubt they are lefs aggravate^ than malicious interefted lies, many admit of, but I think without fufiicient reafon. 1. Jocular lies, when there is a real deception intended, but not in any thing material, nor intend- ed to continue long. However harmlefs thefe may feem, I reckon they are to be blamed, becaufe it is uiing too much freedom with fo facred a thing as truth. And very often fuch perfons, as a righteous punifhment in Providence, are left to proceed fur- ther, and eiiher to carry their folly to fuch excefs, as to become contemptible, or to go beyond folly into malice. 2. Officious lies, telling falfehoods to children or iick perfons, for their good. Thefe very fel- dom anfvver the end that is propofed. They lefien the reverence for truth ; and, particularly with re- gard to children, are exceedingly pernicious ; fpr, as th^y muft foon be difcovercd, they lofe their Le6l. 15. MORAL PHILOSOPHT. I39 force, and teach them to deceive. Truth and au- thority are methods infinitely preferable, in deal- ing with children, as well as with perfons of riper years. LECTURE XVI. Of Oaths and Vows, A?>IONG the figns and appendages of con- tracts, are oaths and vows. An oath is an appeal to God, the Searcher of hearts, for the truth of what we fay, and always exprefTes or foppofes an imprecation of his judge- ment upon us, if we prevaricate. An oath, therefore, implies a belief in God, and his pro\-idence, and indeed is an a5: of wonnip, and fo accounted in fcripture, as in that expreflion, "Ihcu shall fear the Lord God, and shalt swear by his jiaJ7ie. Its ufe in human affairs is very great, when managed with judgement. It may be ap- plied, and indeed has been commonly ufed, i. In the contra6ts of independent ftates, who have no common earthly fuperior. In ancient times, it was ufual always to clofe national treaties by mu- tual oaths. This form is not fo common in mo- dem times, yet the fubflance remains ; for an ap- peal is always fuppofed to be made to God, againil the breach of public faith. 2. It has bten adopted by all nations, in tbeir 14® LECTURES ON Led. l6. adminiilration of juftice, in order to difcover truth. The mofl common and.miiverfal application of it has been, to add greater folemnity to the teftimony of witnefles. It is alfo fometimes made ufe of with the parties themfelves, for conviction or pur- gation. The laws of every country point out the cafes in which oaths are required or admitted in public judgement. It is, however, lawful, and in common practice, for private perfons, voluntarily, on folemn occafions, to confirm what they fay by oath. Perfons entering on public offices, are alfo often obliged to make oath, that they will faith- fully execute their truft. Oaths are commonly divided into two kinds, as^ sertory and promissory ; thofe called purgatory fall under the firft of thefe divifions. There is, per- haps, little neceflity for a divifion of oaths, for they do not properly Hand by themfelves ; they are confirmations and appendages of contrafts, and intended as an additional fecurity for fmcerity, in the commerce between man and man. Therefore oaths are fabjedl: to all the fame regu- lations as contrails, or rather oaths are cnly law- ful when they are in aid or confirmation of a law- ful contradi:. What, therefore, voids the pne, will void the other, and nothing elfe. A contrad, o- therwifc unlawful, cannot be made binding by an .oath ; but there muft be a very great caution ufed not to make any unlawful centred, much lefs to confirm it by an oath. It is eafy to fee the extreme abfurdlty of our being obliged to fulfil a criminal engagement by oath J for it would imply, that out of reverence to L^£l:. l6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. I4I God we ought to bteak his commands ; but nothing can be more abominable than the principle of tliofe who think thej maj fafelj take an unlawful oath, becaufe it is not binding ; this is aggravating grofs injuftice by deliberate profanity. I have faid, that oaths are appendages to all law- ful contracts ; but in aflertorj oaths, which are only- confirmations of our general obligation to fincerity, it is neceflary, not only that what we fay be true, but that the occalion be of fufficient nioment to re- quire or juftify a folemn appeal to God. Swearing on common occafions is unneceiTary, rafh, profane, and deftru6live of the folemnity of an oath, and its real ufe. From the general rule laid down, that oaths are lawful when applied to lawful contrails, it will follow, that they become unlawful only w^hen the fulfilling of them would be violating a perfed right ; but perhaps an additional obfervation is ne- celTary here. Contrails mull be fulfilled, when they violate an imperfe6t right ; whereas fome oaths may be found criminal and void, though they are only contrary to imperfect rights ; as for example, fome perfons bind themfelves rafhly by oath, that they will never fpeak to, or forgive their children, who have offended them. This is fo evidently criminal, that nobody v.-ill plead for its being obligatory, and yet it is but the violation of an imperfe£l right. The fame perfons, however, might in many ways alienate their property, to the prejudice of their children, by contracts which the law would oblige them to fulfil. Vol. VII. N 141 LECTURES 0!T Lecl:» l6. In vow?, there is no party but God, and the perfon himfelf who makes the vow. For this rea- fon, Mr Hutchinfon relaxes their obligation very much ; fuppoiing any perfon had folemnly vowed to give a certain part of his fubftance to public or pious ufes, he fays, if he finds it a great inconve- nience to himfelf or family, he is not bound. This, I apprehend, is too lax. Men ought to be cau- tious in making fuch engagements ; but I appre- hend, that when made, if not dire£lly criminal^ they ought to be kept. Of the Use of Symhols in Contracts, Besides promifes and oaths, there is fometimes, in contrails, a ufe of other vifible figns, called fymbols ; the mofl common among us are, figning and fealing a written deed. There is alfo, in fome places, the delivery of earth and ftone in making over land, and fundry others. In ancient times, it was ufual to have folemn fymbols in all treaties, mutual gifts, fscrifices, feafts, fetting up pillars. The intention of all fuch things, whenever and wherever they have been pra6lifed, is the fame. It is to afcertain and keep up the memory of the tranfaftion. They were more frequent and folemn in ancient times than now, becaufe before the in- vention of writing they were more necelTary. Of the Value of Property. Before we finifli the fubjedl of contra(9:s, it may te proper to fay a little of the nature and value of Led. l6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1 43 property, which is the fubjecl of them. Nothing has any real value, unlefs it be of fome ufe in hu- man life, or, perhaps we may fay, unlefs it be fuppofed to be of ufc, and fo becomes the object of human defire ; becaufe, at particular times, and in particular places, things of very little real im- poutance acquire a v^lue, which is commonly tem- porary and changeable. Shells and baubles are of great value in fome places ; perhaps there are fome more baubles highly valued in every place. But, though it is their ufe in life that gives things their value in general, it does not follow, tliat thofe things which are of moil ufe and necef- fity, are therefore of greateft value as property, or in commerce. Air and water, perhaps we may add fire, are of the greatell ufe and neceffity ; but they are alfo in greateil plenty, and therefore are of little value as a polTeilion or property. Value is in proportion to the plenty of any commodity, and the demand for it ; the one taken in the inverfe, and the other in the dired proportion. Hence it follows, that money is of no real va- lue. It is not wealth properly, but the lign of it, and, in a fixed ilate of fociety, the certain means of procuring it. In early times, traffic was car- ried on by exchange of goods ; but, being large, not eafily divided or tranfported, they became very troublefome. Therefore, it foon became neceffary to fix upon feme fign of wealth, to be a Handard by which to rate different commodities. Any thing that is fit to anfwer the purpofe of a common fign of wealth, mufl have the following N a 144 LECTURES ow Le^, 16, properties: It mufl: be, i. Valuable; that is, have an intrinfic commercial value, and rare, o- therwile it could have i>o comparative value at all. 2. Durable, otherwife it could not pafs from hand to hand. 3. Divifible, fo that it might be in larger or fmaller quantities, as are required. 4. Portable, it muft not be of great fize, other- wife it would be extremely inconvenient. Gold and iilver were foon found to have all thefe properties, and therefore are fixed upon as the fign of wealth. But, befides being the fign of the va- lue of other commodities, they themfelves are alfo matters of commerce, and therefore increafe or de- creafe in their value, by their plenty or fcarce*. nefs. It may feem to belong to the ruling part of any fociety, to fix the value of gold and filver, as figns of the value of commodities ; and, no doubt, they do fix it nominally in their dominions. But in this they are obliged to be ftri£lly attentive to the value of thefe metals as a commodity, from their plenty or fcarcenefs, otherwife their regulations will be of little force ; other nations will pay no regard to the nominal value of any particular country ; and even in internal commerce, the fubjefl would fix a value upon the figns, according to their plenty. It is as prejudicial to commerce to make the nominal value of the coin of any country too fmall, fts too great. We {hall clofe this part of the fubje^, by fpeak- ing a little of the Le the malignity of tranfgrefiing thefe laws, fuch a% running of goods, breaking over a fence, &.c. 3. In the beft conftitutions, fome fandlions are appointed for the breach of thcfe laws. Wherever a Hate is founded upon the principles of liberty, fuch laws are made with feverity, and executed with ftridlnefs. Finally, a man of real probity and virtue adopts thefe laws as a part of his duty to God and the fo- ciety, and is fubjedl, not only for wrath, but aKo for confcience fake. , RECAPITULATION. Having gone through the three general divifion^ of this fubjeft, Ethics, Politics, and Jurifprudence, I fhall conclude with a few remarks upon the whole, and mention to you the chief writers who have diftinguiihed themfelves in this branch of fcience. I. You may plainly perceive, both how exten- five, and how important moral philofophy is. As to extent, each of the diviHons we have gone through might have been treated at far greater length. Nor would it be unprofitable to enter into a fuller dlfquifition of many points j but this mud be left to every fcholar's inclination and opportmiitie-s in future life. Its importance is manifell from this circumflance, that it not only points out perfo- nal duty, but is related to the whole bufinefs of ac- tive life. The languages, arxd even mathematical tS^ LECTURES ow Left. l5. and natural knowledge, are but hard words to this fuperlor fcience. 2. The evidence which attends moral difquifi- tions, is of a different kind from that which attends mathematics and natural philofophy ; but it re- mains as a point to be difculTed, whether it is more uncertain or not. At iirll fight, it appears that au- thors differ much more, and more effentially, on the principles of moral than natural philofophy. Yet perhaps a time may come, when men, treat- ing moral philofophy as Newton and his fucceffors have done natural, may arrive at greater precifion. It is always fafer, in our reafonings, to trace fafts upwards, than to reafon downwards upon metaphy- seal principles. An attempt has been lately made by Beatty, in his Effay on Truth, to eftablifh cer- tain impreflions o^ common fenfe, as axioms and firfl principles of all our reafonings on moral fub*^ je£ls. 3. The differences about the nature of virtue are not, in faiSl, fo great as they appear ; they amount to nearly the fame thing in the iffue, when the par- ticulars of a virtuous life come to be enumerated. 4. The different foundations of virtue are many of them not oppolite or repugnant to each other, but parts of one great plan ^ as benevolence and felf-love, &.C. They all confpire to found real virtue j the authority of God, the dictates of con- fcience, public happinefs, and private intereff, all coincide. 5. There is nothing certain or valuable in moral philofophy, but what is pericifliy coincident with the fcripture, where the glory of God is the firil Left, 1 6. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Ijl principle of aftion, arifing from the fubjeftion of the creature ; -where the good of others is the great objed of duty, and our ovm intereft the necellary confequence. In the firll dawn of philofophy, men began to write and difpute about virtue. The great inquiry among the ancients was, what was the iummum ho» num / by which, it fecms, they took it for grant- ed, that vinue and happinefs were the fame thing. The chief combatants here, were the ftoics and e- picureans. The firft infifted that virtue was the summum honuniy that pleafure was no good, and pain no evil ; the other faid, that the summum hc^ num confifled in pleafure, or rather that pleafure was virtue ; the academics and Platonifls went a middle way between thefe. I am not feniible that there is any thing among the ancients, that wholly correfponds with the mo- dem difpute upon the foundation of virtue. Since the difputes arofe in the fixteenth and feventeenth centuries, fome of the moft coniider- able authors, chiefly Britifh, are, Leibnitz, his Theodicee and his Letters ; — Hutchinfon's Inqui- ries into the Ideas of Beauty and Virme, and his Syftem ; — Wollafton's Religion of Nature delinea- ted : — Collins on Human Liberty ; — Nettleton on Virtue and Happinefs j — David Hume's Eflavs ; — Lord Kames's EiTays ; — Smith's Theory of Mo- ral Sentiments ; — Reid's Inquiry ; — Balfour's De- lineation of Morality ; — Butler's Analogy and Ser- mons ;— Balguy's Tra£ls ; — Theory of Agreeable Senfations, from the French ; — Beatty on Truth j — EiTay on Virtue and Harmony. 152 LECTURES ON, &c. Left. t6» To thefe maj be added the whole deiftical wri- ters, and the anfwers written to each of them in particular, a brief account of which may be feen in Leland's View of the Deiftical Writers. Some of the chief writers upon government and politics are, Grotius, PufFendorf, Barberac, Cum- berland, Selden, Burlamaqui, Hobbes, Machiavel, Harrington, Locke, Sydney — and fome late books, Montefquieu's Spirit of LaVs ; Fergufon's Hiftory of Civil Society ; Lord Karnes's Political Eflays ; Grandeur and Decay of the Roman Empire ; Mon- tague's Rife and Fall of Ancient Republics ; Go- guet's Rife and Progrefs of Laws, Arts, and Sciences. JLECTIJR^ES ON ELOQUENCE. Vol. Vri. , I LECTURES ON ELOQUENCE. Gentlemen, T T TE, are now vo enter on the ftudj of eloquence, ^ ' or, as perhaps it ought to be called, from the- manner in which you will find it treated. Com- l^ofition, Tafte, and Criticifm. Eloquence is undoubtedly a very noble art, and .when poiTell'ed in a high degree, has been, I think, in all ages, one of the moll admired and envied ta- Jents. It has not only been admired in all age?-, but, if I am not miilaken, among all ranks. Its power is univerfally felt, and therefore probably the talent more univerfally elleemed than either ge- nius or improvement in feveral other kinds of hu- man excellence. Military Ikill and political wif- dom have their admirers-, but far inferior in num- 03 15^ LECTURES OK Left. 1. ber to thofe who admire, envy, or would wifli to imitate, him that has the power of perfuafion. Plato, in his Republic, or, Idea of a well-regu- lated State, has baniflied orators, under pretence that their power over the minds of men is danger- ous, and liable to abufe. Some moderns have adopted the fame fentiments. Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, I believe, (though I am not certain), has embraced it. But this is a manner of thinking and reafoning altoge- ther fuperficial. It v/ould militate equally againfl all cultivation of the mind, and indeed againfl eve- ry human excellence, natural and acquired. They are, and have been, and may be, abufed by men of vicious difpolitions. But how (hall this be pre- X^ented ? It is impoflible. How Ihall it be counter- acted ? Only by affifting the good in the cultiva- tion of their powers, and then the fame weapons will be ufed in defence of truth and virtue, with much greater advantage than they can be in fuppor^ of falfehood and vice. Learning in general, pof- fefied by a bad man, is unfpeakably pernicious, and that very thing has fometimes made weak 3)eople fpeak againft learning ; but it is juft as ab- furd, as if, in the confines of a country expofed to hoftile inroads, the inhabitants fhould fay, We will build no forts for protection, becaufe, if the enemy get into poffeflion of them, they will become the means of annoyance : we will ufe no arms for de- fence ; for, if the enemy take them from us, they will be turned againft us. Perhaps it may be proper to take notice of what the apoflle Paul fays, ia his firll epiftle to the Cc- Lea I. ELOQUEjrCE. t|f rinthians, in feveral places, particularly from the beginning of the 2d chapter, <^ And I, brethren,^ &:c. and in the 4th chapter, nth verfe, " And my Ipeech and my preaching was not," &.c. I have mentioned this, to prevent any of you miftaking, or being prejudifed againil, the fubjed, and fliall obferve upon it, that the meaning of the apoftle in this and other fimilar paiTages, is fully comprehend- ed in one or more of the following particulars : I. That he came not to the Corinthians with an artful delufive eloquence, fucli as the fophiils of thofe days made ufe of to varnilh over their fooliih fentiments. 2, That he came not to Ihew his fkiii in fpeaking for and againfl any tiling, as many of them did, not to difcover or communicate truth, but to difplay their own talents. 3. That the truths he had to communicate needed no ornaments to fet them off, and were not by any means adapt- ed to the proud fpirit of the world. And, 4. That he would ufe the greateft felf- denial, and not by any means attempt to recommend himfelf as a man of ability and learning, but content himfelf with the humble and limple doftrine of the crofs. And the truth is, after the higheil improvement in the art of fpeaking, there muft be the greateft referve and felf-denial in the ufe of it, otherwife it will defeat its own purpofe. Rhetoricians do ufually give it among the very precepts of the art, to appear to be in earneft, and to have the fubjeft or the intereit of the audience at heart, and not their own fame ; and this can nev-erbe attained to fo great perfection, as when there is the humility of a true dilcipl^ 03 *5* LECTURES ON Le(5l. I. and the difmterefled zeal of a faithful minifter of Chrill. That this is not contrary to the moft dili- gent application for the improvement of our powers, is manifefl in itfelf, and appears from the many- exhortations of the fame apoftle to his young dif- ciples, Timothy and Titus, i Tim. iv. 13. ** Till I come, give attendance," &.c. and ver. 15. " Me- ditate," &.C. I know not whether any apology is neceflary foi' my undertaking to fpeak on this fubjed, or the manner of treating it. Some may expeft, that dif- tourles on eloquence flioukl be diftinguifhed exam- ples of the art of which they treat. Such may juft be pleafed to obferve, that a cool, plain, and fimple manner of fpeaking, is neceflary in teaching this, as wxU as every other art. No doubt, a juft- nefs and preciiion of expreflion, will be of great benefit in thefe difcourfes ;. but there will be no need of that high and complete polifh that might be expelled in what is prepared for publication. Nor would the fame brevity and concifenefs be any advantage to difcourfes once delivered, that would be reckoned a beauty in what is in every body*s hands, and therefore may be often read. Before entering on the ftrift and methodical dif- cuflion of the fubjed, I have commonly begun the courfe by two or three preliminary difcourfes, coft- taining fuch general obfervations as may be moft intelligible, and may ferve to prepare the way for -what fhall be afterwards introduced. The fubjeft of the iirlt preliminary difcourfc (ball be the following ^uellion ; Whether does ait Le£l. I. ELO(itiEycE. 159 or nature contribute moll to the produ£lion of a complete orator? This is a queftion often afked, and many things have been faid upon it ; yet, to difcufs it as a mat- ter of controverfy, and adduce the arguments on each fide, in order to a decifion in favour of the one, and prejudice of the other, I take to be of very little confequence, or rather improper and abfurd. It feems to be jull as if one ihould pro- pofe an inquiry, whether the foil, the climate, or the culture, contributes molt to the production of ihz crop ? Therefore, inftead of treating the que- ftion as if one fide of it were tnie, and the other falfe, I fhall make a few obfervations on the in- fluence of nature and art, in order to your forming jufl apprehenfions cf the fubje<51:, and to direft you in your future condudl and ftudies. 2 , Some degree of natural capacity is evidently neceflary to the inftruflion or ftudy of this art, in order to produce any effeft. A Ikilful labourer may fubdue a very ftubborn, or meliorate a very poor foil J but when there is no foil at all, as on a bare and folid rock, his labour would be impoffible or fruitlefs. There muil therefore, doubtlefs, be fome capacity, in general, and even fome turn for this very branch of knowledge. In this fenfe, it is true of every other art, as well as oratory, that a man mult be bom to it. There are fome fo deftitute of oratorical powers^ that nothing can pofiibly be made of them. It will be ftrange, however, if this is not eafily dif- covered by themfelves, and if it does not make- the Itudy as unplsafant as it is difficult, fo Uiat thej t6o LECTURES oy Lei^. I, will fpeedilj give it over. I have known fome examples, but very few, of minifters, whofe prin- cipal deled was mere barrennefs of invention. This is exceedingly rare, becaufe tlie far greateft number of bad fpeakers have enough to fay, fuch as it is ; and generally the more abfurd and inco- herent, the greater the abundance. When fpeaking on this obfervation, I muft make one remark, that a total want of capacity for one branch of fcience, is not inconfillent even with a great capacity for another. We fometimes fee great mathematicians who make miferable orators. Jsfay, it is reckoned by fome of the belt judges, that this fludy is unfriendly to oratory. The de- finite preciHon of methematical ideas, which may all be ultimately referred to menfuration, feems to be contrary to the freedom and boldnefs of imagi- nation, in which the ftrength of oratory Ijes. There are, however, exceptions to this, in fact. Dr Clark, and Dr Barrow, two of the moll eminent mathematicians of the laft age, were alfo eminent orators ; that is to fayj the firft was a very accurate writer, the wother a very fervent preacher. I have only further to obferve, that many have thought academical teaching not to be favourable to oratory ; that is to fay, thofe who are ac- cuftomed to the cool difpaffionate manner of fpeak- hig, ufual and neceffary in the inftru<£lion of youth, frequently lofe a good deal of that fire and impe- tuofity which they might naturally poffefs, and which is of fo much importance in fpeaking to a large and promifcuous aflembly. 2. To make what is c make you vain and coxcomicaJy Knickknackically, firaplify, domefticate, pultpitically. ^§4 LECTURfeS ON Le^. ^ the moft genuine fimplicity, and at tlie fame time xvith perfpicuity ? We find it is quite otherwife. Perhaps it would be be ft to fay, it is following truth, or following that wliich is eafiefl and plaineli, and probably would be followed by all, but for affec- tation. On this fubjeft I can think of nothing fo good as to fay, Realize and fuppofe you faw the thing you would defcribe, and put j^ourfelf in the very ftate of him v»^hofe fentiments you would fpeak. Clear conceptions make diflind expreffions, and reality is a great afliftant to invention. If you were bid to iludy a fubjeft abflraclly, it would be with great difEciTlty that things proper and fuitable to it would come into your mind. But if you yourfelf were in the fituation that is to be fuppo- fed, the fentiments pertinent to it would crowd upon you immediately. Let me try to make this fami- liar by an example : Suppofe I were to aik any of you juft now, what are the circumftances that ag- gravate fm, or make it more heinous, and deferving of fevere punifliment ? It is highly probable he would either be at a lofs altogether, or at leall would omit many of them. But if any of you had received an injury from another, in explaining of it, he would not fail to come over them every one. He would fay it was unprovoked. — If he had done him fervice, he would not fail to upbraid him with it, and nothing would be forgotten between the-, two that could aggravate the crime. Supposing the reality of every thing, alfo, ferves particularly to deliver a fpeaker from affecled or- naments, and every thing in language or carriage Le(Jl. 3. ELOQUENCE. 18^ that is improper : If you were pleading the caufc of one accufed of a capital crime, it would be beii to fuppofe that you yourfelf were the a<:cufed per- fon, ai?d that you were fpeaking for your own life. This would give an earneftnefs of fpirit, and a juft- nefs and corre^lnefs to the manner, infinitely dif- tant from that theatrical pomp, which is fo pro- perly faid to be a departure from the limplicity o£ nature. LECTURE IV. HAVING given you fome preliminary difcour- fes on fuch points as I thought would ferve to prepare you for what might be afterwards faid, I proceed to' treat the fubjecl more methodicallyv and more fully. There are various ways of di- viding the fubjed, which yet may each of them be faid to take in the whole, in one way or other. Several of thefe muft be combined together j as it is not fuilicient to view a building only from one ftation. If you would underfland it thoroughly, you mull view it from different Rations, and even take it in profile, and leani not only its outward appearance, but its inward llruciure. The me- thod I have refolved to follow, and w^hich feems to me as complete as any I could fall upon, is this — I. To treat of language in general, its ouali. •l86 LECTURES ON LciH:. 4. ties, and pcwers— eloquent fpeech — and its hiftory ^nd pradlices as an art. II. To coniider oratory as divided into its three great kinds, the fublime — fimple — and mixed,-^ their characters — their diilinftions — ^their beauties —and their ufes. III. To confider it as divided into its conftituent parts — invention — difpolition — ftjle— pronunciation — and gefture. IV. To confider it as its objecl is different — in- formation— demonilration — perfuafion — entertain- ment. V. As its fubjed is different — the pulpit — the bar — and the fenate, or any deliberate affembly. VI. To confider the flrufture and parts of a par- .ticular difcourfe, — their order,— *cbnne6lioti—pi*6- portion — and ends. VIL Recapitulation, and an inquiry into the principles of tafte, or of beauty and gracefulnefs, -as applicable not only to oratory, but to all ihc other (commonly called) fine arts. In the firfl place, then, I am to tr&at of language jn genera] — its qualities and powers — eloquent ipeech — and its hiftory and prar Lecl. 4. snd ferved the fame purpofe. The word heith in Hebrew, oikos in Greek, domus in Latin, maison in French, and house in Englifli, though all of them different, are equally proper for fignifying the fame thing, when once they ate fixed by the cuftom of the feveral nations. Some have attempted to re- duce the original words of a fuppofed original lan- guage, and even the letters of the alphabet, to a natural refemblance of the things to be fignified ; but their attempts have been fruitlefs, and ridicu- lous. It was in ancient times a pretty general ima- gination, that there was- a certain language that was original and natural to man ; that this was the firft language in ufe ; and that if men were not taught another language by example, they would all fpeak this language. But experience, after trial had been made by feveral curious perfons, fhowed this imagination to be vain ; for thofe who were brought up without any communication with men, were always dumb, and fpoke none at all, except fometimes imitating the natural founds of fome beafts or birds, which they might occafional- ly hear, Herodotus's ftory is either a fable, or it proves nothing, of a king of Egypt having two children nouriilied by goats, and pronouncing the word Bee, or Beecos, which, they faid, fignified bread in the Phrygian language. This was a thing merely accidental, if true ; yet, at any rate, of very doubtful authority. The words in articulate fpeech, therefore, are arbitrary; nor is there any poflibility of thfeir being otherwife, for words are only founds ; and though it is poflible in fome few particulars to fix upon Led. 4. ELOQUENCE. 1B9 words with a natural relation ; as for example, perhaps the names of animals might fometimes be given them, with lome refemblance of found to the natural founds which thefe animals utter ; vet even this w^ith difadvantages, as anj bcdj maj perceive, bj trying to make a word that fliall re- femble the neighing of a horfe, the lowing of a bull, &c. But as to all inanimate viJible objeds, it is impoffible to reprefent them by found ; light and found, the eye and the ear, being totally diffe-- rent in kind. I can recolledl nothing that makes any dilRculty in this matter, unlefs that fome may fay. How then do you find place for that particu- lar beauty of poetry, and other defcriptions, in making the found an echo to the fenfe ? But this is eafily refolved. In fome cafes, the paflions give a modulation to foimd ; and in the quantity of the iyllables, and eafe or difficulty of pronouncing ihem, there may be a refemblance to llownefs and labour, or their oppoiites, or both : As in the fa- mous paflage of Homer, Ton men Tissiphon ; or, iu Mr Pope, who exemplifies the rule in gi^Tug it. *' 'Tis not enough, no harfhnefs gives offence," &c. If words are arbitrary, it ^may be aiked, ho've language came firfl into ufe ? in which the opi- nions are \^rious, but the controverfy is not of any great moment. Some think it was in the fame way as other creatures exert their natural powers, ihat man by practice gradually came to the ufe of fpeech, and fettled the meaning of words by cuf- lom. Others think that this would either never have happened, or have taken a very long tijne. Vol. VJI. r 19^ LECTURES ovf Lecl. 4. and fuppofe that tlieir Maker taught them at leaft fome degree of practice, which fliould open the way to a more extenfive ufe of the facuhj. And the confideration, that founds in language are arbi- trary, in fome degree favours this fuppofition, be- caufe it may be obferved, that as mankind are ca- pable by inftruftion of the greateft and • moll mul- tifarious improvement, fo without iiiilruftion they are capable of doing leaft. A human infant, when firft brought forth, is more helplefs, and longer helplefs, than other animal that we know. It does not feem to be of much importance to form a de- terminate opinion of this queftion. It occurs in the very fame way again, and may be reafoned upon the fame principles, whether alphabetical wri- ting was an invention and difcovery of man, or re- vealed by God. Thofe who hold the laft opinion obferve, that hieroglyphic writing, or writing by figns or pictures, was before alphabetical ; and that the improvement of hieroglyphics does not lead to, but from alphabetical writing : That the one coniiils of natural emblems, and vifible figns of fentiments, and the other of arbitrary or artificial figns for fimple founds ; fo that the more complex you make the hieroglyphic, you differ the more from the alpha- bet. It feems probable, that this, and indeed the radical principles of all great difcoveries, were brought out by accident, that is to fay, by Provi- dence : therefore it is probable, that God gave to our firll parents, who were found in a Hate of full growth, aU the inftrudion neceflary for proceeding upon, and exercifing the faculty of fpeech, the kngth that w^as necefifary for the purpofes of hu- LcSi, 4. EL0QJ7ENCX. 19! man life. It is alfo probable, from the analogy of providence, that he left as much to the exercife of the human powers, as convenience and application could convenient! J fuppl j. I will not enter much into the formation and conflniction of language in general. It is formed bj a certain number of f.mple founds, which, whea varioufl J combined, produce that variety- of words, "U'hicli, though certainly not ftri£lly infinite, jet have been hitherto inexhauHed bj all ihct langujiges in the world. The letters are di-^dded into vowels andi confonants, the fiift having a found of themfelves, and the other only giving a fort of modification to that found. Some great philologifls are of opinion, that in the Hebrew, and feveral other ancient lan- guages, their whole letters are coiiiona^/s, tending to mark the different conngurations of the organs of found at the beginning of- pronunciation, and the vowels are the founds themfelves, which they fay men were taught to adopt by habit, firft in fpeaking, and then in writing, and afterwards were diftinguiflied by marks or figns, for the fake of readers. Hence the controverfy about the Hebrew points, and indeed reading the dead languages in general, which is attended with great uncertaintv, particularly from ,the following circumftances. Vowels have in general been but five or fix in number, which ihould exprefs all the fimple founds, and yet they do not ; and perhaps there is not a language in which there is greater confufion in this" matter, than our own, which m.akes the Englifli fo exceedingly difficult for a foreigner to attain. Several R 2 19^ LECTURES ON Le£l:. zj. Engliih vowels have three or four dlfFerent founds ; and, as Sheridan fays, fome of them the length of five ; / has three in one word, viz. infinite, Thefe things not being ncceflary to my main pur- pofe, I only point at themv/ithout enlarging. It is plain, that in whatever manner languages were fiiil formed, we can eafily fee that they came ilowly and by degrees to perfection. An eminent French author. Father Lamy, fays, the Hebrew language was perfect in its original ; but he ad- vances no proof of this, but fhowing indeed by very juft hiilorical remarks and criticifms, that the He- brew was anterior in point of time to the Greek ; and thA.t in writing, the letters were taken from ihe Hebrew, and employed in the Greek. Hiflo- ry fays, that Cadmus was a Phenician, and he has generally among the Greeks the honour of introdu- cing letters. It is alfo obferved, that as the let- ters of the alphabet were ufed in expreffing numbers, the Greeks, after they had in procefs, of time al- tered or left out the letter vau in Hebrew, which {lands fixth in order, they put a new mark j* fof fix, that the reft might retain their powers ; which plainly iliews, that the Hebrew alpliaoet was older than the Greek, as it now Hands. But, for my own part, I do not underftand the meaning of faying, that the Hebrew language was perfed at firft ; it might be fitted for all the pur- pofes of them that ufed it firft, and is probably at this day as good as any other language, fo far as it goes ; but it is plain, that this and all the other languages of the -firft ages were narrow, fiiort, and fimpie. They muft have been fo from the nature Le£t. 4. ELOQUENCE. ^ jgj of the thing ; moft probably they confiiled chiefly of monofyllables, reprefenting fimple ideas. What occalion had they, for complex or compound words, when they had few, if any, complex or compound ideas ? This appears very plainly from the flate of the Hebrew language, fome of the othei: orien- tals, and the language of all uncultivated people. It holds likewile in the cafe of the Chinefe lan- guage, which, though the people are not unculti- vated, properly fpeaking, is yet in an unimproved ftate, from their having had little intercourle with other nations. All fuch languages have few ad- j^61ives ; and when they do ufe words as adjec- tives, they are commonly figurative. There is an ingenious and probable deduction how a fcanty narrow language might be firft ufed in Shuckford's Conne^lions. They might exprefs qualities by the name of fome animal remarkable for them — as a lion-man, for a violent or fierce man. This is wholly agreeable to the genius of the Hebrew lan- guage. The Hebrews defcribe every thing that is very great, by adding the name of God to it, as — the trees of God — ^the river of God. It follows^ that ill all uncultivated languages, the figures are frequent, and very ftrong. The Indians in Ame- rica have a language full of metaphors. They take up the hatchet, for going to war j and they brighten the chain, when they confirm a peace. Hence it appears, that in the earliell times, if they ufed figures, it was the efflid of neceffity, ra- ther than choice. But what men did at firfl out of neceffity,, orators afterwards returned to fiom R3 •194 LECTURES ON _ Ltd.. 4. choice, in order to increafe the beauty or force of their cli£lion, or both. In fa^t, figures do make the greateft impixffion on men's minds. They are fenfible, and therefore level to every man's capa- city : for the fame reafon they make a ftrong im- preffion on the imagination. They likewife leave a great deal of room for the creative power of fan- cy to make additions. A fign, or fymbol, feen by a multitude, on a fubje6l that is underftood, carries the contagion of enthufiafm, or rage, ex- ceedingly far. In the 19th of Judges, you fee the Levite took his concubine, and cut her into twelve parts, and fent them to all the tribes of Ifrael. The Roman alfo, holding up the ftump of his hand which he loft in the fervice of the public, pleaded for his brother with a power vaftly fuperior to any language whatever. LECTURE V. HAviKG given you a fhort view of language in general, if it were not too long, I would confider the ftrudure of particular languages ; in- llead of which, take the few- following fhort re- marks : I. The nature of things neceflarily fuggefts many of the ways of fpeaking, which conftitutes the grammar of a language, and in every language there is nearly the fame number of parts of fpcech, Lc£l. 5. ELOQUENCE. I95 as they are enumerated in the Latin grammar ; noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, prepofi- tion, interjection, conjundion. 2. In the ufe cT thefe, there is a very great varie- ty. Nouns, to be fure, are declined nearly the fame way in all, by cafes and numbers ; though (he Greeks in this differ a little, uftng three num- bers inflead of two, having a particular infle£^ion of the word, when there are but two perfons meant ; and another for the plural or more : but in the verbs, there is a very great diverfity ; in the adive and pafTive figniUcation, they generally agree, but fome exprefs the perfons by termina- ■ons, and fome by pronouns and nominatives ex- preifed. Some have moods, which others have not. The Greeks have an optative mood ; the Latins have gerunds ; the Hebrevrs, v>4th fewer differences of moods, have conjugations that carry fome variety of fignification to the fame word. In oie word, fUiiser, (he delivered), there is not only ilils and its pafuve, but anotlier, he delivered di- ligently, and the paffive ; another, he made to de- liver ; another, he delivered himfelf. Tlie Greek:;, bcfides the adive and paffive, have a media vox^ of Vv'hich perhaps the ufe is not fully underflood ; fnicG fome of the beft grammarians fay it fignifies doing a think to one's felf ; Tupsofnai^ I fhall flrike myfelf. Moil of the modern languages decline their verbs, not by infledion of the termination, as the Greek and- Latin, but by auxiliary verbs, as the Englilh and French. The CLinefe language is perhaps the leall improved of any language that Jias'fubfilted for any time ; this probably is owing Jg6 LECTURES ow Le£l. 5. to their want of alphabetical writing; every word among them had a characler peculiar to it. fo that letters and words were the fame in number in their language ; this rendered it of immenfe difficulty to underfland their writing among themfelves, and quite impoiTible to foreigners ; but they were vaft- ly furprifed to iind^ that the Jefuits from Europe, that came among them, could eafily write their language by our alphabet ; and as they, ufe the fame word in different tones, for different meanings, thefe fathers alfo foon found a way of diftinguifh- ing thefe in writing, by certain markjs and accents, placed over the word, differing as it was to be dif- ferently taken. , 3. Some have amufed themfelves with inventing a language, with fuch a regular grammar as might be eafily underflood, and having this language brought into general ufe. We have a remark of this kind, in Father Lami's Rhetorique,. in French, and he fays the grammar of the Tartai- language comes neareft ta it. We have alfo had fome fchemes and proportions of this kind in Englifh, but it feems wholly chimerical. I fliall only obferve fur- ther, that fome few have imagined, that the Hebrew language itfelf was originally, a:iid when complete, a perfe£llanguage,and that we now have it only maim- ed, and but a fmall part of it. The e fuppofe the language to be generated thus, by taking the letters of the alphabet, and iirft going through them re- gularly by two, and then by three, ^% ng, ad, &c. aba, ahby Sec. All thefe fchemes are idle, becaufe no perfon can pofTibly lay dowa rules beforehand^ Lecl. 5. ELOQUENCE. I97 for every thing that may be hereafter thought and fpoken ; and therefore, when they are brought out, they will be expiePicd as thofe to whom they liril occur fnall incline ; and cullom will finally fix them, and give them their authority. Leaving thefe things, therefore, as matters of more curiofity than ufe, I proceed to fpeak of elo- quent fpeech, and its hillory as an art. It is plain, that in the progrefs of fociety, and the commerce of human life, it would foon appear, that fome fpoke wuth more grace and beauty, and fo as more to incline the hearers to their fentiments, than others ; neither is it hard to perceive, that it would be early in repute. In the firft alTociations of man- kind, they muft have been chiefly governed bj thofe who had the pov/er of perfuafion. In uncul- tivated focieties, it is fo ilill ; in an Indian tribe, the fachem or wife man direfts their councils. The progrefs of oratory towards perfedion mull have been evidently, in fact, like the proprefs of all other human arts, gradual, and in proportion to the encouragement given to its exercife. It pre- vailed where the ftate of things, and conftitiition of government, favoured it, but not othervviis. It is to be ocferved here, that by the confent of all, and by the memorials of antiquity that are kfr, poetry v/as moic ancient than oratory j oir .rhaps we may rather fay, that the firfi exertions cf genius in eloquent expreiSon v^ere-in poetry, not in profe. It has frequently been made matter of critical inquiry, why poetry was prior to oratory, id why fooner brouglit to^ perfection? I do not perceive very clearly what great advantage there igS LECTURES 017 Le£t. 5. is in determining this queftlon, ftippofing we fliould hit upon the true reafons ; one reafon I take to be, that the circumftance in poetry that gives generally the higheft pleafure, viz. a ftrong and vigorous fancy, is leail indebted to application, inftriidion, or time, for its perfeftion ; therefore poetical pro- ductions in general, and that fpecies of them in particular, which have moil of that qualitj^ mull be as ealily produced in uncultivated times, as any other ; and, for fome reafons given in a former dif- courfe, mud appear then v/ith the greatefl efFe£l. Whereas, to fuccefs in oratory, fome knowledge of the human l^eart, and even fome experience in the ways of men, is neceifary. Another difference is plain ; poetical produftions having generally pleafure or imirxcdiate entertainment as their defign, may produce that effecl in any age ; whereas, the circnmflances that rendered the orator's difcourfe interefling, are all gone. Perhaps to this we may add, that the incitements to poetry are more general. A poet pleafes, and obtains fame from every fingle perfon who reads or hears his produclions ; but an affembly, bulinefs, and an occasion, are neceijary to the orator. This lall Is Hkewife limited in point of place and fitua- tion. Oratory could not thrive in a (late where ar- bitrary power prevails, becaufe then there is no^ thing left for large affemblies, and a diffufive pu- blic, to determine ; whereas poetry is pleafmg to perfons, under any form of government what- ever. Thofe who have given the hiflory of orator\% have rather given us the hiilory of the teachers ot Lec^. 5. ELOQUENCE. I99 tliat art, than its progrefs and effc6ls. It muft be obferv-ed, however, that in this, as well as in poe- trj, criticifm is the child, and not the father of genius. It is the fruit of experience and judge- ment, bj relleclion upon the fpontaneous produc- tions of genius. Criticifm inquires what was the caufe of things being agreeable, after the effeft has been fcen. \Vard brings a citation from Cicero, to fliow that the orator's art was older than the Trojan war. The purport of this is, that Homer attributes force to UljiTes' fpeeches, and fweetnefs to Neftor's; perhaps alfo he has cliaracterifed Menelaus' mainer as fimple, ihort, and unadorned. There is not, liowever, any certainty in this art being much ftu- died or explained in thefe early times from this ci- tation ; for though Homer is an excellent poet, of inimitable fire and great flrength of natural judge- ment, it is not certain that he kept fo perfectly to propriety, as to defcribe only the manner and flyle* of things at the time of the Trojan war, which was 250 years before his own. I fhould be more apt to conclude, that he had defcribed manners, charac- ters, and fpeakers as they were in his own time, with a little air of antiquity. We are, however, told by Paufanias, that the firfl fchool of oratory in Greece was opened in the fchool of Thefeus, the age preceding that war. If there be any certainty in this, its being taught in Greece has been very ancient indeed ; but thefe being fabulous times, it is fcarcely to be depended upon. However, it is certain that oratory flouriihed early, and was improved greatly in Greece. Many cir- <:unuftances concurred to produce this effe^. The fOO LECTURES ON Le^l. 5. fpirlt and capacity of the people — ^the earlj intro- du£lion of letters — but chiefiy their political litua- tion — the freedom of their ftates — the frequency of public affemblies — and the importance of their de- ciiions. There is much faid of the fpirit and capa- city of the Greeks for all the arts ; and to be fure their climate, fo ferene and temperate, might have all the effe£l that a climate can have : but I rekon the two other caufes much more conliderable. The introdu£lion of letters is necelTary to the improve- ment and perfection of a language ; and as they were early blefled with that advantage, they had the bell opportunity of improving. However, the iaft caufe of all is much more powerful than both the former, though perhaps literature is neceffary to be joined with it to produce any great effect. As to fome of the other arts, particularly painting and ftatuary, an eminent modern critic fays, the Greeks could not but excel, becaufe they, of all others, had the belt images from nature to copy. He fays that the games in Greece, in which the bell formed bodies for agility and llrength in the whole country were feen naked, and llriving and exerting themfelves to the very utmoll, mull have prefentedr-to perfons of genius originals to draw from, fuch as in moll other nations never are to be feen. If this remark is jull in the other arts, the influence of eloquence in the public affemblies of thefe free Hates mull have had a fmiilar effed in the art of fpeaking. The art of fpeaking in Greece, however, does not feem to have rifen high till the time of Pericles, and he is faid to have been fo powerful an orator, that Led. 5. ELOQUENCE. 101 he kept up his influence in the citj as much by his eloque^nce as tyrants did by their power. There is a paflage of Cicero, which feems to fa;- that he was the firft who prepared his difcoorfes ir. writing ; and fome have been fimple enough to beheve that he read them ; but nothing can be a more manifeft mif- take, becaufe action or pronunciation was by all the ancients coniidered as the great point in oratory. There were to be feen in Cicero and Qiiintilian's times, orations faid to be of Pericles ; but both thefe great orators feem to be of opinion that they were not his, becaufe they did not at all feem to come up to the great fame of his eloquence. Mr Bayle, a \ ery eminent critic, fays juil:l7, that thefe great men might be miilaken in that particular ; for a very indifferent compofition may be the work of a very great orator. The grace of elocution and the power of a£tion might not only acquire a man fame in fpeaking, but keep up his influence in public affem- blies. Of this we have two very great Britifh ex- amples, Mr Whitfield in the pulpit, and Mr Pitt in the fenate. After Pericles there were many great orators in Greece, and indeed all their flatefmen were orators till the time of Demofthenes, when the Grecian eloquence feems to have attained its perfeclion. Tlie praifes of this great fpeaker are to be fo ge- pcrally met with, that I fhali not iniift upon them at fill, fiirther than reminding you, that though no doubt eminently qualified by nature, he needed and received great improvement from art. The Roman eloquence was of much fhorter durar- VoL. VII. S 20r LECTURES ON LeiH:. 5. tion. It is true that the Roman flate being free, and the aflemblies of the people having much in their power, it feems, according to the principles we have gone upon, that public fpeaking mui\ have been in efteem ; but there is fomething peculiar. The Romans were for many ages a plain, rough, unpolifhed people. Valour in war was their idol; and therefore, though to be fure from the earliell times the afTemblies muft have been manaored in their deliberations by their fpeakers, yet they were concife and unadorned, and probably confifted more of telling them their ftory, and fliowing their wounds, ivhich was of frequent pra£lice among them, than any artful or pailionate harangues. The tiril fpeak- ers of any eminence we read of in the Roman hiftory, were the Gracchi. Cicero, I believe, makes little mention even of them. Anthony and CralTus were the firfl celeorated orators among the Romans, and they were but in the age immediately befort- Cicero himfclf, and from his time it rather fell into decay. 1 have faid above, that genius and excellence was before criticifm. This is very plain ; for though we read cf fdiools and rhetoricians at difTere!;' times and places, thefe are confidered by the gre <■ mafters as perfons quite contemptible. Of di: kind therein a remarkable paflage in Cicero, in h'.- Brutus, " At hunc (fpeaking of Pericles) non dc- clamator," &.c. The firft juft and truly eminent crliic in Greece ^Vas Ariilotle, who flourillied as late as the time of DemoHhenes ; and Cicero hinifelf was the lirlt eminent critic among the Romans. Ariflotle has laid open the principles ci Left. 5. ELOQUEVCE. 203^ eloquence and perfuafion as a logician and philofo- pher, and Cicero has done it iii a ftill more mafterly manner, as a philofopher, fcholar, orator, and ftatef- xnan ; and I confefs, unlefs he has had many authors to confult that we know nothing of, his judgement and penetration are quite admirable, and his books De Oratore, &.c. more nniihed in their kind thaa ajij of his orations themfelves. As to the effefts of oratory, they have been and are furely very great ; but as things feen through a mill,, or at a great diilance, are apt to be miftaken in their fize ; I am apt to think many fay things in- credible, and n'iake fuppoiitions quite contrary to nature and reafon, aud therefore to probability. Some fpeak and write as if all the ancient orators had a genius more than human, and indeed by their whole flrain feem rather to extinguifh than excite, an ardour to excel. Some alio feeai to me to go upon a fuppofition as if all the people in the ancient republics had been fagesj as well as their ftatefmen orators. — There is a remark to be found in many critics upon a flory of Theophraftus the pliilofopher, from which they infer the delicacy of the Athe- nians. That philofopher, it feems, went to bny fomething of an herb-woman, at a flail, and £he in her anfwer to him, it feems, called him ftranger. This, they fay, ihows that (he knew him by his accent not to be a native of Athens, although he had lived there thirty years. But we are not even cer- tain that her calling him ftranger implied any more than that he was unknown to her. Eefides, though- it were true that fhc difcovercd him not to be an Sa 204 LECTURES ON Left. 5. Athenian boril, this is no more than what happens in every populous country, that there is fomething in tilt accent which will determine a man to be of one country or province, rather than another; and I am fomething of opinion, that this would be more difcernible in Greece than any where elfe. The different ctialeds of the Greek tongue were not reckoned reproachful, as many local differences aye in Britain, which therefore people will endeavour to rid themfelves of as well as they can. In fliort, I take it for granted, that an alTembly of the vulgar in Athens was juft like an aflembly of commcm people among us, and a fenate at Athens in under- itanding and taile was not fuperior to the fenate of Great Britain, and that fome of them v/ere but mere mobs ; and that they were very difovderly, is plain from what we read of Plato being pulled down from the delk, when he went up to defend Socrates. The moft remarkable flory of the effed of oratory is that told of Cicero's power over Caefar, in his oration for C. Ligarius. This is very pompoufly told by fome critics, that Cccfar came to the judge- ment-feat determined to condemn him, and even took the pen in his hand to fign his condemnation j but that he was intercfled by Cicero's eloquence, and at laft fo moved that he dropped the pen, and granted the orator's requeft. But fuppofing the facls to have happened, I am very doubtful of the jullnefs of the remark. Cacfar was a great politi- ''cian, and as we know he did attempt to eftabliih his authority by m.ercy, it is not unlikely both that he determined to pardon Ligarius, and to flatter Cicera's vanity by giving him the honour of obtaining it. la Ihort, oratory has its chief power in proTnilcuous af- femblies, and there it reigned of old, and reigns ftill, b/ its viiible efTeel. LECTURE VI. WE now proceed to confider eloquence as divided into its three great kinds — the fu- blime, the limple, and tlie mixed. This is very unhappily exprefled by Ward, who divides flyle into the low, the middle,, and the fublime. Low is a. word which, in itsfiril and literal fenfe, figniiles lltuation, and when applied metapliorically, never is in any inilance ufed in a good fenfe, but always ftgnifies what is either unhappy, or bafe and con- temptible, as we lay a man's or a flate's finances are low. We fay a man is- in a low Hate of health. We fay he is guilty of low, mean pra£lices j has alow, mean, paltry llyle^ It was therefore con- veying a very wrong idea to make low one of th& different kinds of ftyle. You may obferve that I have introduced this diilinftion in a manner fome» what different from him and other authors. They confider it as a divifion of ftyle. I choofe rather to fay, vhere are three different great kinds, ii.to which eloquence and eompofition may be divided. The reafcxi is, 1 believe, the word styk^ which was ufed both by the Greeks and Romans, but ef^e. allv the latter, has, like many others, gradually chanc,ed its- jaeaaing. At ^il it signified the manner of wri»- S3 2ra5 lECTURES ON Lee!. 6, ting in general, and Is even fometimes ufed fo ftil], but more commonly now in Engiilli it is confined to the diftion. Nothing is more common than to fay, fublimity in fentiments and ftyle, fo as to diillnguifli the one from the other. I am fenfible that even in this confined fcnfe there is a fublimity, fimpliclty, and mediocrity in language itfelf, which will na- tiu-ally enough fall to be explained; but it is better, upon the whole, to confider them as different kinds of eloquence, for feveral reafons. Sublimity in writing confif^s with all ftyles, and particularly many of the hfgheft and mofl admired \ examples of fublimity are in the utmoft fimplicity of flyle. Sometimes they are fo far from loling by jt, that they owe a great part of their force to it. That remarkable example of fublimity in the fcrip- ture, h wholly in the fimple. " Let there be light, ** and there was light. *^ There are alfo many others in fcripture : " The gods of the Gentiles are vanity ** and lies," — " I am thit I am."" Some of the other kinds alfo, even the fimpleil, do fometimes admit great force of expreffion, though more rarely j and there is a great danger in the fimple manner of" writing, hy admitting lofty ex- prellions to fwell into bombaft. The mixed kind frequently admits of fublimity of ftyle, and indeed is called mixed, as confifling, as it were, alten.ately of the one and the other, or being made up of a proportion of each. The fublime kind of writing chiefly belongs to the following fubjefts : Epic poetry, tragedy, ora- tions on great fubjefts, and then particularly the peroration. Nothing can be too great for theJGs L<:ct. 6. ELOQUENCE. 107 fubjects; and unlefs thej are treated with fublimit;,v they are not treated fuitablj. The limple kind of writing belongs to fcientitic writing, epiftoiary wri- ting, eflaj and dialogue, and to the whole inferior ipecies of poetiy, pallorals, epigrams, epitaphs, &:c. The mixed kind belongs to hiflorj, fjilem, and controverfj. The firil fort mufl be always fablime in fentiment or language, or both. The fecoud may be often fablime ia fentiment ; fometimes, and very rarely, in language. The mixed admits of both forts with full propriety, and may be often fublime boih in fentiment and language. Let us now coniider thefe three great kinds of compofitioiL, feparately, in the order in which I have named them. I. Of the fublime manner of writing. — This is very difficult to defcribe or treat of , in a critical manner. It is very remarkable, that all writers oa this fubjeft, not excepting tliofe of the greatefl judgement, accuracy, and precilion, when they come to explain it, have ufed nothing but metapho- rical expreHions. It is, however, certain in general, that metaphor fliould be kept as much as poiiibls out of definition or explication. Thefe all agrec« ing, therefore,^ in this circumflance, feems to fhow, that fublimity is a fingle or fimple idea, that cannot be refolved, divided, or analyfed,. and that a tafie for it is, in a good meafure, a feeling of nature. The critics tell us, that mblimity is that which fiir- prifes, raviihes, tranfports : thefe are words fre- quently applied to its effects upon the hearers,, and greatnefs, loftinefs, majefty, are afcribed to the fen- timects, to the character^ to the perfon. An ora- 208 LECTURES C>f Lecl. 6, tion, or tlie fuLlimc parts of a pocm^ have beea eomparcd to the voice of thunder, or penetration of lightning:, to the impetuoiitj of a torrent ; this laft ts one of the b^ll metaphorical exprelTions for fub- liniity in eloquence, bcfcaufe it carries in it, not only the idea o-f great force, but of carrying away every thing with it that oppofes or lies in its wa}^ That may be faid to be fublime, that has an irrefift- ible influence on ttie hearers, and when exasmined carries it in the idea of great power and abilities in the fpeaker : yet even this is not fufficient, it has the cliaracler of greatnefs,. as diftinft from that of beauty, fweetnefs, or ufe. Burke, on the Sublime, has endeavoured to Ihow, that fublimity and beauty, though generally united in our apprehenfions, are diftindt qualities-,, and to be traced to a different fource. Of fublimity in particular, he fays it is always allied to fuch things asraife the paflion of terror : but of this I will fpeak more fuUy upon a head I have referved fc* that purpofe ; in which I propofe to inquire into the firft principles of tafle or approbation, common to this and all other arts. Longinus mentions no lefs than five different fources of the fublime. i. Greatnefs or elevntioa of mind, 2. Pathos or pafiloa. 3. Figure. 4- Noblenefs of language. 5. Compofition, or ar- rangement of words. But though the laft two of thefe are of confiderable moment, and greatly con- tribute to augment the force as well as beauty of a difcouifc, I do not think they are of ihrt ; ature as. to be confidercd upon the fame footing with the other three. Therefore, leaving what is to be i"aid Lc£l. 6. ELOQUENCE. 2C9 upon them to the next head, when it will properly occur, I fliall conlider the others in their order. I. Greatnefs or elevation of mind. — This is in- deed the firft and radical fource of fublimity. It is quite impoflible for a man to attain to fublimitj of compofition, unlefs his foul is great, and his concep- tions noble ; and, on the other hand, he that pof- felTes thefe can hardly exprefs himfelf meanlj. Longinus gives it as an advice, that a man fhould accuilom his mind to great thoughts. But if you alk me, what are great thoughts ? I confefs myfelf unable to explain it, and unlefs the feeling is na- tural, I am afraid it is impoffible to impart it ; yet it feems to be pretty generally underilood. It is common to fay, fuch a man has a great foul, or fuch another has a mean or little foul. A great foul afpires in its hopes ; is not eafily terrified by enemies, or difcouraged by difiiculties. It is worth while to confider a little the effed of a man's outward cir- cumflances. The mind, to be fure, cannot be whol- ly made by any circumilances. Sentiments and flate are different things. Many a great mind has been in narrow circumilances, and many a littl? rafcal has been a king ; yet education and maimer have a fenfible effect upon men in general. I imagine I have obferved, that when perfons of rank have been at the fame time men of real genius, they have generally excelled in majefly and dignity of fentiments and language. This was an advan- tage generally enjoyed by the ancients whofe writ- ings remain to us ; having but their own language to ftudy, and being early introduced into public life, and i;ven into the condud of the greateil aflfairs. 210 LECTURES OxV Lecl. ^. they were led into noblcnefs of fenliment. Xeno- phon, Domofthenes, Cicero, Csefar, were all of them great llatefmen, and two of them great generals, as well as writers. In modern times, there is a more complete partition of employments, fo that tlie ftatefman, general, and fcliclar, are feldom found united in the fame pcrfon ; yet I think it appeara in fa6t, that when ftatefmen are alfo fcholars,. they make, upon the whole, greater orators and nobler •writers, than thofe who are fcholars merely, though of the greateit capacity. In e^rery flation, how- ever, this remark has place, that it is of importance to fublimity in writing, to endeavour to acquire a large and liberal manner of thinking. Whilfl I am making ufe of this language, I would caution -you againil thinking, that pride and vanity of mind are at all allied to greatnefs, in this refpeft. There is a fet of men called free-thinkers, w^ho are pleafed to arrogate to themfelves a large and liberal manner of thinking; and the generality of them are as little creatures as any on the face of the earth. Mr Addifon compares them to a fly, which lighting upon a great building, and perceiving the fmall interftices between the ftones, cries out of vaft chafms and irregularities, which is wholly owing to the extreme littlenefs of his fight, that is not able to fee the dignity and grandeur of the whole building. When I am upon this fubje6l of greatnefs and elevation of thought, as one fource of the fublinie, you will naturally exped that I ihould give fome examples to illuftrate it. I fliall begin with fome out of the fcriptures, where indeed there is the greateft number, ruid theft; the nobleil that can well Left. 6. ELOQUTLKCE. 211 be conceived. " I am God alone, and beddes me there is no Saviour. —Who is this that darkeneth counfel by words without knowledge ? — W ho will fet the briars and thorns agauill me in battle :'* &.C. See aU'o two paffages inimitably grand. — Ita. xli 12. and ver. 2 1. and onwards. To mention fome of the fajings in heathen an- tiquity,— Alexander's faying to Parmenio is cer- tainly of the great kind, yet perliaps with a confider- able mixture of pride as w^U as greatnefs. Par- menio told him, if he were Alexander he would act in a cenain manner. Anfwer i So would I, if I were Parmenio* That of Poms, the Indian king, to Alexander, however, was much greater. When he was Alexander's prifoner, and was afked by that prince how he expected to be treated ? he anfwer- ed, Like a king. Caefar's famous faying of Vent, *oidiy vifi\ has often been quoted as a concife and noble defcription of the rapidity of his conquells ; yet I confefs I think it very dubious ; it had not only an air of improper vanity, but looks like an intended and filly play upon the words, and what we call alliteration. They are three words of the fame length, the fame tenfe, and the fame begin- ning and ending. Cicero, in one of his orations, I believe in that for Marcellus, has a very noble compliment to Caefar, whr^n he fays, the gods had given nothing lo men fo great as a difpoiition to (hew mercy. Bat of all great fayings on record, there is none that ever made fuch an imprefTion upon mc as that of AylifFe to king James III. He had been detected in fome of the pl6ts, &.C. The king fa id to him, Mr AylifFe, d^n't you know 212 LECTURES ON Liidi. 6. it is in my power to pardon you ? Yes, (fays he), I know it is in your power, but it is not in your na- ture ! It is neceflary to put you in mind, in reading books of criticifm, that when examples of greatnefs of fentiment are produced from Homer and the other ancient writers, that all circumftances mull be taken in, in order to form a juft opinion con- cerning them. We muft remember his times, and the general belief of his countrymen with regard to theolog}^, and many other fubjedls. There muft be a probability to make a thing natural, otherwife it is not great or noble, but extravagant. Homer, in defcribing the goddefs Difcord, fays, Her feet were upon the eartli, and her head was covered with rhe clouds. He makes Pluto look up and affirm, that Neptune would open hell itfelf, and make the light to ftiine into that dark abode. There are fome of thefe that appear tome fufpicious even in Homer himfelf ; fuch as, when he makes Jupiter brag, that if all the other gods were to hang at the bottom of a chain, and earth and fea, and all along with them, he would tofs them all up as eafily as a bail. How- ever it w^as with regard to him, who was taught to believe in Jupiter fitting upon Mount Olympus, or quaffing Neclar in the council of the gods, modern and Chriftian writers and fpeakers fliould be careful to avoid any thing that is extravagant and ridicu- lous, or even fuch allufions to the heathen theology as could only be proper Jo thofe who believed in it. —There is the more reafon to infift upon this, that as grandeur and fublimity is commonly a great ob- jed of ambition, particularly with young perfons, Lecl. 6. ELOC^JENCE. 213. they are very ready to degenerate into bombaft. You ought always to remember, thai the lan'g age ought to be no higher than the fubje6l, or the part of the fubjed that is then immediately handled. See an example of the different ways of a fimple and a turgid writer, upon the very fame fentiment, where the Roman empire was extended to the wef- tern coaft of Spain : Sextus Rufus fimply tells it thus — Hispanias per Decinmm Brutum ohtinuimus^ tt usque ad Gades et oceanum perueni?nus, Florus, taking a more lofty flight, fays — Decimus Brutus aliquant 0 totius, &lc. I have only further to obferve, that, in fublime defcriptions, great care fliould be taken that they be all of a piece, and nothing unfuitable brought into view. Longinus juilly blamed the poet Hefiod, that after he had faid every thing he could, to ren- der the goddefs of darknefs terrible, he adds, that a blinking humour ran from her nofe — a circumilance highly difgufling, but no way terrible. LECTURE VII. 1C0ME now to the fecond fource of the fub- lime, which is pathos, more commonly called in Englifh the pathetic, that is, the power of mo«- ving the paffions. This is' a very important part of the fubje6l : a power over the paffions is of the utmoll confequence to a poet ; and it is all in all to an orator. This every one will perceive, if he only V-OL. VII. T 214 LECTURES ON Le(ft. 7. recollects what influence paffion or fentiment has upon reafon, or, in other words, inclination upon the praftical judgeanent. He that polTelles this power in a high degree has the highell capacity of ufefulnefs, and is likewife able to do the greatefl miichief. Sublime fentiments and language may- be formed upon any fubje(Sl:, and they touch the lieart with a fenfe of fympathy or approbation ; but to move the paffions of others, fo as to incline their choice, or to alter their purpofe, is particularly the defign of eloquence. The chief pailions eloquence is intended to work upon are, rage, terror, pity, and perhaps defire in general ; though occafionally he may have occafion to introduce every afFedion. In a heroic poem, £very affedion may be faid to take its turn ; but the different fpecies of oratory, or the different objefts and fubje6ls of it, may be faid to divide the paffions. A fpeaker in political or deliberative affemblics may be faid to have it in view to excite the paflion of rage : he may naturally defire to incenfe his hearers againll their enemies, foreign and domeftic, reprefenting the firll as terrible and dangerous, to excite averfion and hatred; and the other as weak or worthlefs, to excite contempt. An example of this you have in the great fubjed of Demofthenes's Orations, Philip, king of Macedon — another in Cicero's difcourfes againff Catil e and Anthony. Pity is the chief paffiou attempted to be raifed at the bar, unlefs in criminal cafes, where indignation againll vilhiiny of every kind is the part of the accufcr. Terror and its attendants belong ery much to a fpeaker in the pulpit ; rage he has no- Left. 7. ELOQUENCE. 21 5 thing to do with but in an improper fenfe, to raife a ftrong and fteadj, but uniform, indignation againft evil. But even this a fpeaker from the pulpit ihould endeavour to convert into compaflion for the follj and wretchednefs of the guilty perfonr Pity feems to be the fingle objccl in tragedy. One talent of great moment towards raifmg the pa -lions, is a ftrong and clear imagination, and a defcrlptive manner of fpeaking, to paint fcenes and objefts ftronglj, and fet them before the ejes of the hearers ; — to feleft fuch circumftances as will have the moft powerful effeft, and to dwell only upon thefe. We have not any where in Eng- lifli a finer example of the pathetic, and the choice and ufe of circumftances, than the fpeecli which Shakefpeare has made for Anthony, in the tragedy of Ccefar. It appears from the hiftory, that An- thony did fuccefsfuUy raife the fury of the Romans againft thofe who killed Caefar ; and, I think, he could hardly feleft better images aini language^ than thofe we have in the Englifti poet : « But yefterday," &c. I. To railing the paflions with fuccefs, much peiietration and knov;ledge of human nature is nc- celTary. Without this, every attempt muft fail. In confirmation of this remark, though there are per- fons much better fitted for it by nature than others, the moft powerful in raifing the paflions liave ge- nerally been thofe who have had much acquaint- ance v/ith mankind, and praftice in life. Reclufe T 2 2l6 LECTURES ON Ledl. 7. fludents, and profefTed fcholars, will be able to difcover truth, and to defend it, or to write moral precepts with clearnefs and beauty ; but they are feldom equal for the tender and pathetic, to thofe who have been much in what is called the world — by a well known ufe of that word, though al- moft peculiar to the Engliih language. There is perhaps a double reafon for perfons well verfed in the ways of men, having the greateil power upon the paffions. They not only know others better, and therefore how to touch them, but their own hearts, it is likely, have been agitated by more paffions than thofe whofe lives have been more calm and even. 2. To raifmg the paffions of others, it is necef- fary the orator or writer fliould feel what he would communicate. This is fo well known a rule, that I am almoft afhamed to mention it, or the trite quotation commonly attending it. Si vis me flere^ dolendum est primum ipsi tibi. You may as well ^ kindle a fire with a piece of ice, as raife the paf- fions of others while your own are ft ill. I fuppofe the reafon of this, if we would critically examine it, is, that we believe the thing to be a pretence or impofition altogether, if we fee that he who wifhes us to be moved by what he fays, is notwith- ilanding himfelf unmoved. The offence is even fomething more than barely negative in fome cafes. If we hear a man fpeaking with coldnefs and indif- ference, where we think he ought to be deeply interefted, we feel a certain difappointment, and are filled with difpleafure ; as if an advocate was pleading for a perfon accufed of a capital crime, if Led. 7. ELOQUENCF. ^l*j he fhould appear T\'ith an air of IndifTerence and unconceri>, let his language and compofition be what they will, it is always faulty and difgulling ; or, let a minifter, when fpeaking on the weighty fubjecl of eternity, ihow any levity in his carriage, it muli weaken the force of the mofl moving truths ; whereas, when we fee the fpeaker wholly engaged and pofleiTed by his fubjed, feeling every paflion he wiines to communicate, we give our- felves up to him without rcferve, and are formed after his xqtj temper, by receiving his inftruc- ticiis. 3. It is a direction nearly allied to this, that a man iliould never attempt to raife the paffions of his hearers higher than the fubjed plainly merits it. There are fome fubjeds that, if we are ablc^ are of fuch moment, as to deferve all the zeal and fire we can poflibly beftow on them, of w-liich we may fay, as Dr Young, '* Paffion is reafon, tranfport temper here." — A lawyer for his client, whom he believes to be innocent j a patriot for his country, which he believes to be in danger: but, above all, a minifter, for his people''s everlafling welfare, may fpeak with as much force and vehemence as his temper and frame are fufceptible of ; but in many other cafes, it is eafy to tranfcend tlie bounds of reafon, and make the language more lofty than the theme. We meet often, for example, with raifed and laboured encomiums in dedications, a fpecies of writing the moil difficult to fucceed in of any almoft that can be named. The perfon honoured by this mark cf the author's efleem, is very fel» T3. ^^S LECTURES ON Le^. 7. dom placed in the fame rank by the public that he is by him. Befides, though he were really me- ritorious, it feldom comes fairly up to the repre- fentation : the truth is, to correfpond to the plclure, he fhould be almoft the only meritorious perfon of the age or place in which he lives. Now, confi- dering how cold a compliment this is to all the reft, and particularly to thofe who read it, tliere is little wonder that fuch rhapfodies are treated with contempt. I have often thought the fame thing of funeral panegyrics : when a man dies, whofe name perhaps was hardly ever heard of before, wc have a fplendid character of him in the newfpapers, where the prejudice of relations, or the pai'tiality of friendfhip, do juA what they pleafe. I remem- ber, at the death of a perfon whom I Ihall not name, who was, it mull be confelTed, not inconil- derable for literature, but otherwife had not much that was either great or amiable about him, an ele- giac poem was publifhed, which began wiih this line, " Whence this aftonilhment in every face ?" Had the thing been really true, and the public had been deeply affected with the lofs, the introduelion had not been inelegant ; but on fuch a pompous ex- preffion, when the reader recolle6led that he had feen no marks of public aftonifhment, it could not but tempt him to fmile. 4. Another important remark to be made here, is, that a writer or fpeaker, in attempting the pa- thetic, fjiould confider his own natural turn, as well as the fubje<^. Some are naturally of a lefs warm and glowing imagination, and in themfelves fuf- ceptible of a lefs degree of paflion than others \ Le£l. 7. £LO()UBNCE. 219 thefe ihould take care not to attempt a flight that they cannot finifli, or enter upon fuch fentiments and language, as they will probably link, as it were, and fall away from in a little time, ' Such fhould fubftitute gravity and folemnity, inftead of fire, and only attempt to make their difcourfe clear to the underilanding, and convincing to the confcience ; perhaps, this is in general the bed way in ferious difcourfes, and moral writings ; becaufe, though it maj^ not produce fo ftrong or ardent emotions, it often leaves a deeper and more laiiing impreflioa* Of Figurative Speech. It Is common to meet with this exprellion, '' The tropes and figures of rhetoric." This expreflion is not juft : the terms are neither fynonytnous, nor ai'c they two diftipft fpecies of one genus. Figure is the general exprefiion ; a trope is one of the fi- gures, but there are many more. Every trope is a figure, but every figure is not a trope : perhaps we may fay, a trope is an expedient to render lan- guage more extenlive and copious, and may be ufed in tranquillity ; v/hereas, a figure is the efFe(^l of paffion. This diftin6tion, however, cannot be univerfally maintained ; for tropes are oftentimes the efFe6l of pafiTion, as well as of the narrownefs of language. Figures may be defined, any depar- ture from the plain direO: manner of expreffion, and particularly fuch as' are fuggefted by the paf- £ons, and differ, on that account, from the way in 220 LECTDRKS ON Lect. 7. which we would have fpoken, if in a >late of per- fe either difficult or uncommon are inconfiilent with it. Cicero and Horace have both faid, and all critics have faid after them, it is that which, when men hear, thej think that they themfelves could only have faid the fame, or that it is juft a kind of ex- preffion of their own thoughts. Thej generally remai-k further, that it is what feems to be eafy, but yet is not ; as Horace fays, Ut sibi quivis speret iderriy &cc. We may further obferve, that what is truly fimple, always carries in it the idea of being eafy in its production, as ^vell as in imitation ; and indeed the one of thefe feems necefTarily to fuppofe the other. Whatever feems to be the effedt of iludy and much invention, cannot be fimple. It is finely exemplified in the introduction of An- thony's fpeechin Shakefpeare : "I am no orator, as Brutus is," &c. Rollin has given us an admirable example of a ftory told with a beautiful fknplicity, from Cicero's Offices. There is an example alfo in Livy's account of the battle of the Horatii and Curiatii, only with a little more force of expref- fion, as the importance and folenmity of the fub- jecl feemed to require it. But it requires a very mafterly knowledge of the Latin language, to per- ceive the beauties fully, that are pointed at by Rollin in the firil inftancc, or might eafily be men* tioned in the laft. There is no author in our lan- guage who excels more in fimplicity than Addifon, The Spedator, in general, indeed, but efpecially the papers written by him,, excel in this quality, Eafe and elegance are happily joined in them, and nature itfelf, as it were, feems to fpeak in theiiu U3 230 LECTURES ON Lefl. 9. If fome of the later periodical writers have equal- led, or even excelled them, in force or elegance^ not one has ever come up to them in fimplicitj. The fubjefts, or the fpecies of writing in which fimplicitj chiefly fhines, are, narration, dialogue, epiftolary writing, effay writing, and all the light- er fpecies of poetry, as odes, fongs, epigrams, ele- gies, and fuch like. The ancients were remark- able for a love and admiration of iimplicity, and fome of them remain to us as eminent examples of its excellence. Xenophon, in his inftitution of Cyrus, is particularly remarkable for a fweet and dignifled fimplicity. He ufes neither language nor ideas that are difficult and far-fetched. In the fmaller compofitions of the ancients, as odes, epi- grams, &c. they were at prodigious pains to polifh them, and make them quite eafy and natural. They pla(?ed their great glory in beftowing much art, and at the fame time making it to appear quite eafy and artlefs, according to the faying now growTi into a proverb, Artis est celare artem. The beauty of fimplicity may not appear at firft light, or be at all perceived by perfons of a vitiated tafte ; but all perfons of good judgement immediately^ and the bulk of mankind in time, are cliarmed with what is quite eafy, and yet truly accurate and elegant. It ought to be carefully obferved, that fimplicity is quite a different thing from lownefs and meannefs, and the great art of a writer is to preferve the one, without degenerating into the other. It is the eafiefl thing in the world to fpeak or write viilgarifms, but a perfon of true talle will carefully avoid every thin^ Le£l. 9. ELOQUENCE, 23I of that kind. For example, one v/ho would vrrite Innplj, and as near the language of plain people in ordinary difcourfe as pofTible, would jet avoid every abfurdity or barbarifm that obtains a place in common converfation, as to fay, " This here table, and that there candle." It is alfo quite con- trary to fimplicity, to adopt the qua,ini expreiTions, or cant phrafes, that are the children of faihion, and obtain for a little, or in fome particular places, and not in others. The . Spe£bator attacked, with ^eat fpirit and propriety, feveral of thofe that were introduced into converfation and writing in his time, fuch as moh, rep, pos, hite^ bamhQO%ley and feveral others. Molt of ihem he fairly defeated, but one or two of them got the better of him, and are now freely iniroduced into the language, fuch as mob, JoLnfon alfo has put bamboozle in his Dic- tionary, which he calls, indeed, a low word. Ar- buthnot is his authority, but it was plainly ufed by him in the way of ridicule ; and therefore it fiiould either not have been in ihe Dictionary at all, or fuch an authority Ihould not have been given for it. It is exceedingly difficult, and requires an excel- lent judgement, to be able to defcend to great fim- plicity, and yet to keep out every low expreflion or idea. I do not think it is eafy to be a thorough judge of pure didion in any language but our own, and not even in that, without a good deal of the knowledge of human life, and a thorough acquaint- ance with the beft authors. Writers and fpeakers of little judgement are apt at times to go into ex- tremes, to fweli too much on the one hand, and .23 2 LECTURES ON Le£c. 9. to fall into what is vulgar and offenfive on the o- ther. When fpeaking on iimplicity, I obferve, that there is a fimplicity in the tafte and compofition of a whole difcourfe, different from fimplicity of fen- timent and language in the particular parts. This will incline a man to avoid all unneceiTary orna- ment, particularly the ornaments of faftiion, and the peculiar drefs or mode of the times. We fay in architecture, that a building is in a fimple ftyle, when it has not a great multiplicity of ornaments, or is not loaded with beauties, fo to fpeak. It is very remarkable, that books written in the fame aee w^ill differ very much one from another in this re- fpeft ; and thofe which have leafh of the orna- ments then in vogue, continue in reputation when the others are grown ridiculous. I will give you an inllance of this — A fmall religious treatife, Scougal's Life of God in the Soul of Man, which is written with great fimplicity, and yet dignity, and may now be read with pleafure and approba- tion by perfons of the beft tafte ; while mofl: of the other writers of his age and counti'y are ridiculous, or hardly intelligible. Perhaps it may help us to form right notions of fimplicity, to coiifidijr what are the oppofites, or the greateft enemies to it. I. One is, abilraclion of fentiment, or too great refinement of any kind ; of this the greateft ex- ample in an author of merit, is the writer of the Rambler ; almoft every page of his writings fur- Diilics us with iiiftances of departure from fimpli- Lea. 9. ELOQUENCE. 233 city, partly in the fentiment, and partly in the diftlon. 2. Another is, allegory, and efpecially far-fetch- ed allufions, as in the example which the Spectator gives of a poet, who fpeaks of Bacchus' call coat ; this is little better than a riddle ; and even thofe who difcern it, will take a little time to reflet, that according to the heathen mythology, Bacchus was the god of wine ; wine is kept in calks, and therefore an empty cafk, or at leail an ufelefs one, may be called Bacchus' cafl coat. 3. A third enemy to fimplicity is, an affeftation of learning. This fpoils fimplicity many ways ; it introduces terms of art, which cannot be underflood but by thofe who are adepts in a particular branch. Such perfons have been long expofed to ridicule, under the name of pedants. Sometimes, indeed, the word pedantry has been in a manner confined to thofe addicted to claflic literature, and who in- termix every things they fay with fcraps taken from the learned languages ; but this is quite improper, for lawyers, phyficians, dunces, or fchool mailers, are equally ridiculous, when they fill their difcourfe with words drawn from their particular art. 4. The only other enemy to fimplicity I fhall. mention is, an ambition to excel. This, perhap??, ihould not have been fo much divided from the reft, as made the great principle from which the reil proceed. Nothing more certainly renders a man ridiculous, than an over forwardnefs to difplay his excellence ; he is not content v/ith plain things, and particularly wi;h fuch tilings as every body 234 LECTURES OJJ Le£l. 9. might fay, becaufe thcfe would not diflinguiili him. On the whole, as I obferved on fublimity, that one of tlie befl and furefl ways to attain it was to think nobly ; fo the befl way to write fimply, is to think fimply, to avoid all alleviation, to attempt to form your manner of thinking to a noble felf-dc- nial. A man little folicitous about what people think of him, or rather having his attention fixed Upon quite another purpofe, viz. giving information, or producing conviftion, will only attain to a fimple manner of writing ; and indeed he will write bell in all refpe6ls. As to the mixed flyle or manner of writing, as it confills of the mixture of the other two, I fliali not need to fay any thing by way of explaining it, but only make a remark or two, of the ufe and application of it. The mixed kind of writing chiefly confifts of hiftory and controverfy. The great quality neceflary to execute it properly, is foundnefs of judgement, to determine on what fub- je6ls, and on what parts of fubjeiSls, it is proper to write with iimplicity, and on w^hat with force ; one would wifh ntot to go beyond, but juft to gra, tify a reader's inclination in this refpeft. There are many cafes in hiftory, where the greateft fublimity both of fentiments and language is both admitted and required -, particularly all the beauty and all the force that can be admitted into defcription, is of importance in hiftory. Thofe who will read, in Robertfon's Hiftory of Scotland, the account he gives of the aftonifliment, terror, and indignation, that appeared in the Englifti Lea. 9. ELOQUENCE. 235 court, * when news was brought of the maflacre at Paris, or, in the fame author, the account of the execution of Marj Queen of Scots, will fee the force and fublimity of defcription. The difference between fublimitj of fentimcnt and language in an hiftorian, and in a poet or orator, feems to me to refemble the difference between the fire of a ma- naged horfe, when reined in by the rider, and marching with a firm and ftately pace, and the fame when flraining every nerve in the eager con- tention in a race. We ihall enter a little into this matter, if we confidcr the different images that are made ufe of in the different arts. In poetry we fay, a beautiful, ftriking, fhining metaphor, fer- vent, glowing imagery- In oratory w^e fay, warm, animated, irrefiftible. In hiftory we ufe the words force, noblenefs, dignity, and majefly, particular- ly thofe lafl attributes of dignity and majelly. He- rodotus has been often called the father of hiflory, though, I confefs, I apprehend he has obtained this title chiefly becaufe of his antiquity, and Ins being the firft that ever gave any thing of a regu- lar hiftory ; but though he has fome things augufl enough, yet he has admitted fo many incredible llories, and even peculiarities into his work, ns very much detracts from its dignity ; we muff, in- deed, impute a good deal of this to the age in which he lived, and the impoffibUity of their dif- tinguiihing truth from falfehood, fo well as thofe of later ages, who have had the advantage of all pall experience. Hiftory, indeed, is not only of the mixed kind of writing, fo as to admit fometimes fublimity, and 236 LECTURES ON Left. 9. fometlmes (implicity, but thofe ftyles fliould be real- ly blended together, in every part of it. The mofl noble and animated fentiments, charafters, or defcrip- tions in hiftory, Ihould yet be cloathed with fuch a gravity and decency of garb, fo to fpeak, as to give an air of fimplicity to the whole. It is an advantage to a poem, that the author fays but little in his own perfon, but makes the charafters fpeak and fay all ; and in an orator it is an advantage, when he can carjry the hearers off from himfelf to his fub- je£t ; but above all, an hiftorian fliould not fo much as wi{h to fhine, but, with the coolnefs of a philofo- pher, and the impartiality of a judge, fliould fet the a6lors and tranfadions before the reader. Controverfy is another fubj eel of the mixed kind, which ought to be in general written with fimplicity, yet will fometimes admit of the ornaments of elo- quence : of this I fhall fpeak a little more after- wards, and therefore fhall now only add, that con- troverfy differs from hiflory, in that it fometimes admits of pafTion and warmth, when there feems to be a fufficient foundation laid for it ; a controverfial WTiter will endeavour to iutereft his reader, and excite either contempt or indignation againfl his ad- verfary. After having given you this view of the three great kinds of writing, or, as they are fometimes called, different flyles, it may not be amifs to ob- ferve, that there are diflinftions of ftyle, which it is proper that an able waiter fhould obferve, that do not range themfelves, at leafl not fully and properly, under thefe three heads, but may be faid to run through all the kinds of eloquence. Lecl. 9. ELOQUENCE. 237 Many eminent authors have faid, that the climates have fome efTea upon the flyle ; tliat in the warmer countries the flyle is more animated, and the figures more bold and glowing : and nothing is more com- mon, than to afcribe a peculiarity of ftyle, and that particularly elevated and full of metaphor, to the orientals, as if it belonged to that part of the globe. But if I am not miflaken, both this and other things, fuch as courage, that have been attributed to the climate, belong either not to the climate at all, or 111 a fmall meafure, and are rather owing to the ilate of fociety and manners of men. We have before had occafion to fee that all narrov/ languages are figu- red. In a flate where there are few or no abflrad ideas, how fhould there be abflrad terms ? If any body will read the poem of Fingal, which appears to have been compofed on the bleak hills of the north of Scotland, he will find as many figures, and as bold, as in any thing compofed in Arabia or Perfia. The flate of fociety, then, is what gives a particular colour to the flyle , and by this the flylesof different ages and countries are diftinguifhed. That the climate does but little, may be feen j ufl by compar- ing ancient and modern Italy; what difference between the flrength and force of the ancient Latin tongue, and the prefent Italian language, in the exprefTion of fentiments I It mufl therefore vary with fentiments and manners; and what difference between the flern and inflexible bravery of a free ancient Roman, and the effeminate foftnefs of a modern Italian I vet they brsathed the fame air, and were nurfed by the fame foil. I will jufl go a little off frpm the fub- Vou VII. X 238 LECTURES ON Le*^:. 9. je6l to fay, that a very late author (Lord Karnes) feems to think that the courage of mankind is go- verned by the climates ; he fays, that the northern climates produce hardened conftitutions, and bold and firm minds ; that invafions have been made from north to fouth : but, I apprehend, he may be miftaken here, both in his fa6ts and the reafons of them. — Invafions have not always been made from north to fouth : for the Roman arms penetrated very far to the north of their territory ; the firfl great conquerors of the eafl in Egypt and Babylon car- ried their arms to the north : and where the conqueft ran the other wa}", it was owing to other circum- itances ; and Dean Swift fays, much nearer the truth, it was from poverty to plenty. The defign of this digreflion is to fliow, that not only the circumftances that appear in a language, but feveral bthers that have alfo been attributed to climate, owe very little to it, but to the ftate of man- kind and the progrefs of fociety. The maxim of that great modern writer, Montefquieu, which he applies to population, is alfo true of language— that natural caufes are not by far fo powerful as moral caufes. Allowing, therefore, as fome have afBrmed, that the northern climates may give a roughnefs and harfhnefs to the accent and pronuncia- tion, I believe it is all that we can expe6l from climate ; the diflinftion of flyles and compofition mufl come from another original. Lea. 10. ELOQUENCE. 23f LECTURE X. HAVING in a great meafure rejefted the fup^ pofition of the ftjle in writing being afFedcd hy the climate, and fhown that it rather takes its colour from the ftate of fociety, and the fentiments and manners of men, it follows, tliat all the great diilinftions that take place in manners will have a correfpondent efFe£l upon language fpoken or writ- ten. When the manners of a people are little po- lifhed, there is a plainnefs or a roughnefs in the lljle. Abfolute monarchies, and the obfequious fubje£lion introduced at the courts of princes, oc- cafions a pompous fwelling and compliment to be in requeft, different fram the boldnefs and fome- times ferocity of republican ftates. Seneca, in remarking upon the Roman language, fays. Genus dicefidi 7nutatur per puhlicos moresy Sec. This he exemplifies in the Roman language, which was fhort and dry in the earlieft ages, after- wards became elegant and ornate, and at lafl loofe and diffufe. The flyle of an age alfo is fometimes formed by fome one or more eminent perfons, who, having obtained reputation, every thing peculiar to them is admired and copied, and carried much into excefs. Seneca has remarked this alfo, that commonly one author obtains the palm, and becomes the model, and all copy him. Hccc vitia unus aliquis inducit^ And he gives a very good example of it, of which ;we may now judge in Salluft. He alfo very pro- X2 2"4^ LECTURES ON Left. I©. perly obferves, that all the faults that arife from imitation become worfe in the imitator than in the example : thus reproving^the fault jufl: now men- tioned in our anceilors. It is remarkable that Seneca himfelf was another example of the fame thing. His manner of wTi- ting, which is peculiar, came to be the llandard of the age. His manner has been called by critics, point, and antitheiis ; — a fliort fentence containing a ilrong fentiment, or a beautiful one, as it were, like a maxim by itfelf. For an example or two of this : To exprcfs the definition of Lyons, he fays, Liigdumim quod ostendehatur, &:c. That Lyons, which v/as formerly fhown, is now fought. And on the fame fubjeft, — Una nox, &:c. There was but one night between a great city and none, ^uid! est eques Rom anus, &.c. What ! is a Roman knight a freed man or ilave ? names generated by ambition or oppreffioa. The fault of this fententious manner of writing does not lie in the particulars being blameable, but in the repetition and uniformity becoming tedious ; —when every paragraph is flulFed with fentences and bright fayings, generally having the fame tune, it wearies the ear. The moil remarkable book in the Englifli language for putting continual fmart- nefs, fentence, and antithefis, for elegance, is the Gentleman Inftrufted. I fnall read you one para- graph—" The miiyfortune of one breathes vigour into the others : They carry on manfully the attack. Their heads run round with the glalles. Their tongues ride poll. Their wits are jaded. Their reafon is diilanccd. Brutes could not talk better. Left. 10. ELOQUEN-CE. 141 nor men worfe. Like fl^ippers in a ftomi, they rather hallooed than fpoke. Scarce one heard his neighbour, and not one uuderflood him ; fo that noife flood for fenfe, and every one pafled for a virtuofo, becaufe all played the fool to extravagance." I fhall not enlarge much farther upon the differ- ence of ftyle arifino from the characler of an age, as in the ages before the Reformation, called the times of chivalry, when military prowefs vas the great thing in rcqueft — their gallantry and heroifm were to be feen in every writer. — At the time of the Re- formation and the revival of learning, their cita- tions of the ancient writers and allufions to tlie clafTic phrafes diftinguifhed every author. In the age of the civil wars in England, of which religion was fo much the caufe, allufions to lingular expreffions and theological opinions, are every where to be met with, of which the great Milton is an example. But there is another diftinftion of llyles, which is chiefly pcrfonal, and will dilHnguiih one author from another, in the fame age, and perhaps of the fame or nearly the fame abilities. There are feve- ral different epithets given to ftyle in our languao-e, which I Ihall mention in a certain order, which I fuppofe will contribute fomething to explain the meaning of them. We call a ftj^le, fimple or plain, fmooth, fweet, concife, elegant, ornate, juft, nervous, chafle, fevere. Thefe are all different epithets which will each of them convey to a nice critical ear fomething different ; though I confefs it is not eafy to define them clearly, or explain them fully. Plainnefs and fimplicity is, when the author does ■X3 24^ LECTURES ON Le6t. 10. not feem to have had any thhig in view, but to .-be underflood, and that by perfons of the v/eakeft un- derftanding. That ought to be in view in many writings, and indeed perfpicoity will be found to be a chara£ler of many ftyles, when there are other great qualities ; but we call that plain and fmiple, when there is no difcovery of literature, and no attempt at the pathetic. Seougal's Life of God in the Soul of Man, and Dr Evans's Sermons, are ad- mirable patterns of tliis mar.ner. 2. I would call that a fmooth ftyle, when the utmoft care had been taken to meafure the periods, and to confult the ear on the ftrufture of the fentence ; for this 1 know no author more remarkable than Hervey, in his Meditations, 3. Sweetnefs feems to me to differ from the former only in that the fubjefls and the images are generally of a pleafmg or footliing na- ture, fuch as may particularly be feen in Mrs Rowe's Letters; perhaps alfo in a m-ore modem compofition by a lady. Lady Mary V/. Montague's Letttrs. And indeed v^^hen female authors have excelled, they generally do excel in fweetnefs. 4. The fiext is coiicifenefs. This is eafily underflood ; A is juft as much brevity as is confiflent with perfpicuity. It is a beauty in every writing, when other qualities are not hurt by it. But it is peculiarly proper for critical or fcleutific writing, becaufe there we do not fo much expeft or want to know the author's fentimcnts,,but as foon as poilible to learn the fafts, to understand them fully, and range them metho- dically. There are many more authors who excel in this refped in the French, than in the Engli(h language. Not tlie fgicatific writings, but tivea Leci. 10. ELOQUENCE. 243 political and moral writings, are drawn up "by tliera with great concifenefs. There cannot be greater concifenefs than in Montefquieu's Spirit of Laws. Brown's Eftimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times, feems to be an imhation of that au- thor in his manner. In elTaj-WTiting, D3\Hd Hanie feems to have as happily joined concifenefs and per- fpicuity as moft of our Engliib writers. Some pious writers have been as faccefsful this way as moil of our nation ; fuch as Mafon's Sayings, and Tvlafon on Self-knowled.;e. c. A ftyle is called elegant, when it is formed by the principles of true taile, -and much pains is taken to ufe the beft and pureft exprelHons that the language will afford. It is very common to join together eafs and elegance. The great patterns we have of thefe are Addifon and Tillotfon. Seed's Scniions, too, may be men- tioned here, as very much excelling in both thefe qualities ; fo alfo does David Hume. The other Hume, author of the Elements of Criticifm, though a very good judge ox writing, feems in point of ftyle to be very deieclive himfelf. If he has any talent, it is concifenefs and plainnefs -^ but he is at the fame time often abrupt and harlh. 6. An ornate llyle may be fai J to be fomething more than elegsnt, introducing into acompofition all the beau- ties of language, where they can fmd a place with propriety. I mendoned before, that Hervey's ftyle^ in his Meditations, w^as exceedingly fmooih and fiowing. I may add, it has alfo the qualities of elegant and ornate. That ftjle is elegant which is correct and free from faults ; that is ornate w^hicji •bounds with bijautics. 'j. The next cbaradlor ^44 LECTURES oy Le6l. lO. of ftjle is, fhat it is jufl. By this I underftand, a particular attention" to the truth and meaning of every expreiTion. Juftnefs is frequently joined with, or othcrwife exprefTed by precifion ; fo that, (if I may fpeak fo), together with a tafte which will relifh and produce an elegance of language, there is a judgement and accuracy which will abide the fcnitiny of philofophy and criticifm. Many well- turned periods and ihowy expreffions will be found defev51:ive here. This jullnefs of ftyle is fcarcely ever fouhd without cleaniefs of underftanding, fo that it appears in accuracy of method, in the whole difcourfe, as well as in the flyle of particular parts. Dr Samuel Clark was a great example of this« He was one of thbfe few mathematicians who were good writers, and, while he did not lofe the life and fervour of the orator, preferved the precifion of the natural philofopher. 8. Nervous or ftrong, is the next character of ftyle; and this implies that in which the author does not wholly negle^l elegance und precifion. But he is much more attentive to dignity and force. A ftyle that is very ftrong and nervous, might often receive a little additional polifh by a few more epithets or copulatives, but cannot defcend to fuch minutenefs. It is a fine expreflion of Richard Baxter, upon ftyle, " May I fpeak plai]ily and pertinently, and fomewhat nervoufly, T have my purpofe." Baxter was a great ex- ample of a nei*vous ftyle, with great negleft of ele- gance; and Dean Swift is an illuftrious example of- the fame fort of di£lion, with a very confiderable attention to elegance. Both the one and the other feem to write in the fulnefs of their hearts "; and to Lefl. 10. ELOQUENCE. 24^ me without fcruple thofe terms arc commonly beft, that firft prefeiit ihemielves t(5 a fertile invention and warm imagination, without waiting to choofe in their room thole that might be more fmooth or Ibnorous, but lefs emphatic. 9. Chaftity of ftyle, I think, ftands particularly oppofed to any embellilb- meuts that are not natural and necelTary. Nay, we generally mean by a very chafte writer, one who does not admit even all the ornaments that he might, and what ornaments he does admit are al- ways of the moft decent kind, and the moil pro- perly executed. 10. Severity of ftyle has this title only by way of comparifon. That is a fevere ftyle which has propriety, elegance, and force, but feems rather to be above and to difdain the orna- ments which every body elfe would approve, aijci the greateft piirt of readers would deftre. LECTURE XI. T^^E come now to the third general head, ^ ^ which was, to fpeak of oratory as it is divid- ed into the feveral parts which conftitute the art. Tliefe have been generally tlie following, inven- tion, difpofition, ftyle or compofition, pronunciation, including gefture. 1 . Invention. This is nothing elfe but fmding out tlie fentiments by which a fpeaker or writer would explain wha-t he has to propofe, and the arguments by which he would enforce it. This fubje^l is treated of very largely, in moft of the books t^6 LECTURES ON Led. II. of oratory, In which I think they judge very wrong,' In by far the greateft number of cafes, there is no neceffity of teaching it ; and where it is neceflary, I believe it exceeds the power of man to teach it with efre you could neither perceive half fo diftinftly what was there, nor could it at all have fuch an effeft, as if every thing was difpofed in a juft order, and pla- ced where it ought to fland ; nay, a much fmaller quantity, elegantly difpofed, would exceed in gran- deur of appearance a heap of the moll collly things in nature. (5.) Order is alfo neceflary to brevity. A con- fufed difcourfe is almoll never fhort, and is always jfilled with repetitions. It is with thought in this refpe£l, as with things viiible, for, to return to the former fimilitude, a confufed heap of goods or furni- ture fills much more room than when it is ranged and claffed in its proper order, and every thing carried to its proper place. Having Ihown the excellence of precifion and me- 4hod, let us next try to explain what it is ; and that J may have fome regard to method while I am fpeaking of the very fubjeft, I fhall take it in three lights: I. There muft be an attention to order in the difpofition of the whole piece. Whatever the parts be in themfelves, they have alfo a relation to one another, and to the whole body, (if I may fpeak .io), that they are to compofe. Every work, be it xvhat it will, hiflory, epic poem, dramatic poem, oration, epiflle, or efiay, is to be confidered as a whole ; and a clearnefs of judgement in point of Led. II. £LOQU£NCE. 251 method, will decide the place and proportion of the feveral parts of which they are compofed. The loofeft elTay, or where form is lea ft pro fe (Ted or ftudied, ought yet to have fome fhape as a whole j and we may fay of it, that it begins abruptly or ends abruptly, or fome of the parts are mifplr.ced. There are often to be feen pieces in which good things are faid, and well faid, and have only this fault, that they are unfeafonable and out of place. Horace fays, in his Art of Poetry, what is equally applicable to every fort of compofition, Dcnique sit quod vis simp/ex duntaxat et unum ; and fhortly after, Infelix operis summay quia ponere totum riesczet» This judgment in planning the whole, will par- ticularly enable a perfon to determine both as to the place and proportion of the particular parts, whether they be not only good in themfelves, but lit to be introduced in fuch a work j and it will alfo (if I may fpeak fo) give a colour to the whole compofition. The neceility of order in the whole ftrudlure of a piece, {hows that the rule is good which is given, by fome, that an orator, before he begin his dif- courfe, fliould concentrate the fubjedt as it were, and reduce it to one fingle propofition, either exprefTed, or at leaft conceived in his mind. Every thing fhculd grow out of this as its root, if it be in another principle to be explained ; or refer to this as its end, if it be a point to be gained by perfuafion. Ha- ving thus ftated the point clearly to be handled, it will afford a fort of criterion whether any thing ad- duced is proper or improper. It wiD fuggeft the topics that are jufl and fuitable, as'well as enable Y2 252 LECTURES ON Left. II. US to rejed whate-er is in fubftancc improper, or in lize difproportionate to the defign. Agreeably to this principle, I think, that not only the fubjed of a fingle dlfcourfe iliould be reduceable to one pro- portion, but the general diviiions or principal heads Ihould not be many in number. A great number of general heads both burdens the memory, and breaks the unity of-the fubjed, and carries the idea of fevcral little difcourfes joined together, or to fal- low after one another. 2. Ofder is necelTary in the fubdivifions of a fub- je£t, or the way of ftating and marlhalling of the feveral portions of any general head. This is ap- plicable to all kinds of compolition^ and all kinds of oratory, fermons, law- pleadings, fpeeches. There is always a divifion of the parts, as well as of the whole, either expreli'ed formally and numerically, or fuppofed, though fuppreffed. And it is as much here as any where, that the confulion of inaccurate writers and fpeakers appears. It is ahvays necef- fary to have fome notion of the wliole of a piece ; and the larger divinons being more bulky, (fo to fpeak), difpofitioninthemismore eafily perceived; but in the finailer, both their order aiid liz.e is m danger of being Icfs attended to. Obferve, there- fore, that to be accurate and jull, the fubdivifions of any con^spofition, fuch I mean as are (for exam- ple) introduced in a numerical feries, i, 2, 3, &.c. lliould have the following properties. (t.) They Ihould be clear and plain. Every thing indeed fliculd be clear as far as he can make it, but precifion and diftindnefs Ihould efpecially appear in the fubdivifions, juft as the bounding lines Le6l. II. ELOQUENCE. 2^^f of countries in a map. For this reafon the firfl part of a fabdivifion fliould be alike, a fhort deli- nition, and, when it can be done, it isbeft exprefled in a lingle term ; for example, in giving the charac- ter of a man of learning, I maj propofe to fpeak of his genius, his erudition, his induftry or applica- tion. (2.) They fiiould be truly diflin£l ; that is, every body fliould perceive that they are really different from one another, not in phrafe or word only, but in fentiment. If you praife a man firft for his judgement, and then for his underftanding, they are either altogether or fo nearly the fame, or fo nearly allied, as not to require diftinclion. I have heard a minifter, on John, x\di. 11." Holy Fa- ther," 8ic. in fliowing how God keeps his people, fay, 1. He keeps their feet : ** He fhall keep thy- feet from falling." 2. He keeps their w^ay : " Thou Ihalt keep him in all his ways." Now, it is plain^ that thefe are not two different things, but two me- taphors for the fame thing. This indeed was faulty alfo in another refpeft ; for a metaphor ought not to make a divifion at all. (3.) Subdiviiions fhould be neceifary^, that i.s to fay, taking the word in tlie loofe and popular fenfe, the fubjeft fhould feem to demand them. To multiply divifions, et^en where they may be made really difiincl, is tedious, and difguflful, un. lefs where they are of ufe and importance to our clearly comprehending the meaning, or feeling the force of what is faid. If a perfon, in the map of a country^ Ihould give a different colour to every Y3 254' LECTURES ON Left. II. three miles, though the equality of the proportion would make the divifion clear enough, yet it would appear difguftingly fuperfluous. la writing the hiftorj of an eminent perfon's life, to divide it into fpaces of ten years, perhaps, would make the view of the whole more exa6b ; but to di- vide it into fingle years or months, would be fini- cal and difagreeabie. The increafe of divifions leads almoll unavoidably into tedioafnefs. (4.) Subdivifions fhould be co-ordinate ; that is to fay, thofe that go on in a feries, i, 2,3,. &c. fhould be as near as pofTible fimilar, or of the fame kind. This rule is tranfgreffed, when either the things mentioned are wholly different in kind, or when they include one another. This will be well perceived, if we confider how a man would defcribe a fcnfible fubje61, a county for example y New-Jerfey contains, i. Middlefex. 2. So- merfet county. 3. The townfhips of Prince- ton. 4. Morris county. So, if one, in defcribing the charafter of a real Chriftian,. fliould fay, faith,, holinefs^ chai^ty, juftice, temperance, patience, this, would not do, becaufe holinefs includes juftice, &^c.. When, tiierefore, it feems necelTary to mention different particulars that cannot be made co-ordi- nate, they iliould be made fubordinate. (5.) Sub-divifions fhould be complete^ and ex- hauil the fubjecft. This, indeed, is common to all civiiions, but is of moH importance here, where it is mofl negleded. It may be faid, perhaps. How can we propofe to exhaufl any fubjeft ? By ma- king the divifions fuitable, particularly in point of comprehenfion, to the nature of the fubjeft i as aa Le£b. II. ELOQUENCE. 2j5 example, and to make ufe of the image "before in- troduced, of giving an account of a country, I ma^r faj, the province of Nevv-Jerfey confilis of two parts, Eaft and Weft Jerfey. If I faj it coiilifts of the counties of Someriet, &.c. I muft continue till I have enumerated all the counties, otherwife the divifion is not complete. In the fame man- ner, in public fpeaking, or any other- compolition,^ whatever divifion is made, ii is not legitimate, if it does not include or exhauft the whole fubjeft j which may be done, let it be ever fo great. For example : True religion may be divided various ways, fo as to include the whole j I niay fay, that it confifts of our duty to Gne view, under {he three ^reat kinds of writing, and ^5^ LECTURES ON Left. 1 2-. will again be mentioned under the two following heads, as well as the remarks at the clofe : yet I will drop a few hints upon it in this place. I. It is neceffary that a writer or fpeaker fhould be well acquainted with the language in which he fpeaks ; its charafters, properties, and defefts, its idioms, or peculiar terms and phrafes, and likewife with as many other languages as poflible, particu- larly fuch as are called the learned languages, the Latin and Greek. Our own language is the Eng- lifh. A thorough acquaintance with it mail be acquired by extcnfive reading in the beft authors^ giving great attention to the remarks made by cri- tics of judgement and erudition, and trying it our- felves in practice. Our language, like moft of the northern languages, is rough, w4th a frequent meeting of confonants, difficult of pronunciation ; it abounds in monofyllables. You may write a whole page, and fcarce ufe one word that has more than one fyllable ; this is a defeft, and to be avoid- ed when it can be done confiftently with other pro- perties, particularly fimplicity and perfpicuity. Our language is faid to have an over proportion of the letter j-, and therefore called a biffing lan- guage. This a writer of judgement will endeavom* to avoid, w^henever he can do it with propriety and elegance. A thorough acquaintance with the genius and idioms of our own language, can fcarcely be attained without fome acquaintance with others, l)ecaufe it is comparifon of one with another which illuftrates all. There are not only fmaller diffe- rences between one language and another, but there are fome general difference sin the arrangement of Lq^, 12. ELOQUENCE. 259 words, in the ancient and modern languages : in the Greek and Latin, the governed words are pretty- generally before the verb. It is a miflake for us to fay, that the Englifti order is the natural order, as fome have done. It is certain that they ai'e either both alike natural and equally obvious, when once cuftom has fixed them, or that the ancient order is the more natural of the two. There are two things, the adion and the object, to be conjoined j and it is fully as proper to turn your attention firfl to the obje6t, before you tell what you are to fay of it, or what you would have done with it, as after. Istud scalpellum quod in maim babes y commoda mihipaulisper^ si placet: and in longer and more involved fentences, the fufpending the fentiment for fome time till it be completed, is both more pleafing and more for- cible. Our own language admits of a little tranfpofi- tion, and becomes grander and more fonorous by it, both in poetry and profe. 2. We may attend to the arrangement of the claufes of a fentence, and their proportion and found. Every fentence may be coniidered as having fo many claufes or members, \>^hieh have, each of them, fome meaning, but which is not complete till it is clofed. Every fentence is capable of receiving fome degree of harmony, by a proper ftrudure ; this it receives when the moft important ideas, and the moft fonorous exprelTions, occupy the chief places ; but what, you will fay, are the chief places ? We naturally, fays an eminent French author on this fubjedl, love to prefent our moft interefting ideas firft ; but this order, which is didtated by felf- love, is contrary ♦to wha: we are dircfted to by the 16C> LECTURES ON Left. 12. art of pleaflng. The capital law of this art, is to prefer others to oiirfelves, and therefore the mofl ilriking and interefting ideas come with the greateft beauty, as well as force, in the clofe. Where the difference does not lie in the ideas, the words or phrafes that are moft long and fonorous ought to be fo diftinguifhed ; this rule, however, will admit fome exception, when we are to perfuade or inftruft, for we muft never feem to have fweetnefs and cadence chiefly in view. The rule of placing in a fentence the moft im- portant ideas and exprefFions laft.. was taken notice of by ancient writers. I?i verbis obser'vandum est^ fays one of them, ut a majoribus ad minus descejidat uratio, melius enim dicetur^ mr est optimus, quam "jir optimus est. Sometimes feveral monofyllables ter- minate a fentence well enoughj becaufe in pronun- ciation they run into one, and feem to the hearers little different from a lingle word. It is an obfer- vation, that the ear itfelf often directs to the rule upon this fubjedl. Some French critics obferve, that fome fyllables in their language which are ufually fliort, are produced in the end of a fentence ; for inftance, ^e suis votre servitcur Monsieur ^ je suis le voire ; where votre is fliort in the firft fentence, and long in the fecond ; and I believe the fame thing would happen in tranflating that fentence literally into Engliih. The harmony of fentcnces is preferved cither by a meafured proportion, or regular gradation of the claufes : Cicero fays upon this fubjeft. Si f?i^mbra^ &:c. In every fentence confifting of two members only, every body's ear will make them fenftble, I Lcc\:. 12. ELOQUENCE. 26 1 ' that the lail claufe after the paufe of the voice ought to belongeft; as in Shakcfpeare, " But yefterdaj," Sec. In longer fentences there muft be a greater varie- ty, and feveral caufes mull: contribute to determine the length of the ciaufes ; but it is plain, the laft muft be longer than the preceding ; and fometimes a regular gradation of more than two ciaufes has a very happy efFeft ; fuch as thefe of Cicero, ^/o- rum qucvstor fueram^ Stc. Again he fays in the fame oration, Hahct honor em ^ &c. There is an- other order in which there are two equal, and one- unequal member, and in that cafe, when the unequal member is fliorteft, it ought to be placed firfl ; when it is longeft, it ought to be placed laft, as iix the two following examples : Testis est Africa^ &c. and Eripite nos ex miseris, &:c. There is another ftruclure of the members of a fentence, in which this rule is departed from, and yet it pleafes, be- caufe of a eertainexaft proportion, as that of Mon- fieur Fenelon, Dans s a douleur^ &:c. The firft and laft members are equal, and that which is in the middle is juft double to each of them. Perhaps it will be alked, Muft an author then give attention to this precife meafure ? Muft he take a pair of fcales or compalTes to meafare every period he compofes ? By no means. Nothing would be more frigid and unfuccefsful, but it was proper thus to analyfethe fubjeft, and fhow in what manner the ear is pleafed ; at the fame time there is fo great a variety and compafs in the meafures of profe, that it is eafy to vary the ftrudure and ca- dence, and make every thing appear quite fimplc Vol. VII. Z 26s- LECTURES ON Left. 12. and natural. This leads me to the third remark uDon ftvle. 3. That variety is to be particularly fludied. If a writer thinks any particular ilru«5lure neceiTary, and forces every thing he has to fay juft into that form, it will be highly difagreeable ; or if he is much enamoured with one particular kind of orna- ment, and brings it in too frequently, it will imme- diately difguft. There is a mixture in the principles of tafle, a defire of uniformity and variety, fimpli- city and intricacy ; and it is by the happy union of all thefe, that delight is moft efFe£lually produced. What elfe is neceflary upon ftyle, will fall very properly under fome of the following heads. The lafl part of the oratorial art is pronunciation, including gefture. This is of the utmoft, and in- deed of univerfally confefTed importance. The effects of the different manner of delivering the fame thing are very great. It is a famous fubjeft, largely treated of by all critical writers. It feems to have been nicely fludied by the ancients ; and if we may judge from fome circumllances, their ac- tion has been often very violent. We are told of Cicero, that when he firfl went to the bar, the vio- lence of his aftion, and what is called contentio laterum, was fucli as endangered his couflitution, fo that he took a journey for his health, and on his return took to a more cool and managed way of fpeaking. There is alfo fomewhere in his wri- tings, an expreflion to this purpofe, Nee fuit etiam^ quod minimum est, supplosio pedis ; as if llamping with the foot had been one of the leaft violent mo- tions then in ufe. We cannot judge qf this matter Led. 12. ELOQUENCE. 263 very well at fiich a diftance. There is a difference in the turn of different nations upon this fabje6l. The French and Italians have much more warmth and fire in their manner than the Briiiili. I re- member once to have been told that no man could perceive the beauty of Raphael's picturv* of Paul preaching at Athens, unlefs he had feen a French- man or Italian in the pulpit. Leaving you to read and digeil all the criticifms and remarks upon this fubjeft to be met with in different authors, I ihall only give a few dii'e£lions ihat I efteem mofl ufe- ful for avoiding improprieties, and attaining feme degree of excellence in this refpeft. 1. Study great (incerity -, try to forget every pm*pofe but the very end of fpeaking, information, and perfuading. Labour after that fort of prefence of mind which arifes from felf-denial, rather than from courage. Nothing produces more aukward- nefs than confulion and embarrailment. Bring a clown into a magnificent palace, and let him have to appear in the prefence of perfons of high rank, and the fear and folicitude he has about his own carnage and difcourfe, makes both the one and the other much more abfurd and aukward than it would have otherwife been. 2. Learn diitindl articulation, and attend to all the common rales of reading, which are taught in the Engliih grammars. Articulation is giving their full force and pov.crs to the confonants as well as the vowels. The difference between a well articu- lated difcoiLirfe and one defective in this refpe^, is, that the firft you will hear diflinftly as far as you Z 2 264 LECTURES ON Le<^, 12, can hear the voice ; the other you will hear found enough, yet not underftand almoft any thing tliat is faid. Piactice in company is a good way to learn this and feveral other excellencies in difcourfe. 3. Another rule is, to keep to the tone and key of dialogue, or common converfation, as much as pofTible. In common difcourfe, where there is no aiiedlation, men fpeak properly. At leaft, thougli even here there are dilTerences from nature, fome fpeaking with more fweetnefs and grace than others, yet there is none that falls into any of thofe unna- tural rants or ridiculous geilures, that are fometiiues to be feen in public fpeakers. 4. It is of coiifiderable confequence to be accuf- tomed to decency of manners in the befl company. This gives an eafe of carriage and a fenfe of delicacy, which is of great ufe in forming the deportment of an orator. 5. In the lail place, every one fliould coniider not only what is the manner, bell in itfelf, or even befl fuited to the fubjedl, but what is alfo beii fuit- ed to his own capacity. One of a quick animated fpirit by nature, may allow himfelf a much greater violence of a£lion, than one of a colder difpolitiou. If this lad works himfelf up to violence^ or lludies to exprefy much paffion, he will not probably be able to carry it through, but will relapfe into his own natural manner, and by the fenfible difference between one part of his difcourfe and another, ren- der himfelf ridiculous. Solemnity of manner ihould bo fubflituted by all fuch perfcns in the room of fu-c. Led. 13. ELOQUENCE. 2^5 LECTURE XIII. WE come now to the fourth general division of this fubjecl:, which is, that its object or end is ditFerent. The ends a writer or fpeaker may be faid to aim at, are informarlon, demonilration, perfiiafion, and entertainment. I need fcarce tell you, that thefe are not fo wholly diilinft, bat that they arc frequently intermixed, and that more than one of them may be in view at the fame time. Perfuafion is aifo ufed in a fenfe that includes them all. The intention of ail ipeech, or wriiiag, which is but recorded fpeech, is to perfuade, taking the word with latitude. Yet I think you will ealily perceive that there are very different fons of com- pofition, in fome of v.'hich one of the above-men- tioned purpofes, and in others a difFcrent one, takes the lead, and gives the colour to the whole performance. Great benefit will arife from keep- ing a clear view of what is the end propofed. It will preferve the writer from a vitious and mLfta- ken tafte. The fame thoughts, the fame phrafeology,- the fame fpirit in general, running through a wri- ting, is highly proper in one cafe, and abfurd in another. There is a beauty in every kind of wri- ting when it is well done, and impropriety or bad tafte will fometiraes fliow themfelves in pieces very iiiconiiderable. If it were but inditing a meflagc- card, penning an article in a newfpaper, or draw- ing up an advertifement, perfons accuilomed to each of thefe will be able to keep to the common \2t6 LECTURES ON Le^t. 1 3. form, or beaten track ; but if any thing different is to be faid, good fenfe and propriejtj, or their con- traries, will foon fhow themfelves. The writings which have information as their chief purpofe, are hiflory, fable, epiftolary writing, the common intercourfe of bufinefs or frieadihip, ^nd all the lower kinds. The properties which •Ihould reign in them, are the following, i. Plain- nefs ; 2. Fulnefs ; 3. Preciiion ; and, 4. Order. 1 . Plainnefs it is evident they ought to have ; and indeed not barely perfpicuity, fo as to be intelligible, but an unaffeded fimplicity, fo as not to feem to have any thing higher in view than to be uiider- ilood. 2. AVhen we fay that fulnefs is a property of writings which have information as their purpofe^ it is not meant to recommend a long or diffufe nar- ration, but to intimate that nothing fhould be omit- ted in giving an account of any thing, which is of importance to its being truly and completely under- ftood. Let a writer be as large as he pleafes in what he fays, if he omits circumftances as effential as thofe he mentions, and which the reader would naturally defire to know, he is not full. Many are very tedious, and yet not full. The excellence of a narrative is to contain as many ideas as poffible, provided they are interefling, and to convey them in as few words as poffible, confiflently with per- ipicuity. 3. Precifion, as a quality of narration, belongs chiefly to language. Words ihould be chofen that are truly expreflive of the thing in view, and all Rnibigubus as well a^ fuperiluous phrafes carefully Left. 13. ELOQUENCE. 257 avoided. The reader is impatient to get to the end of a ftory, and therefore he null not be flopped by any thing but what you are fure he would be glad to know before he proceeds further.*" 4. The lafl particular is order, which is necef* fary in all writings, but efpecially in narration. There it lies chiefly in time and place, and a breacJi of order in thefe refpects is more eafilydifcerned < and more univerfally offenfive than in 'any other. Comnaon hearers do no't always k^ow when you violate order in ranging the arguments on a moral fubjeft ; but if you bring in a ftory abruptly, or tell it corifufedly, either in a letter or a difcourfe, it will be inftantly perceived, and thofe will laugh at you >vho could not tell it a whit better therafelves. Imagination is not to be much ufed in wiitings of the narrative kind. Its chief ufe in fuch writings is in defcription. A man of a warm fancy will paint firongly, and a man of a fentimental turn will intereft the afteclions even by a mere recital of facts. But both tlie cne and the other iliould be kept in great moderation j for a warm fancy is often joined to credulity, and the fentimental perfan is given to invention ; fo that he will turn a. real hiilory into a romance. In hiftory a certain cool and difpalHonate dignity is the leading beauty. The writer fhould appear to have no intereft in characters or events, but deliver them as he finds them. The character which an illuftrious hiftorian acquires from this felf-denia], and being, as it were, fuperior to all the perfonages, how great foever, of whom he treats, has fomettiing awful and venerable in it. 268 LECTURES ON Leci:. I3, It is dlftinguifhed by this circumflance from the applaufe given to the poet or orator. Demonftration is the end in vaew in all fcientific ■writings, whether eflajs, fyftems, or controverfy. The excellencies of this kind of writing maj be reduced to the three following : Perfpicuity, order, and ftrength. The two firft are neceflary here as every where elfe, and the compofition fhould be ilrong and nervoKS to produce a lafting conviftion ; more force of language is to be admitted, at lead more generally in this kind than in the former j but a grent deal lefs of imagination and fancy than even there. Whenever a fcientific writer begins to paint and adorn, he is forgetting himfelf and dif- guiling his reader. This will be fenfibly felt if you apply it to the mathematics. The mathema- tician is converfant only with fenfible ideas, and tlierefore the more naked and unadorned every thing that he fays is, fo much the better. How would itlook if a mathematician fhould fay, Do you fee this beautiful, fmall, taper, acute angle ? It always approaches to this abfurdity, when, in fearch- ing after abflrad truth, writers introduce imagina- tion and fancy. I am fenfible that, having men- tioned controverfy as belonging to this clafs, many may be furprifed that I have excluded ijn agination altogether, fl nee commonly all controverfial waiters do, to the utmofl of their ability, enlift imagination in the fervice of Reafon. There is nothing they are fo fond of as expofing the weaknefs of their ad- verfaries by Urokes of raillery and humour. This I did on purpofe that I may ftatc this matter to you clearly. Controverfy fliould mean, and very ge* Lecl. 13. ELOQUENCE. 269 ntTally fuch writers pretend to mean, v/eighiiig the arguments on each lide of a contelled queiiion, in order to difcover the tmth. What llrong profef- fions of impartiality have we fometimes from the very champions of a party- quarrel I while yet it is plain, that fearching after truth is what they never .think ofy but maintaining, by every art, the caufe v.hich tliey have already efpoufed. I do not deny that there are fometimes good reafons for making ufe of fatlre and ridicule, in trontroverfies of the political kind, and fometimes it is necelTary in felf-defence. If any writer in behalf of a party, attempts to expofe his adverfaries to public fcorn, he ought not to be furprifed i^ the meafure he metes to others, is meafured out to him again. What is unlawful in the aggreilor, becomes •piliiiabre, if not laudable, in the defender. Some- times it is necefiary to expofe tyrants, or perfons in power, who do not reafon, but puniih ; and fome- -times it is neceil'ary to bring down felf-fuflicient perfons, ^Hth whom there is no dealing till their pride is levelled a little with tills difmaying vreapon. Dr Brown has fct this matter in a very clear light, in his ElTays on the Characleriftics, where he fays, that ridicule is not the tell of truth, but it may he r. ry ufeful to expofe and difgrace known falfehood. But when controverfy is rjeally an impartial arch after tnith, it is the farthefl diftant imagin- able, either from pailionate declamation on the one hand, or fallies of wit and humour on the other, Tiiere is one inflance of a controverfy carried on between Dr Sutler and Br Clark, upon the fub- '::c1 of fpace and perfcnal identity, in which there Al- Le£t. 13. ELOQUENCE. 273 fop's Melius Inquirendum ; but, above all, in Swift's writings, profe and verfe. It is obferv'ed fometimes, that the talent of humour is often pofTefled, in a very high degree, by perfons of the meaneft rank, who are themfelves ignorant of it ; in them it appears chiefly in converfation, arid in a manner that cannot be eaflly put upon paper. But as to thofe who think fit to try this manner from the prefs, they fhould be well affured before- hand, that they really pofTefs the talent. In many other particulars, a real tafte for it, and a high ad- miration of any thing, is a coniiderable fign of fome degree of the talent itfelf ; but it is far from being fo in wit and humour. Mr Pope tells us, that " gentle dullnefs ever loves a joke :" and we fee every day people aiming at wit, who produce the moft miferable and fhocking performances : fome- times they do not excite laughter, but loathing or indignation ; fometimes they do excite laughter, but it is that of contempt. There is a diftin<5lion which every one fhould endeavour to underftand and remember, between a wit and a droll ; the firft makes you laugh at what he fays, and the objeft of his fatire, and the fecond makes you laugh at his own expence, from his abfurdity and meanuefs. LECTURE XIV. "V^TE come now to the fifth general divifion of ^ ' eloquence, as its fubjeft is diflferent ; under which we may confider the three great divifions of Vol. VII. A a 174 LECTURES ON Le£l. I4. the pulplf, the bar, and promifcuous aflemblies. All the general principles of compofition are com- mon to thefe three kinds, nor can any man make a truly diftinguiflied figure in any one of them, with- out being well acquainted with literature and tafte. Some peculiarities in different ways of writing have been already touched at, all which I fuppofe you gave attention to ; but there are flill fome differ- ences, as the fcene in which a man is to move in life is different, which are highly worthy of obfer- vation. I will, therefore, confider each of thefe feparately, and try to point out the qualities for which they ought to be diflinguifhed ; or delineate the chara6ler of an accomplilhed miniller, lawyer, and fenator. I begin with the pulpit. Preaching the gofpel of Chrifl is a truly noble employment, and the care ©f fouls a very important trufl. The qualities of mofl importance, I think, are as follow. I. Piety— To have a firm belief of that gofpel he Is called to preach, and a lively fenfe of religion upon his own heart. Duty, intereft, and utility, all eonfpire in requiring this qualification ; it is of the utmofl moment in itfelf, and what men will the leafl difpenfe with in one of that profeflion. All men, good and bad, agree in defpifing a loofe or profane minifler. It difcovers a terrible degree of depravity of heart, and thofe that begin fo feldom alter for the better. The very familiar acquaintance which they acquire with ferious thoughts and fplrltual fub- jefts, ferves to harden them againfl the arrows of conviction ; and it is little wonder that for fuch da- ring wickednefs, God fhould leave them to them- Le£l. 14. ELOQJJENCE. 275 felves, or fentence them to perpetual barrennefs. But whilft I think it my duty thus to warn you, I mufl beg leave to guard it againft abufe, left, while we are aggravating the fin of profane minifters, others fhould think themfelves at liberty, who have no view to that facred offic:^. We have even feen perfons decline the facred office, becaufe they did not think they had true religion, and then, with feeming eafe and quietnefs, fet themfelves to fome other bufmefs, as if in that there was no need of reliction at all. Alas ! after all that can be faid of the guilt and danger of an irreligious minifter, there is an infinite danger to every one who fhall go out of this life an irreligious man. Will it not be poor confolation, think you, in the hour of ficknefs or death, that though you mull perifh everlaftingly, you go to hell, not as a minifter, but a lawyer or a phyfician ? I do truly think, this has been a pillow of fecurity to many poor thoughtlefs fouls, and that they have actually rid themfelves of conviftion, by this miftaken comfort, as if there was much merit in it, that they would not be mi- nifters, becaufe they wanted religion. Remember this, then, in a fingle word, that there is neither profeftion nor ftation, from the king on the throne to the beggar on the dunghill, to whom a concern for eternity is not the one thing needful. But, let me juft take notice of the great advan- tage of true religion to one deftined for tbe work of the miniftry. (i.) It gives a man the knowledge that is of moft fervice to a minifter. Experimental know- A a 2 27^ LECTURES ON Lc6i. I4. ledge is fuperior to all other, and necefTarj to the perfedion of every other kind. It is indeed the very pofTefTion, or daily exercife of that virhich it is the bulinefs of his life, and the duty of his office, to explain and recommend. Experimental know- ledge is the beft fort in every branch, but it is ne- ceflary in divinity, becaufe religion is Vvhat cannot be truly underftood, unlefs it is felt. (2.) True piety will direft a man in the choice of his ftudies. The objedl of human knowledge is fo extenfive, that nobody can go through the whole, but religion will dired the ftudent to what may be moft profitable to him, and will alfo ferve to turn into its proper channel all the knowledge he may otherwife acquire. (3.) It will be a powerful motive to diligence in his ftudies. Nothing fo forcible as that in which eternity has a part. The duty, to a good man is fo prefling, and the objeft fo important, that he will fpare no pains to obtain fuccefs. (4.) True religion will give unfpeakable force to what a minifter fays. There is a piercing and a penetrating heat in that which flows from the heart, which dlftinguifties it both from ihe coldnefs of indifference, and the falfe fire of enthufiafra and vain-glory. We fee that a man truly pious ha^ often efteem, inHuence, and fuccefs, though his pails may be much inferior to others, who are more capable, but lefs confcientious. If, then, piety makes even the weakeft venerable, what muft it do when added to the finell natural talents, and the beft acquired endowments ? (^.) It adds to aminifter's inftrudion, the weight Lect. 14. ELOQJJENCE. Iff of his example. It is a trite remark, that example teaches better than precept. It is often a more ef- fectual reprimand to vice, and a more inciting ar- gument to the pradice of virtue, than the bell of reafoning. Example is more intelligible than pre- cept. Precepts are often involved in obfcuritj, or warped bj controverfj ; but a holy life immediately reaches, and takes poiTeilion of the heart. If I have lengthened out this particular beyond the proportion of the reft, I hope you will forgive it for its importance, and obferv'e, as the conclu- fion of the whole, that one devoted to the ferries of the gofpel fliould be really^ visibly , and eminently holy. 2. Another character which fliould diflingnifii pulpit-eloquence, isfimplicity. Simplicity is beau- tiful every where ; it is of importance that young perfons Ihould be formed to a taile for it, and more difpofed to exceed here than in the oppofite ex- treme ; but, if I am not miilaken, it is more beau- tiful, and the tranfgreilions of it mere offenfive, in the pulpit, than any where elfe. If I heard a lawyer pleading in fuch a flyle and manner, as was more adapted to -difplay his own talents, than to carry his client's caufe, it would con£derably leilen him in my efteem ; but if I heard a miniftcr aiEling the fame pan, I fhould not be fatisfied with con- tempt, but hold him in deteftation. There are feveral ob\-ious reafons why Cm- plicity is more efpecially necefiary to a minifter than any other. 1. Many of his audience are poor- ignorant creatures. If he mean to do them any fervice, he muil keep to what they ucderlland, ^d Aaj 2*}% LECTURES ON Lecl. 1 4. that requires more iimplicity than perfons without experience can eafily imagine. It is remarkable, that at the firfl publication, it was a chara6ler of the gofpel, that it was preached to the poor. In this our blefled Mafter was diftinguiihed, both from the heathen philofophers and Jewifh teachers, who confined their inflruftions in a great meafure to their fchools, and imparted what thej elleemed their moft important difcoiurfes, to only a few cho-- fen difciples. 2. Simplicity is neceffary to pre- ferve the fpeaker's character for fincerity. You heard before how neceffary piety is, which is the proper parent of fincerity in the pulpit. Now, it is not eafy to preferve the opinion of piety and fin- cerity in the pulpit, when there is much ornament. Befides the danger of much affefted pomp, or fop- pery of ftyle, a difcourfe very highly poliilied, even in the truell tafte, is apt to fuggeft to the audience, that a man is preaching himfelf, and not the crofs of Chrifi:. So nice a matter is this in all public fpeaking, that fome* cri- tics fay, that Demofihenes put on purpofe fome errors in grammar in his difcourfes, that the hear- ers might be induced to take them for the im- mediate effufions of the heart, without art, and with little premeditation. 1 doubt much the foli- dity of this remark, or the certainty of the facl ; but however it be, there is no occafion for it in the cafe of a minifter, becaufe preparation and premeditation are expe«3:ed from him ; and in that cafe he may make his difcourfes abundantly plain and fimple, without any affected blunders. 3. Simplicity is alio neceffary, as fuited to the gofpel Le6l. 14. ELOQUENCE. ^79 itfelf, the fubjecl of a miniiler's difcourfes. No- thing more humbling to the pride of man, than the do£lnne of the crofs ; nothing more imbecoming that doftrine, than too much finery of language. The apoftle Paul chofe to preach " not with the words which man's wifdom teacheth ;" and again, *^ not with excellency of fpeech, or wifdom •,'* which though I admit that it does not condemn ftudy and found knowledge, yet it certainly fnows, that the ftyle of the pulpit fhould be the moft fimplc and felf-denicd of any other. 3. Another qualification for a minifter is accu- racy, from the utmoft diligence in his important work. I place this imnnediately after the other, to guard it againft abufe by excefs. To avoid vain affetled ornaments, is a very different thing from negligence in preparation. The very fame apoftle who fpeaks with fo much contempt of human wif- dom, yet greatly infifts, in writing to Timothy and Titus, on their giving them.felves to ftiidy, to exhci-tation, to do£lrine, *' Meditate upon thofe things," fays he, &c. Study and accuracy, indeed, is neceffary, that a minifter may procure and keep up the attention of his hearers ; that he may inform the judge- ment, as well as convince the confcience. The an- cient fathers have generally infifted upon this, as of much moment. And in our own times, I obferve, that it is neceffary to avoid ofTending perfons of finer tafte, who are too much attached to the out^ fide of things, and are immediately difgufted with every error againft propriety, and are apt to re- proach religion itfelf, for the weak»nefs or abfurdi- ^8o LECTURES ON Lecl. I4. iy of thofe who fpeak in its behalf. Let no man feek to avoid that reproach which may be his lot, for preaching the truths of the everlafting gofpel, but let him alwajs avoid the jufl reproach of han- dling them in a mean, flovenly, and indecent man- ner. 4. Another quality of a miniiler's eloquence, fhould be force and vehemence. I have in fome former parts of the general fubje£l, fhown you how and when this is to be moft exerted. The delign of the prefent remark is to let you know, that there is no fpeaker who has a greater right to ex- ert himfelf to the utmoft, or who may properly intereft his hearers more, than a minifler of the go- fpel. No fpeaker has fubje£ts or arguments more proper for producing this eife£l. To coniider the fubjedls which a fpeaker from the pulpit has to handle, one would think that it mull be the eafiefl thing imaginable to fpeak from them in a power- ful and interefting manner. The eternal God— the greatnefs of his works — the univerfality of his providence — his awful juftice — hisirrefiftible power -^his infinite mercy* — and the wifdom of God in the my fiery of redeeming grace — the condition of faints and finners while on earth — and the final decifion of their eternal ilate in the day of judge- ment. The truth is, the fubjeds are fo very great in themfelves, that it is not poffible to equal them by the manner of handling them. Probably for this very reafon many fall fiiort. Difcouragcd by the immenfity of the theme, they fall below what they might have done on fubje6ls lefs awful. This, h9wever, ihews, with v.hat a holy ambition thofc Left. 14. ELOQUENCE. 281 "who are employed in the fervice of Chrifl in the gofpel, Ihould endeavour to exert themfelves in the glorious caufe. Provided they are themfejves in eameft, and take truth and nature as their guide, they can fcarcely exceed in zeal and ardour for the glory of God and the good of precious fouls. 5. Another excellent quality of pulpit-eloquence is, to be under the reftra'nt of judgement and pro- priety. I place this afterj^^-the former, as its coun- terpart, and neceffary to give its proper efFe<^« And it may be obferved, that as religious and mo- ral fubjecls give the fureft and the fulleft fcope to zeal and fervour, fo they need, as much as any, the ftri(St government of prudence and experience. I do not mean only by this, to guard minifters from the irregular ferv'-ours of enthufiafm, but to give, if poffible, a degree of folidity and real truth to their inlln^dlions. They ought to avoid all turgid de- clamation, to keep to experience, and to take things as they really are. Let fome people, for ex- ample, fpeak of riches, and what Iball you hear from them ? Gold and filver, what are they, but ihining drofs, fparkling metals, a thing of no real value ? that in the eye of reafon and philofophy, they are of no extcnfive ufe, and altogether con- temptible. And, indeed, to take things in a certain philofophical abflra6lion, they are good for no- thing. Mere gold or filver you can neither eat nor wear. Their value, yon will fay, depends all upon opinion, the changeable fancy of men. But ihis manner of fpeaking, and all that is related to it, feeming to be phliofophy and reafon, is really abfurdity and nonfeufe. For though it be true. 282 LECTURES ON Le-cr arts ? This will ferv:^ greatly to improve and perfect our judgement a.d taile. It was very early obferved, that there was a. relation between the different arts, and fome com- mon principles that determine their excellence.. Cicero mentions this in the introdudion of his ora- tion for Archias the poet. Ktenim omnes artes qu v ad huniari'tatein pertinent^ haheiit quoddam comurune -jinculum^ et quasi cognatlonc quadam inter se conti- 7imtui\ Thefe arts, which, Cicero fays, ad Immaiiitatevi pertine?iti are called by the moderns the fine arts» This is to diilinguilh them from thofe commonly called the mechanic arts,, making the utenfils and conveniences of common life. And yet even thefe may be included, as tafte and elegance, or the v/ant of it may plainly be difcerned in every production of human Ikill. Hov.-e^-er,. thofe called the fine arts are the following : Poetry,, oratory,, mufic, paints ing, fculpture, archite£lure. It mud be allowed, C c 3 50-2 LECTURES ON Le6l. l6. that though thefe arts have fome common princi- ples of excellence, there are fome perfons who have a ftrong inclination after, and even a capacity of performing in fome of them, and not in others. There are good orators who are no muficians, or perhaps who have very little tafbe for the beauties of architefture. Yet commonly complete critics, and thofe who have a well-formed tafte, are able to perceive the beauty of the whole, and the relation of one to another. It is remarkable, that the expref- fions in compofition are frequently borrowed from one art, and applied to another. We fay, a fmooth, polifhed ftyle, as well as a polilhed furface ; and we fay, a building is fweet or elegant, as well as an oration. We fay, the notes in muiic are bold and fwelling, or warm and animated. One of our modem authors on eloquence, has thought fit to take exception at the ufe of the word taste y as being of late invention, and £is implying nothing but what is carried in judgement and genius. But I apprehend that the application of it, though it Ihould be admitted to be modern, is perfectly juft^ It came to us from the French. The hon gout among them was applied firft to claflic elegance, and from thence to all the other arts. And as a fenfe of the beauty of the arts is certainly a thing often diftin^l from judgement, as well as from erudi- tion, the term.feems not only to be allowable, but well chofen. We find perfons who can reafon very ftrongly upon many fubjeds, v/ho yet are incapable of elegance in compofition, and indeed of receiving much, delight from the other fine arts. Nay, we find perfons of uncommon acutenefs in mathematics Ld^» 16. ILOQUENCE. 303 and natural philofophy, who yet are incapable of attaining to a fine tafte. It has been fometimes faid, that tade is arbitrary. Some will have it, that there is no fuch thing as a flandard of tafte, or any method of improving it. It is a kind of common proverb with many, that there is no difputing about tafte : that it is of this intelledual as of natural tafte ; according as the pa- late or orc^ans are differently formed, what gives an agreeable reliih to one, gives a difagreeable one to another. They fay that the modes of tafte are temporary and variable — that different nations, cli- mates, governments, and ages, have different ways of fpeaking and writing, and a diff*erent turn in all the arts — that chance, or particular perfons, will be able to give a turn to the mode in all thefe. Even fo great a man as Dr Warburton has embraced this fentiment, and to thofe who attack the fcriptures as not being a complete model of eloquence he anfwers, there is no fixed ft andard of eloquence \ that eloquence is one thing in Arabia, another in Greece, and another in England. For this reafon he condemns thofe who, after the example of Mr Blackwall, in his Sacred Claflics, vindicate the fcriptures from objeftions of this kind, or produce inftances of their fublimity and beauty. But though I have ftiown you in fome of the former difcourfes, that the ftyle and manner in 'vogue will receive fome tindlure, and be liable to fome variation, ifrom all the par- ticulars mentioned ; yet there is certainly a real beauty or deformity in nature, independent of thefe partial changes, which, when properly explained, and examples of it eihibited, will obtain more oni-. 5^4 LECTURES ON L8<51. l6; verfcil approbation, and retain it longer than the others. The poetry and oratory of the ancients, and their painting and ilatuary, are inllances and proofs of this. It may alfo appear from wliat I mention- ed to you formerly, that thofe compofitions whicli have moil fimplicity, and fuch excellencies as are moll folid, witli feweil of the cafual ornaments of falhion, and the peculiarities of their own age, will pleafe, when tlicir contemporaries are loft in ob- livion. The fame thing holds with pieces of furni- ture that are elegant but plain. Such have the beauties of nature, which belong to every age. But to ihow this more fully, even the remarks upon natural tafte are not true in fuch a fenfe as to weaken what has been fald. For though it is cer- tain, that perfons ufed to the cOarfeft kind of food, which they have often eaten v/ith reliih, may fhow at iirft an averlion to the delicacies of cookery, yet after a perfon has been a little accuftomed to that kind of preparation of viftuals in which regard is had to the mixtures that are ipoft proper to gratify the palate, he will not eafily return to his flovenly provilion. But though there were lefs in this re- mark, it feems plain, that there is a tafte in the fine arts, and a real foundation for it in nature. But fuppofing that there is a foundation in nature for tafte and criticifm, there is another queftion that arifes, viz. Can we tell what it is ? Can we reach the original principles which govern this matter I Can we 'fay, not only that fuch and fuch things pleafe us, but why they do fo ? Can we go any- further than we have already done, as to compofi- tion ? gome have refufed that we can with certainty Lea. 16. ELOQUENCE. 3O5 reach the fource of this fubjecl. When the caufc is aiked, whj one perfon, one thing, or one com- pofition, is more excellent than another, they fay it is an immediate and fimple perception, a je ne scats quoiy as the French fay ; which phrafe feems to have taken its rife from the circumflance which often occurs, that in a houfe, a garden, a ftatue or paint- ing, or even in a perfon's countenance and carriage, you perceive fomething agreeable upon the whole, and yet cannot fuddenly tell wherein it lies, the parts are not better proportioned perhaps, nor the features better formed, than in another, and yet there is fomething in the compofition of the whole that gives the moft exquiiite delight. Others, how^ever, and the far greateft number, have thought it proper to go a great deal further, and to inquire into human nature, its perceptions and powers, and endeavour to trace cut the princi- ples of tafte, which apply in general to all the fine arts, or in greater or lefs proportion to each of them, for fome apply more to one than to others. As for example, if the fenfe of harmony is an origi- nal perception, it applies chiefly to mufic, and re- motely to the pronunciation of an orator, and ftill more remotely to the compofition of an orator. Thefe powders or perceptions in human nature have been generally called the powers of imagination. Mr Hutchinfon calls them reflex fenfes, finer inter- nal fenfations ; and upon examination we fhall find, that, befides the internal fenfes, there are certain finer perceptions, which we are capable of, which may be faid to take their rife from outward objeds^ 306 LECTURES 01^ Le(^. 16, and to fuppofe the external fenfation, but yet to be additions to, and truly diftind froin it. As for ex- ample, I fee a beautiful perfon. My eye immediate- ly perceives colour, and fhape varioufly difpofe^; but I have further a fenfe of beauty in the whole. I hear the found of mulical inilruments ; my ear re- ceives the noife ; every body's ear who is not deaf does the fame. If I have a fenfe of harmony, I take a pleafure in the compofition of the founds. The way to examine the principles of talle, is to confider which of thefe perceptions are limple, im- mediate, and original ; which of them are depend- ent upon others ; and how they may be combined and compounded, and afford delight by fuch com- poiition. This is an extenfive fubje£l:, and it is difficult to treat it concifely, and yet plainly ; and indeed, after all the pains I can take, there will be reafon to ap- prehend fome obfcurity wull remain to perfons not ufed to fuch kind of difquifitions. The way I fhall take is, to llate to you critically or hiilorically the way in which this matter hath been treated by fome of the moft celebrated writers. The Spectator, written by Mr Addifon, on the Pleafures of the Ima- gination, reduces the fources of delight or appro- bation to three great clailes, novelty, greatnefs, and beauty. He fays, that fuch is our denre after no- velty, that all things that were before unknown, are from this circumftance recommended to us, and that we receive a delight in the difcovery and con* templation of what we never faw before, except fuch objeds as are painful to the organs of fight •, Left. 1 6. ELOQUENCE. 307 that children run from one play-thing to another, not becaufe it is better, but new ; that it is the fame cafe with men; and that authors in particular are at great pains to have fomething new and flriking in their manner, which is the more difficult to be at- tained that they muft make ufe of known words, and that their ideas too muft be fuch as^ are eafily intelligible. There is fomething here that would require a good deal of explication. I do not think that any object is, properly fpeaking, painful to the organs of fight, except too much light j but we do not confider this as a fault in the objeft, Ijut feel it as a weaknefs in ourfelves. And further, if there be fuch a thing as beauty, one would think, that if beauty be agreeable, it muft have a contrary, which is uglinefs, and that muft be difagreeable. As ta greatnefs, this has been always confidered as a fource of admiration. The moft ancient critics obferve, that we do not admire a fmall ri\^et, but we admire the Danube, the Nile, the ocean. This I udll afterwards confider. As to beauiy, it has been confidered as of all other things moft inconceiv- able, and therefore made a firft and immediate per- ception. Others have taken beauty and grace as the ge- neral terms, including every thing that pleafes us. Thus we fay, a beautiful poem, ftatue, landfcapc. Thus alfo v.e fay, a fublime and beautiful-fentlment. Thus they have taken in under it, novelty and great- nefs, and every other agreeable quality. Many eminent critics havcacled in this manner, particu- iTirly the ancients. Longinus, on the Sublime, ia* 308 LECTURES oN Left. i6. troduces feveral things which do not belong to it, as diftinguifhed from beauty. Taking beauty as the general objecl of approbation or fource of de- light, and as applicable to all the fine arts, it has been varioufly analyfed, A French writer, Croufaz, Traite de Beau, ana- lyfes beauty under the following principles : Varie- ty, unity, regularity, order, proportion. Variety is the firft. This feems to be related to, or perhaps in fome refpe6ls the fame with novelty, which was formerly mentioned. It is certain, that a dead uni- formity cannot produce beauty in any fort of per- formance, poem, oration, llatue, pifture, building. Unity is, as it were, the bound and reftraint of variety. Things mull be connected as well as va- rious ; and if they are conneded, the variety is no- thing but confufion. Regularity is the fimilarity of the correfpondent parts ; order is the eafy grada- tion from one to another ; and proportion is the fuitablenefs of each part to the whole, and to every other part. I think it cannot be denied, that all thefe have their influence in producing beauty. » One of the mod celebrated pieces upon this fub- jed, is the famous painter Hogarth's Analyfis of Beauty. He firil produced his fyftem in a fort of enigma, drawing one curved line, with the title of the line of beauty, and another with a double wave, •Vvhich he called the line of grace. He afterwards publilhed his Analyfis of Beauty, which he refolves into the following principles : Fitnefs, variety, uni- formity, fimplicity, intncapy, and quantity. The foft principle is fitnefs j under which he Ihows, that Le£l. 16. ELOQUENCE. 3C9 we always conceive of a thing as intended for fome ufe, and tlierefore there muft be a ccn-efpondencc or fuitablenefs to the ufe, otherwife, whatever be its appearance, we rejedt it as not beautiful. He in- fiances failors, who, whenever there is a fhip that fails well, they call her a beauty. The fame thing will apply perfectly to all kinds of writing : for whatever fine fentiments and noble expreflion be in. any compofition, if they are not fuited to the feafoa and fubjecL, we fay with Horace, Sed nunc non erat his locus. Variety and uniformity mufl be com- pounded together ; and as he has made no mention of order and proportion, it is to be fuppofed, that by variety he meant that which changes in a gradual and infenlible manner; for variety without order is undiflinguilhable, and a heap of confufion. Sim- plicity means that which is eafy, and which the eye travels over and examines without difficulty ; and intricacy is that which requires fome exercife and attention to follow it ; thefe two muft limit one another. In reprefenting beauty as a viiible figure, he obferves, that a ftraight line has the leaft beau- ty ; that which has a w^ave or eafy declination one way begins to be beautiful ; that which has a double wave has ftill greater grace. The truth is, if thefe two things do not deftroy the one the other, fimplicity and intricacy improve and beautify one another. Mr Hogarth obferves, that ringlets of hair waving in the vdnd have been an exprelfion of grace and elegance in every age, nation, and lan- guage ; which is juft a contrafted wave, firft, that Vol. VH. D d 3^0 LECTURES OtT Le£l. 16, of the curls, and this again rendered a little more intricate by the motion of the breeze. If one would have a view of this principle as exhibited in a fingle kind, let him look at the flouriflies with which the mafters of the pen adorn their pieces, and he will fee, that if thej are eafy and gradual in their flexions, and jufl as intricate as the eye can follow without confuiion, any thing lefs than that is lefs beautiful, and any thing more deftroys the beauty by diforder. I might fliow you how this principle applies to all the art, but fliall only mention com- pofition, where the fimplicity muft be combined with refinement, and when the combination is juft, there refults the moft perfed elegance. Mr Ho- garth adds quantity ; that a thing having the other qualities, pleafes in proportion as it is great ; as we fay, a magnificent building, where the proportions are truly obferved, but every part is large. I have only to obferve, that Mr Hogarth has very well illuftrated the principles of beauty ; but at the fame time he feems to have introduced two, which belong to other fources of delight, vaz. fitnefs and quantity, as will be fhown afterwards. It is to be obferved, that in the enumeration of the principles of beauty, there are to be found in fome authors things not only different, but oppolite. A French author, not many years ago, to the prin- ciples mentioned by others, adds ftrength, which he illuftrates in this manner : He confiders it as a principle of grace and beapty in motion, and fays that every thing that we do with great difficulty, gnd that feems to require our utmoll effort, is feea Lecl. 16. ELOQUENCE. 311 with uneafincfs, and not with pleafure. For this reafon, he fajs the motions of young people in ge- neral are more graceful than thofe of old ; and agree- ably to this we join the word ease to gracefulnefs as explicatory ^ — a graceful, eafy carriage. With this explication it feems abundantly proper to admit the remark. On the other hand, there are fome who have made comparative weaknefs a principle of beauty, and fay, that the more light and flendt^r any thing is, unlefs it be remarkably weak, it is the more beautiful, and that things remarkably Urong rather belong to another clafs. Thus we fay, a fine, tender, delicate fliape — and, on the contrary, we fay, a ilrong, coarfe, robuil make — a flrong, coarfe, mafculine woman. Perhaps we may recon- cile thefe two, and fay, they are both principles, be- caufe there fliould be juft as much of each as is fuit- able to the thing in queftion, that a perfon may have either too ilrong or too weak a frame, for be- ing efleemed beautiful — that a pillar or dome may be too delicate to be durable, or too ftrong and bulky to be elegant. Again: Many writers, as you have feen, make greatnefs a principle of beauty; yet there are others who make littlenefs one of the conftitucnts'of beau- ty. Thofe who do fo tell us, that /:ft/e is a tern^ of endearment, in every nation and language vec known ; that it is the language of the vulgar, and therefore the undefigned expreflion of nature. They inftance the diminutive appellations wjiich are aUvays ufed in fondling j—j^.VsZv.v, ^-^//c /a, have Dd 2 3^2 LECTURES ON Ltd:. j6* more affeclion, than J^/ius and Jilia — my dear little creature — it is a pretty little thing. To enumerate the fe different appearances, fome, particularly Burke on the Sublime, affirms, that the ideas of fublimity and beauty are ideas of a clafs radically different ; that the firft, fublimity, ultimately arifes from the paflion of terror, and the other from that of love and delight ; he, with a good deal of ingenuity, re- folves all the fources of the fublime into what is either terrible, or allied to this paflion, exciting it either immediately in fome degree, or by alTocia- tion. It is however uncertain, whether we fhould reduce what we receive fo much delight from, to a paflion, which in itfelf, or in its purity, fo to fpeak, is painful. This objection he endeavours to remove, by fhewing that the exercife of all our pafEons in a moderate degree, is a fource of pleafure ; but per- haps we may diftinguifh the ideas of fublime and beautiful, without having recourfe to the paflion of terror at all, by faying, that there is an aiTeclion fuited to ih2 greatnefs of objects, without coniider- ing them as terrible, and that is, veneration : na}^, perhaps v/e may go a little further, and fay, that veneration is the afTeftion truly correfpondent to greatnefs, in innocent creatures, which becomes terror In the guilty. I cannot go through the particulars of Burke's theory. He feems rightly to devide the ideas of fublime and beautiful ; by the union of which, fome have made one thing, otliers direftly its con- trary, to belong to beauty. One thing remarkable in Burke's Efiay is, that he denies proportion to be any of the caufes of beauty, \\dnch yet almoft every LcS:. i6. ELOQUENCE. 315 other writer has enumerated among them; and what he fays of the infinitelj various proportion in plants and animals, feems to be much in fupportof his opinion : yet in works of art, proportion feems of much moment ; and it is difficult to fay to what fource to refer it. I view a building, and if the parts are not in a regular proportion, it otTends mj eye, even though I 'could fuppofe that the difproportioii was voluntary, in order to obtain fome great con- venience. I (houldbe inclined to think, that there are a con- fiderable number of llmple principles, or internal fenfations, that contribute each its prirt in formiiifj our tafte, and are capable of being varioufly combin- ed, and by this combination arc apt to be confounded one with another. One of the moH diftincl and com- plete enumerations, we have in Gerard's EiTay on T&fte, and is as follows : A fenfe of novelty, fublimit y, beauty, imitation, harmony, ridicule, and virtue. I cannot go through all thefe in order, but liiall make a few remarks, and fliow where the diviiion is juil or defective. His diftinguifhing all thefe from one another, is certainly juft ; but there are fome thinp^s that he introduces under wrong heads ; fitnefs, for example, he introduces under the head of beauty ; and this feem.s rather a fource of approbation dif- tin^ Lecl. ^i6. indeed only is their true perfe6lion. The gratifica- tion even of our internal fenfes is highly improved, when united with tafte and eleo-ance ; as the moil delicious food, when ferved up with neatnefs and order, accompained with politenefs of manners, and feafoned with fprightlj conVerfation. In the fame manner, the line arts themfelves acquire a double beauty and higher rellfh, when they are infepara- bly conneded with, and made fubfervient to purity of manners. An admirable poem, or an eloquent difcourfe, or a fine pi ft are, would be ft ill more ex- cellent, if the fubjefl of them were interefling and valuable ; and when any of them are perverted to impious or wicked purpofes, they are juft objects of deteiliation. After having thus attempted the analyiis of the principles of tafle and elegance, I would obferve, that as nature feems to delight in producing many great and different efFefts from fimple caufes, per- haps we may find an ultimate principle that governs all thefe. A French author has written a treatife called the Theory of Agreeable Senfations, in which he fays, that the great principle is, whatever ex- ercifes our faculties, without fatiguing them, gives pleafure ; and that tliis principle may be applied to our bodily form, and to tlie conflitution of our mind, to objefts of external fenfation, to objedf s of tafte, and even to our moral conduct. It may no doubt be carried through the whole of criticifm ; and we may fay, this ftates the bounds between variety and uniformity, fimplicity and intricacy, order, propor- tion, and hcirniony. Le<^. l5. ELOQUENCE. 3x7 Neither would it be difRciilt to fliow, that this principle maj be applied to morality, and that an inflnitelj wife and gracious God had fo ordered matters, that the moderate exercife of all our powers fhould produce at once virtue and happinefs, and that the leaft tranfgrefTion of the one mud prove of neceffitj an injury to the other. You may fee from the preceding remarks, that the foundation is laid for tafte in our nature ; yet there is great room for improvement and cultiva- tion ; — by inv^eftigating the grounds of approbation; by comparing one thing with another ; by ftudying the beft examples ; and by refledlion and judgement, men may corred and reiine their tade upon the whole, or upon particular confined fubje£ls. Carrying tafte to a finical nicety in any one branch, is a thing cot only undefirable, but con- temptible; the reafon of which may be eafily feen: when a perfon applies his attention fo much to a matter of no great moment, it occafions a neceiTary negleft of other things of mtich greater value. After you pafs a certain point, attachment to a par- ticular purfait is ufelefs, and then it proceeds to be hurtful, and at lafl ccntcn.ptibie. END OF VOLUME VH. ♦ • p^